351st Bomb Group

1. Roll Call and Assign Aircraft.

   	"A" Group		"B" Group
   Stations	0715		0730
   Engines	0810		0830
   Taxi	0825		0840
   Take-Off	0840		0855
   Return to Base	1403

2. Target for today:
   1. Dock area Emden [Germany]
   2. Any target in Germany.
   3. Eelde [Airfield] (Groningen) [Netherlands]
   Loading: 12 x 500 [lb.] G.P. [General Purpose +] Maximum [# of] M47A1 Incendiaries
3. S-2 [Intelligence] –
4. Navigator:
   1. Wing Rendezvous:
   2. Altitude and time on Oxygen:
   3. Route in, I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run], Return:
   4. C.W. [Combat Wing] dispersal point:
   5. Emergency Fields
5. Weather -
6. Operations -
   1. Wing Formation - Lead - 351st, High - 351st, Low - 401st
      92nd C.W.[Combat Wing] - 3rd, Air Commander - Col. Hatcher.
7. Diversions and other efforts -
   2 CBW's [Combat Wings] from 2nd Division, 2 CBW's from 3rd CBW, both hitting Naval installations at Emden.
   
8. Fighter Cover -
   1. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's 5340-0735E [near Esens, Germany] to target to 5310-0645E [Hoogezand, Netherlands] to limit of range.
      
   2. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's 5310-0645E [Hoogezand, Netherlands] to Coast
      
   3. Type and No. - Area support by six Groups of P-47's covering 2nd & 3rd divisions.
      
9. Special Instructions -
   1. There will be no division commander, each CBW air commander will make his own decisions.
   2. Only specified last resort target in occupied country will be bombed if primary isn't attacked.
   3. Let down headings - Splasher 16 -
    Lead 351st - 350° Mag. [Magnetic Compass heading]
    High 351st - 10° Mag.  Low 401st - 20° Mag.
   4. Deenethorpe [England] = Point X,   Spaulding [England] = Point B,
    Peterborough [England] = Point A,   Louth [England] = Point Z
   
   
   
10. C.O's [Commanding Officer's] Comment -
11. Dismissal of all but Pilots and Co-Pilots

12. 	Call Sign	[Tail] Letter		Flares
    351st Lead Group	Ragweed Red	J		RY [Red Yellow]
    351st High Group	Ragweed Blue	J		G
    401st Low Group	Ragweed White	S		R

    
    

    Spits [Spitfires] -____	Bombers -____		Ground Sector -____
    P-47's - Denver - 2	Bombers - Goldsmith 2-3		Ground Sector - Tack Line

    
    

    VHF Channels		Channel		Ships Monitor
    92nd C.W.		A		All Ships Except
    				Lead Group [Plane #'s]	High Group [Plane #'s]
    Air Commander		B		9849, 5823	9835-Y, 0994
    P-47's		D		9835-N, 9861	9823, 3542

13. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0700 - 1300	RY [Red Yellow]	Z	V
    1300 - 1900	YY	B	C
    1900 - 0100	R-RR	J	D

14. Flying Control - A. Taxi Plan, B. Runways and Taxi Strips, C. Spares
15. Conclusion - Special Briefing

1. Twenty-one aircraft of the Lead Group took off as scheduled for the Mission of 11 December, 1943. The assembly with the High Group was made as planned, while the assembly with the Low Group was made off the English Coast.
2. The briefed flight plan was followed. Three aircraft returned to base before the enemy coast was reached because of mechanical failures.
3. Fifteen aircraft bombed the primary target, while three bombed a target of opportunity when the bombs were prematurely and accidentally released by the Deputy Lead aircraft.
4. The flak encountered in the target area was moderate and accurate. Fighter opposition was slight and did not appear until after the friendly fighter support had withdrawn.
5. The return to base was made without incident. None of our aircraft are missing.

1. The High Group of twenty-one aircraft took off as scheduled at 0840. The group formed at 4,000 feet and went through a hole in the overcast at 6,000 feet. The assembly with the Lead Group was carried out as planned.
2. The Low Group joined the Combat Wing Formation off the English Coast. The briefed course was followed.
3. Two aircraft returned from within England and three returned before the enemy coast was reached.
4. The primary target was attacked by sixteen aircraft. The target was slightly covered by an ineffective smoke screen.
5. Due to failure of the bombsight, it was necessary to release the bombs on the Combat Wing Leader. No sighting operation was performed.
6. The return route was followed without incident. None of our aircraft are missing.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0855 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0925 hours at 3,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 1013 hours at 10,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 1028 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1131 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 10/10ths. Tops 9,500 feet.
      2. Visibility 2 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude NOT AT ALTITUDE OVER ENGLAND.
   7. Means of navigation over England. - GEE - PILOTAGE
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. - AIR PLOT – GEE
   9. Joined task force at 1245 hours at 54°00'N-07°30'E
   10. Departed English Coast at 1031 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1301 hours.
   12. Fighter rendezvous:
       1. Going in: 1250 hours.
       2. Coming back: CONTINUES hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 83 degrees.
       2. 62 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: AIR PLOT – GEE
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP at 1305 hours.
       2. Mag heading over Target 160 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 23,000 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1311 hours.
       5. Method of target Identification and weather over target: VERY HAZY – VISUAL IDENTIFICATION SMOKE SCREEN
       6. Difficulties encountered with Radio, Compass, and special equipment: NONE
   15. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix 54°05'N-04°34'E B PULSE LOP & DR GS USED TO OBTAIN FIX.
       2. Time 1207 hours.
   16. Comments: “GEE” – XF – RF UNIT #24 WAS USELESS.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0840 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0905 hours at 2,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 1015 hours at 10,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 1039 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1122 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 10/10ths. Tops 10,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 30 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude_____degrees. _______ knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. GEE AND SPLASHER BEACONS
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. GEE
   9. Joined task force at ____ hours at _____________
   10. Departed English Coast at 1039 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1304 hours.
   12. Fighter rendezvous:
       1. Going in: 1243 hours.
       2. Coming back: 0 hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 60 degrees.
       2. 50 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: BY GEE
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP at 1308 hours.
       2. Mag heading over Target 190 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 24,000 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1312 hours.
       5. Method of target Identification and weather over target: PINPOINT FROM IP - C.A.V.U. [Ceiling & Visability Unlimited] OVER TARGET
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, Compass, and special equipment: FLUXGATE COMPASS STUCK EVERY SO OFTEN ON A HEADING – SLOW MOVING ON TURN.
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix 53°54'N-03°38'E
       2. Time 1152 ½ hours.
   17. Comments:

Group 351st “A”

Target Emden, Germany

Method of bombing Group

Altitude 22,500 ft.

Wind Direction 82° - 71 MPH

Direction of Attack 153° True

1. The 351st “A” Box leading the 92nd Combat Wing reached the IP at 1305. The turn on course was made by the pilot and slightly past the IP.
2. No difficulty was encountered in locating the aiming point due to good visibility and an ineffective smoke screen. Upon engaging the directional clutch the C-1 autopilot became most erratic which necessitated that it be disengaged.
3. The PDI on the pilot’s instrument panel was noted to be erratic and oscillation required that the bombardier direct the pilot by inter-phone for the approach.
4. Synchronization was on at bomb release but slightly to the right of the ordered M.P.I. due to lack of time to execute proper corrections by this method.
5. The Group leader sighted for range and deflection. Deputy Group leader accidentally released early and two aircraft released on his bombs.

Group 351st “B”

Target Emden, Germany

Method of Bombing Group

Altitude 24,000 ft.

Wind direction 82° - 71 MPH

Direction of Attack 153° True

1. The 351st “B” Box flying the High position of the 92nd Combat Wing reached the IP with bombing interval at 1306. The rate end of the bombsight was observed to be sluggish before reaching the IP.
2. At the turn on course for the target the disc was observed to have stopped turning.
3. Upon attempting to re-engage the disc it was found to be frozen; Apparently from a Vapor-lock. The Lead Bombardier directed the pilot to a Wing formation so as to bomb on the Combat Wing leader.
4. Bombs were released on the Combat Wing leader with a 7-second time delay due to time lag in flight.
5. No sighting operation was performed.

1. The Group lead took off on schedule, but the assembly over the field was delayed by the fact that the ships following required longer to become airborne because of the ice on the perimeter and runway.
2. After forming the group we left the field, climbing on course toward a hole in the overcast. However, we were unable to take full advantage of the small break in the overcast as we were behind schedule and it was necessary to enter the clouds on instruments.
3. After climbing above the overcast we found that our Group was scattered so a reassembly was started in the vicinity of Peterborough at 10,000 feet. At this point the high group joined the Combat Wing formation.
4. From Peterborough we followed the flight plan, leaving the departure point eleven minutes late. Shortly after leaving the departure point we executed a 360° turn to allow the 401st Group to join the Combat Wing formation.
5. After climbing to altitude on course to DR [Dead Reckoning] point, the C-1 was set up and functioned satisfactorily. Near the DR point we spaced ourselves behind the combat wing which was supposed to be behind our combat wing, and followed them to the IP [Initial Point of bomb run].
6. At the IP the bombardier took over, but it was found that the C-1 was not functioning properly so a run on manual was attempted. This, too, was impossible, so the run was made on course correction on interphone.
7. Reassembly and return to base were made without incident.

1. We took off as scheduled at 0840 hours and formed over the field at 4000 feet. The overcast was at 6000 feet, but we found a hole and proceeded to go through. The High Squadron fell out of formation as we came through, but caught up within a few minutes.
2. We took our place in the Wing Formation as we left the English Coast. We found the climb a little slow but otherwise the trip over was airtight.
3. As we approached the target, the bombardier told me the bombsight was out of commission. We tried to call the Deputy Leader but received no answer. We then flew abreast of the Low Group and bombed on the Combat Wing Leader.
4. Flak was moderate at the target. No enemy fighters were encountered.

Bombardier - Captain Watts, E.L.   Pilot - Captain Oldham, O. Navigator - Captain Maze, C.L.
Aircraft # 42-37827  Take-off - 0855  Landed - 1446
Objective - Emden, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - As Ordered
Initial Point - 53°39'N - 07°36'E
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Planes in Group - 18    Composite Group -
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations -
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own sighting operation -
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - 1   Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group - 1    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes - M-43 500lb. G.P.[General Purpose]
Number of Bombs Loaded - 262 x 500 per A/C [Sic]    Released - 12 x 500
Fusing, Nose - 1/10    Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Target Area
Mean Temp. Metro -22 Actual -22
Winds - Altitude - 23,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 60° Actual 82°  Velocity - Est. 70 MPH Actual 71 MPH  Temp C. - Est. -40° C. Actual -40° C. Note: Entire Group released on Group Leader.

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Tyman, J.T.  Pilot - 1st Lt. Cruthirds, L.E. Navigator - 2nd Lt. Sullivan, E.L.
Aircraft # 42-37825  Take-off - 0840  Landed - 1502
Objective - Emden
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - As Ordered
Initial Point - 53°39'N - 07°36'E
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Planes in Group - 16    Composite Group -
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations -
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own sighting operation -
Deflection and Range sighting, Group -    Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group -    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes -
Number of Bombs Loaded - 798 x 100 Lb. IB's [Incendiary Bombs]    Released - 672 x 100
Fusing, Nose - Instantaneous    Tail -
Synchronization -

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Good
Mean Temp. Metro -22 Actual -22
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 60° Actual 82°  Velocity - Est. 70 Actual 71  Temp C. - Est. -40° C. Actual -40° C. Note: Entire Group released on Combat Wing Leader.

1. The target was at Emden, Germany and photo coverage was poor. A smoke screen in the target area was only fifty per cent effective, but heavy smoke in the center of the city makes damage assessment difficult.
2. There were fourteen cameras on the mission; one camera aborted, one camera had a malfunction, six cameras froze due to extreme temperature, and there were six cameras making pictures.
3. Camera SAV 351-124 shows bombs away and locates the city of Emden. There were several fires in the heart of the city, and a bomb pattern is seen at the extreme edge of the outer harbor area. Picture No. 4 shows an enlargement of this pattern with some bursts in the water.
4. Other SAV pictures locate bursts of individual ships around the outskirts of the city.

1. The target for 11 December, 1943 was the port area and industrial section of Emden, Germany. Bombing results were unobserved generally because of smoke and haze at the target. Photographic evidence is not available.
2. Twenty-one (21) A/C were dispatched as lead box of the CW, of which fifteen bombed the primary target, three dropped bombs short of the target when the deputy leader accidentally released bombs prematurely, two A/C returned from a point about 50 miles past the English Coast and brought back their bombs, and one A/C jettisoned its bombs in the Channel about ten minutes further on course. These last three A/C returned because of mechanical difficulties. This box suffered no plane losses.
3. About five E/A were seen just past the target area, an ME-210, a JU-88, and a few ME-109’s and FW-190’s, and a few passes were made from the tail below after the fighter escort left the bomber formation. Fighter support was good to the target, but was non-existent after bombs were dropped. There is one claim for an E/A destroyed. There was one man wounded by flak.
4. This box, flying at 25,500 feet, first encountered flak over Langeoog Island at 1305 hrs. It was meager and inaccurate. Flak at the target at 1310 hrs. was moderate and accurate and black, white, and red in color. Meager, accurate flak, apparently fired in predicted concentrations was encountered at Groningen and at Leeuwarden.
5. The weather over the target area was clear except for a ground haze. 8 to 10/10 clouds were present over the Channel and the North Sea, but they dissipated themselves at about six degrees east.
6. Several A/C of this box reported a B-17 apparently operated by enemy personnel. The markings consisted of a blue “H” in a square on the tail, the call letter “O”, and number 230800. This A/C joined the Group at a point just past the English Coast on the route out and remained with the formation until the enemy coast was reached on the way out. At this point it turned back into enemy territory. It flew in several different places in the formation, possibly to direct flak, and had no gunners at the various gun locations. Its bomb bay doors were never opened. 306th Group does not claim this A/C as one of its ships. An ineffective smoke screen was observed at the target.

1. The target for this date was the Port Area and the City of Emden, Germany. Because of ground haze and smoke in the target area, accurate observation of the bombing was difficult. However, members of some crews believed the bombing was quite fair. At this time photographs for verification of this statement are not available.
2. Twenty-one (21) A/C took off at 0840, nineteen crossing the English Coast and sixteen reaching the target. A/C 778 returned early from directly over the field at 0943 and at an altitude of 12,000 feet because the number one engine went out. A/C 523 turned back at 1022 at an altitude of 13,000 feet in the vicinity of forty miles northwest of the field because he lost the formation in the overcast. A/C 9630 turned back at 1225 and at an altitude of 25,000 feet in the vicinity of 53° 57’ N - 05° 50’ E because of electrical malfunctions. A/C 812 turned back at 1240 at an altitude of 25,000 feet in the vicinity of 54° 19’ N - 06° 31’ E because of failure of the ball turret oxygen system. A/C 857 turned back at 1250 at an altitude of 25,000 feet in the vicinity of 53° 40’ N - 06° 35’ E because of failure of two oxygen systems in the front of the ship. Except for A/C 812, which jettisoned its bombs, all of these A/C returned with their bombs. No planes were lost on this mission, but A/C 151 found it necessary to land at Warboys on the return flight because the fuel feed was not functioning properly. This A/C later returned to this base.
3. Fighter opposition was very weak not more than six E/A being observed. Most of these were FW 190’s but one ME 109 and one JU 88 were seen. E/A seemed to be concentrating their attacks on lower echelons, only one ME 109 and one FW 190 making passes at this box. There are no combat claims and there are no casualties. The P-47 fighter escort was first seen over the North Sea near the enemy coast but was not seen after a point just before the target area.
4. Flak was first encountered over Langeoog Island; it was moderate and fairly accurate. Moderate and more accurate flak was experienced over the target, black, white, and red bursts being seen. At Groningen and Leeuwarden meager and accurate flak was encountered.
5. 8-10/10 clouds were over the channel and the North Sea up to a point north of the western end of the Frisian Islands; north of Emden the sky had cleared altogether. The target area was clear except for ground haze.
6. Smoke screens were seen on the north side of the city and on the south side of the bay but they were not very effective.

Target - Emden, Germany.
1. Route followed. - East end of Langeoog Island - Esens - target - 2 mi. S. of Nieuwe Schans - Texel.
2. Visibility at Target. - Good visibility - No contrails.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 18
4. General Axis of attack. - 226° True
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 50 seconds
6. Turn after bombing. - Left turn to due north.
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Lead Group of 92nd CBW.
8. What evasive action was taken? - Right and left turns of 5 degrees.
9. A short description of Flak en route. - Our formation flying at 23,500 feet first encountered meager, inaccurate flak over Langeoog Island at 1303; it was to the right and behind our formation. Meager flak was observed some distance to our left at Aurich. At the target flak was moderate and accurate; black, white, and red bursts were observed. Intensity of bursts increased slightly as our formation left the target. At Groningen a moderate accurate predicted concentration was encountered; three distinct salvoes of about 20 bursts each were fired. At Leeuwarden another predicted concentration was encountered, consisting of six salvoes of 10 bursts each.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. - None

Target - Emden, Germany.
1. Route followed. - Middle of Langeoog Island - Esens - target - 3 mi. SW of Nieuwe Schans - Leeuwarden - center of Vlieland Island.
2. Visibility at Target. - Good visibility. No contrails.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 16
4. General Axis of attack. - 226° True
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 50 seconds.
6. Turn after bombing. - Left turn to 185° true.
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: High Group of 92nd CBW.
8. What evasive action was taken? - Right and left turns of 5 degrees.
9. A short description of Flak en route. - Our formation flying at 25,000 feet first encountered flak over Langeoog Island at 1306; it was meager and fairly accurate. At the target at 1312, moderate accurate flak, apparently continuous following, was observed; black and red bursts were reported, and also some white bursts high, at about 30,000 feet. Meager, fairly accurate flak was encountered at Groningen and at Leeuwarden; there were indications of predicted concentrations at both points, with clusters of 10 – 12 bursts at Leeuwarden.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. - None.

1. Following are the comments made by crew members during the interrogation of this date:
A/C 849V [42-39849 - The Sqdn. Letter was later changed to "K"]: Should have walk around bottles on ship. First aid kit was missing. – Lt. Kogelman.
A/C 835N [42-39835]: Would like to have type mikes that fit inside masks. – entire crew.
A/C 0499 [42-30499]: Please, some good anti-freeze for windows. – Lt. Hansen.
A/C 9861 [42-29861]: What should we do in the case of an unidentified, probably enemy B-17? - Lt. Cannon.
A/C 831H [42-29831]: Several ships bombed before lead ship just before target so that bombs fell in open field. – entire crew.
A/C 877X [42-29877]: Can’t we know numbers and letters of Groups flying on a mission, so we can fire at any Germans flying B-17’s? - T/Sgt. Michel. More emergency oxygen - Lt. Sherman.
[Signed:] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. The following comments were made at interrogation of this date:
A/C 834-F [42-39834]: The driver insisted on taking whole crew to drying room first. – Lt. Mears.
A/C 3542 [42-3542]: Notify the navigators of all ships when departing base, by some visible means. – Lt. Perle.
A/C 780-G [42-37780]: Suggest oxygen be piped from floor in waist; reason: the hose curls up in present position. – Sgt. Gilson. Lead ship doors not opened soon enough. – Lt. Wood. Top Turret still frosts inside. – Sgt. Soderling. Wash the windows. – Lt. Shwayder.
[Signed:] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-29882, 508th Squadron, returned early because of mechanical failure of #1 Engine.
   2. Airplane No. 42-5823, 508th Squadron, returned early because of mechanical failure of #4 Engine.
   3. Airplane no. 42-39853, 510th Squadron, returned early because of Oxygen regulator leak in Navigator’s compartment.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 42-237731, 508th Squadron. One flak hole in top of LM stabilizer, causing damage to stringers. One flak hole in bottom LM outboard wing panel. One flak hole through dorsal fin. One flak hole through navigator’s window.
   2. Airplane no. 42-29654, 508th Squadron. One flak hole through vertical stabilizer. One flak hole through nose section.
   3. Airplane No. 42-30780, 509th Squadron. One 1” flak hole in bottom of left stabilizer.
   4. Airplane No. 42-29848, 510th Squadron. One flak hole through trailing edge of LM outboard wing panel and aileron.
   5. Airplane No. 42-39825, 511th Squadron. One flak hole in dorsal fin. One flak hole in vertical stabilizer. One .50 cal. Hole on LM side of fuselage rear of waist window.

1. Abortives:
   1. Aircraft No. 42-29630, 509th Squadron, returned early because of complete failure of electrical system. Investigation disclosed four burned out generators.
   2. Aircraft No. 42-3523, 510th Squadron, returned early because of Pilot not being able to locate formation.
   3. Aircraft No. 42-39778, 511th Squadron, returned early because of internal failure of #1 Engine.
   4. Aircraft No. 42-29812, 509th Squadron, returned early because a leak in the ball turret oxygen system had drained all the oxygen from one side of the ship.
   5. Aircraft No. 42-39857, 511th Squadron, returned early because of failure of the oxygen system in the front of the ship.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Aircraft No. 42-29863, 509th Squadron. One 1” flak hole under left waist window.

1. Following are the malfunctions as determined by interrogation:
   1. A/C 827 J [42-37827]: Right Top Turret malfunction. [Bad solenoid - written in]
   2. A/C 7731 [42-37731]: Left chin turret would not go into battery. [Relay switch inoperative - written in.]
   3. A/C 0780 [42-30780]: Left nose gun is hard to hand charge.
   4. A/C 849 V [42-39849 - The 351st book and "The B-17 Flying Fortress Story" both show the plane letter as "K"]: Chin turret sight radicals were out. Toggle switch was out.
   5. A/C 761 D [42-39761]: Left tail gun went out.
   6. A/C 831 H [42-29831]: Pawl arm feed in upside down on both tail guns.
   7. A/C 0499 [42-30499]: Tail and nose fuses loose – had to tighten up when pulled pins.
   8. A/C 848 F [42-29848]: Intervalometer set at minimum – clicked off all right, but only seven bombs went out.
   9. A/C 835 N [42-39835]: Tail guns froze. Right waist gun mount has a wing nut off.

1. 1. The following malfunctions were reported by the High Group after the mission of this date:
   1. A/C 948 B [42-29948]: TG [Tail Gun] has third position stoppage. Ejector does not operate properly. [malfunction - written in]
   2. A/C 994 T [42-30994]: Left nose gun sear was worn down, or trigger bar bent. [adapter - written in]; RTG [Right Tail Gun] froze.
   3. A/C 714 T [42-37714]: One gun thrown overboard, in preparation for ditching.
   4. A/C 834 F [42-39834]: A-2 release malfunctioned. Had to salvo. Bomb rack malfunction - written in]
   5. A/C 780 G [42-37780]: Chin turret feed belt does not stay in position.
   6. A/C 7845 [42-37845]: LWG [Left Waist Gun] out. [LWG spacer on trigger bar extension missing - written in]
   7. A/C 7825 [42-37825]: Bomb sight froze up; had to bomb on Low Group. Intervalometer didn’t work. [Bomb rack malfunction - written in]

1. The following malfunctions were reported upon the completion of the Mission of 11 December, 1943:
   1. A/C 42-37827 – Right top turret, bad solenoid.
   2. A/C 42-37731 – Left chin turret, relay switch malfunction.
   3. A/C 42-29848 – Intervalometer malfunction.
2. The proper repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The following malfunctions were reported upon the completion of the Mission of 11 December, 1943:
   1. a. A/C 42-29948 – Tail gun, ejector malfunction.
   2. b. A/C 42-30994 – Left nose gun adapter worn.
   3. c. A/C 42-39834 – Bomb rack malfunction.
   4. d. A/C 42-37845 – Left waist gun, spacer on trigger bar extension missing.
   5. e. A/C 42-37825 – Bomb rack malfunction.
2. 2. The proper repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported the following expenditure for the Mission of 11 December, 1943:
a. Fifty Caliber Ammunition – 5,245 Rounds.
b. 500 lb G.P. Bombs – 288 (Of which 12 were jettisoned)
[Signed:] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer