351st Bomb Group

[Notes:] Breakfast - 03:30
   Briefing - High - 04:30 Low - 05:30

1. (a) Roll Call and Assign Aircraft.

   		High Group	Low Group
   (b) Stations		0700	0720
   (c) Engines		0800	0820
   (d) Taxi		0810	0830
   (e) Take-Off		0825	0845
   (f) Return to Base		1435
   (g) C.O's Comment

2. Target for today:
   Primary - Bremen - Center of town.
   [Secondary] Wilhelmshaven - Dock Area
   Last Resort - Any German City positively identified that can be bombed without disrupting fighter support.
   
   Loading: Maximum [number of] M47A-1 Incendiaries
3. S-2 [Intelligence] –
4. Navigator:
   1. Wing Rendezvous:
   2. Altitude and time on Oxygen:
   3. Route in, I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run], Return:
   4. C.W. [Combat Wing] dispersal point:
   5. Emergency Fields
5. Weather -
6. Operations -
   1. Wing Formation - Lead - 401st, High - 351st, Low - 351st
      94th C.W.[Combat Wing] - 3rd, Air Commander ____.
7. Diversions and other efforts -
   One Wing of Typhoons will attack airdromes in the Venlo & Deelen [Netherlands] at about same time bombers depart English Coast.
   2nd & 3rd Bomb Divisions on same target following 1st Division.
   
   
   
8. Fighter Cover -
   1. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-47's 5308-0450E [Texel Island, Netherlands] to limit [of range].
      
   2. Type and No. - 2 Groups of P-47's 5305-0550E [Grou, Netherlands] to limit.
      
   3. Type and No. - 2 Groups of P-47's 5300-0656E [20 mi. SE of Groningen, Netherlands] to limit.
      
   4. Type and No. - 1 Group of P-38's 5258-0800E [15 mi. SW of Oldenburg, Germany] to target to limit.
      
   5. Type and No. - Spitfires on withdrawal if necessary.
      Watch for P-51's supporting 2nd & 3rd division instead of P-38's.
9. Special Instructions -
   1. Vertical stills [pictures] will be taken of enemy coast in & out and the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] regardless of cloud cover. All ships with cameras. Sgt.Henderson [Photographer] in [plane #] 9499 - 2nd Briefing.
   2. Drop bombs only in Germany.
   3. Bombing is planned for P.F.F. [Pathfinder Force Aircraft] but be prepared for visual bombing.
   4. Radio discipline.
   5. If fighters are needed on withdrawal call leader of group or deputy and have him call for Spits [Spitfires].
   6. PFF [Pathfinder Force aircraft] code word for I.P.: Boxmore.
   Start descent after crossing coast going out. Bomber strike [message] to be sent by High [Group].
10. C.O's [Commanding Officer's] Comment -
11. Dismissal of all but Pilots and Co-Pilots

12. 	Call Sign	[Tail] Letter		Flares
    94th C.W. [Combat Wing]	Ragweed			RY [Red Yellow]
    401st Group	Ragweed White	S		RY
    351st High Group	Ragweed Red	J		G
    351st Low Group	Ragweed Blue	J		R
    351st Weather Ship	Ragweed Purple
    Air Commander	Little Man
    40th C.W.	Bullpen			YY
    41st C.W.	Fatgal			GG

    
    

    Spits [Spitfires] - Bookshelf		Bombers - Cheeky		Ground Sector - Large Type
    P-47's - Denver One		94th Bombers - Goldsmith 1-3		Ground Sector - Tackline

    
    

    VHF Channels		Channel		Ships Monitor
    94st C.W.		A		All [planes] except as noted.
    Air Commander		B		High- 823-O, 853-P, Low- 857-H, 858-G [Monitor] as soon as in formation.
    Spits [Spitfires]		C		High- 192-R, 781-D, Low- 832-N, 831-H, Start monitoring at Zero + 55 [minutes].
    P-47's		D		High- 762-D, 848-F, Low- 834-F, 835-Y, [Monitor] upon departing English Coast.

13. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0700 - 1300	GY [Green Yellow]	B	D
    1300 - 1900	RY	V	M

14. Flying Control - A. Taxi Plan, B. Runways and Taxi Strips, C. Spares
15. Conclusion -
    400 Gals. in Tokio tanks.
    Fly a good formation.
    Watch VHF talk - breaches will be investigated - Use Point Letters.
    Clean up ship & take care of guns.
    If overcast let down on Splasher 16 - High Group heading - 40° mag.[magnetic compass heading] Low 20° mag.
    Assembly - High 16,000' - Turn 7,000', Low 14,000' - Turn 6,000'
    Remember Winds
    Take Off - Turn right to 20° after 2 minutes - High Group - Low Group 30 sec.
    Climb with 38" [Intake Manifold Pressure] & 2,300 R.P.M. - 150 IAS [Indicated Air Speed]
    Leader will circle with wheels down.

1. The 351st High Group took off at 0825 and climbed individually to 1600 feet over Splasher 16 where assembly was made without difficulty.
2. A group passed under a few minutes early at Splasher 16 and was not followed. It is presumed that this group was the lead box. The High Box departed on course to Deenethorpe. The VHF conversation from the Lead Box announced the Lead Box’s position as over Deenethorpe on time but the High Box was still unable to pick up the Lead Box although visibility was unlimited.
3. The High Box then continued on the flight plan hitting Melton Mowbray, then Sleaford on time. We were two minutes early at King’s Lynn so a 360° turn was made there to join the Lead Box which again announced it was on time. No rendezvous was possible at this point. Cromer was reached one minute early, but only one other group was there, the Low Box, also of the 351st.
4. The VHF again announced the Lead Group’s intention to make a 360° circle at the coast to pick up the High and Low Boxes, but it was still out of view. Two circles were made here and finally both High and Low boxes took off on course, the Low Box in the rear. Final wing assembly was over Texel Island in another 360° turn. Close wing formation was attained just past the Zuider Zee.
5. Bombing by this box was visual. Hits are believed to be left of the MPI and in the city.
6. Six attacks were made on this formation by enemy aircraft. Use of rocket guns was reported. The fighter support afforded by the P-47’s and P-38’s was excellent.
7. Flak encountered in the target area was intense and accurate. However no battle damage from flak was sustained by this combat box.
8. A/C 42-5756 returned early because of a #2 engine failure. A/C 42-30780 returned early because the #2 cylinder and exhaust stack were blown. A/C 42-39853 returned early because of a runaway propeller governor on the #2 engine. A/C 42-29849 returned early because of #3 engine failure. A/C 42-29877 returned early because a crew member became ill. A/C 42-29749 returned early because the pilot made a faulty judgment of the fuel consumption shortly before reaching the target area.
9. There were no casualties suffered by this Combat Box in aircraft or crew members.
10. All of our aircraft have returned to base.

1. The Low Box took off at 0845 and formed at 14,000 feet over Splasher 16 within a very short time. The Lead Box was scheduled to pass over Splasher 16 on course to Deenethorpe. However, no box except the high, which was at 16,000 feet was seen. One additional 360° turn was made in an attempt to pick up the Lead Box. However, by VHF from the Lead Box, our Low Box leader heard that the Lead Box was over Deenethorpe and turning to Melton Mowbray. The course flown should have intercepted the Lead Box at Sleaford but Wing assembly was not made.
2. The climb was made faster than normal in order to have some leeway in case the Lead Box had too much of a lead when finally formed. Also a high bank of cloud off Cromer confirmed the leader’s choice in the positive need of a climb to get on top. At Cromer, our Low Box formed on the 351st High Box and made two circles in an effort to pick up the Lead Box. After the last turn, a group was seen about ten (10) miles to the south on a course of approximately 120°. Since the briefed course was 90°, this group was not followed but a course for Texel Island was taken up. At this point, the Lead Box, which had been this group to the south, started a 360° turn to the left, finally picking up the High and Low Boxes. Close Wing formation was attained after passing the Zuider Zee.
3. This group bombed second and results are believed to have been excellent, and on MPI.
4. Flak was heavy and accurate, one man being seriously wounded. One aircraft developed a runaway prop which finally fell off and through terrific vibration, caused the pilot to lose control. The bombardier bailed out just west of the IP. At an altitude of 2,500 feet, the plane was finally brought under control in the flak area south of Emden, where the radio operator was hit very seriously in the upper thigh. He became delirious and finally jumped out of the waist. Both, Bombardier and Radio Operator parachuted safely to earth. The aircraft returned to base.
5. Light attacks were made by enemy aircraft. The policy appeared to be one of flying low and waiting for stragglers. Rocket guns were observed being fired at other formations. Fighter support was very good.
6. A/C 42-30866 returned early because excessive battle damage had knocked out the #3 engine. Lost prop and cowling from one engine. A/C 42-30994 returned early because four crew members passed out due to a reported lack of oxygen. Investigation disclosed no failures of any kind. A/C 42-29831 returned early because of #1 supercharger failure. A/C 42-39834 returned early because of an oxygen leak in the navigator’s compartment. A/C 42-29630 failed to take off because of a flat tire received while taxiing. A/C 42-39780 failed to take off because the #3 supercharger regulator was out.
7. 7A/C 42-6151 landed at West Raynham for refueling. A/C 42-29812 landed at Ludham with two engines out and a flat tire.
8. None of our aircraft are missing.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0826 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0930 hours at 16,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 1050 hours at 22,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 1050 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1121 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 3 /10ths. Tops 14,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 8 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude ____ degrees. ____knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England.
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. GEE
   9. Joined task force at 1050 hours at 22,000 feet.
   10. Departed English Coast at 1042 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1121 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: 1121 hours.
       2. Coming back: ____ hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 260 degrees.
       2. 78 knots per hour.
       3. How determined:
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 1157 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 39 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 27,200 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1206 hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: VISUAL IDENTIFICATION. NO CLOUDS. SMOKE OBSCURED VISION.
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: RADIO COMPASS MEACONED [receiving false signals] TILL 4° E COMING BACK. GEE WIRING OUT OF COMMISSION AT TIMES. RECEIVED RADIO OPERATORS TRANSMISSION ON GEE.
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix 55°05’N - 05°10’E
       2. Time 1129 hours.
   17. Comments:

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0845 hours.
   2. Group formed at SPL. 16 hours at 14,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 1013 hours at 18,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0957 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1127 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 6 /10ths. Tops 12,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 5 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 328 degrees. 37 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. RADIO, GEE, and D.R.[Dead Reckoning]
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. GEE
   9. Joined task force at 1107 hours at ____ feet.
   10. Departed English Coast at 1051 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1127 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: ____ hours.
       2. Coming back: ____ hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 280 degrees.
       2. 64 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: PILOTAGE, BOMBSIGHT
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP at 1200 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 50 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 25,400 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1204 hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: PILOTAGE – TARGET WAS PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY INEFFECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN. CLOUDS ABOUT 3/10 IN VICINITY OF TARGET AREA, TARGET CLEAR.
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: SPLASHER #16 APPEARED TO BE MEACONED [receiving false signals]. SPLASHER #5 APPEARED TO BE MEACONED.
   16. Gee:
       1. (1) Coordinates of furtherest fix 54°00’N - 04°30’E
       2. (2) Time 1323 hours.
   17. Comments:

1. The 351st "A" Group, flying in the high position of the 94th Combat Wing, reached the IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 1200 hours. Visual Bombing was ordered via VHF [Very High Frequency radio transmission].
2. The Bombardier took control of the aircraft after the IP was reached. A smoke screen and bomb bursts from previous Groups obscured the ordered Aiming Point.
3. Prop Wash was encountered with no harmful results. Intense Flak was encountered on the bombing run.
4. The Lead Bombardier sighted for range and deflection while the Deputy Lead Bombardier sighted for range only.

1. Take-off was according to schedule. I climbed on a heading of 20° up to 8,000 feet, turned around, and headed for Splasher 16, reaching the Splasher at the proper altitude. No trouble was encountered in forming. The entire group was formed in twenty-five minutes after I reached the Splasher.
2. We proceeded from Splasher 16, following the briefed flight plan and made all points good and on time with the exception of Cromer, at which point we were one minute early.
3. At Cromer the group made a 360° turn on orders of the Combat Wing Leader, but we did not pick him up.
4. At mid-Channel we began to pick up the Combat Wing Leader but he made a 360° at the enemy coast. From there into the target the formation was fair. It got progressively better in the target area.
5. During bombing our formation was very good. We bombed on C-1.
6. After bombing, we lost the Combat Wing Leader in a shuffle with another Combat Wing. We had to fly out past the target too long because of another Combat Wing on our left. We proceeded back to England with the Wing that had cut us out.
7. There were few attacks on our group by fighters, but the flak was very heavy.
8. We followed the briefed flight plan back to base.

1. The Group assembly was a little slow, but was accomplished in plenty of time to leave Splasher 16 on time.
2. Wing assembly was performed just off the enemy coast. In spite of constant communication with the lead group all along the Combat Wing and Division assembly lines, we did not see the Combat Wing Leader until approximately mid-Channel. At this point the Combat Wing Leader made a 360° turn, and a fair Combat Wing was formed. From then until the I.P. was reached the Combat Wing formation got progressively better.
3. On the bombing run a Combat Wing of the Third Division cut us off and forced us to take the outside of the turn on leaving the target. This separated us from our own Combat Wing and forced us to fly the let-down with the combat wing which had cut us off.
4. Fighter opposition was moderate; and flak was intense and accurate in the target area.
5. Arriving at the coast of England, we left the formation and proceeded direct to the field.

Bombardier - 1st Lt. J.W. Smith  Pilot - 1st Lt N.M. Lynch Navigator - Capt. W. Stockman
Aircraft # 42-29925  Take-off - 0825  Landed - 1526   Organization - 351st "A"
Objective - Bremen, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - As Ordered
Initial Point - 52°58'N - 08°00'E (Near Garrel)
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Planes in Group - 13    Composite Group -
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations - 2
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - 1    Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group - 1    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes - M-47A-1
Number of Bombs Loaded - 42 per A/C    Released - 545
Fusing, Nose - Instantaneous    Tail -
Synchronization - On

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Target Area
Mean Temp. Metro -22°C Actual -21°C
Winds - Altitude - 28,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. Actual  Velocity - Est. Actual 74  Temp C. - Est. . Actual -41° C.

Bombardier - Captain H.H. Wallace  Pilot - 1st Lt D.A. Gaylord Navigator - Capt. C.B. Stackhouse
Aircraft # 42-37825  Take-off - 0845  Landed - 1519   Organization - 351st "B"
Objective - Bremen, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - As Ordered
Initial Point - 52°58'N - 08°00'E (Near Garrel)
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Planes in Group - 13    Composite Group -
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations - One
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - One    Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group - One    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes - M-47A-1
Number of Bombs Loaded - 42 per A/C    Released - 545
Fusing, Nose - Instantaneous    Tail -
Synchronization - On

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - Target Area
Mean Temp. Metro -20°C Actual -20°C
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 260° Actual 260°  Velocity - Est. 90 Actual 74  Temp C. - Est. -44 . Actual -44° C.

1. The target was the warehouse and dock area in the approximate center of the City of Bremen.
2. Photo coverage was fair although heavy smoke from fire and smoke screen partially obscured the target. Five cameras took pictures, two of them showing bombs away. Four camera ships aborted, and five had malfunctions, making a total of fourteen cameras on the mission.
3. SAV 130 taken by ship 3517 in the high group shows bombs away in picture No. 1. The first bursts are seen in picture No. 7. The pattern develops in later photos and measures 3,784’ by 2,322’. This pattern is in the southeastern edge of the city, just short of a large railway junction. The actual MPI is approximately two and a half miles from the intended MPI.
4. SAV 134 taken by ship 6151 in the low group shows bombs away in picture No. 50. A bomb pattern is shown on picture No. 53. Bombs away for this Group is the same spot as the High Group, and the same pattern is shown by both sets of pictures.
5. Other pictures show bursts at different parts of the city, but as no bombs are shown in the air it is impossible to plot these bursts. The northwestern end of the city is on fire and several explosions are seen.

1. The target today was the city of Bremen. Bombing results were good for the High Group. Not all photographic rolls have been developed but the negatives indicated bombs falling in the city area.
2. Seventeen A/C passed the English Coast, thirteen of these bombing the Primary. Two more which took off turned back in England. The four which passed the coast but did not bomb were: A/C 9749, turning back at 1135, 27,000 feet, 53°04’N - 05°47’E., indicated lack of fuel; A/C 853-P, 1130, 27,000 feet, 52°58’N - 04°42’E., oil pressure down on No. 2 engine, runaway prop; A/C 0780, 1010, 17,000 feet, 53°00’N - 01°20’E,. cylinder head out on No. 3 engine; and A/C 849-U, 1125, 24,500 feet, 52°48’N - 03°04’E., No. 3 engine out. The two turning back in England were: A/C 756-R, 0900, 14,000 feet, 5 miles N. of Splasher 16, No. 2 engine failure, and A/C 9877 at 1100, 21,900 feet, Kings Lynn, Tail Gunner became sick. We had no A/C losses.
3. Although as many as 25 E/A were reported from the IP to the target, only six attacks were made on this Group by ME 109’s and FW 190’s. Some ME 210’s and 1 DO 217 and 1 JU 88 were reported lobbing rockets into the formation. There were no claims by this Group and there were no casualties. Fighter support was excellent by P-47’s and P-38’s.
4. Flak was encountered at Texel Island at 1126, meager and inaccurate; at the target at 1200-1209, intense and accurate, and at Neuenbürg and Norderney Island, meager and inaccurate.
5. Weather was good for visual bombing, being never more than 3/10’s in the target area.
6. A smoke screen was active at the target but a high ground wind velocity rendered it mostly ineffective. Smoke screens were also seen at Emden and Wilhelmshaven.

1. The target for this date was the city of Bremen. Observation of the bombing results was difficult, but the photographs show that this Box’s bombs dropped in the city, crossing the railroad tracks in the Eastern side of the city.
2. 17 A/C took off at 0845. A/C 9630 failed to take off, because it blew a tire and ran off the runway. A/C 834-F was forced to turn back at 1045 from the vicinity of Cromer when the Navigator’s oxygen regulator went out and the whole system was drained. A/C 831-N turned back at 1110 at 53°00’N - 04°00’E, when three super-chargers went out. A/C 994-T turned back at 1116 from 53°05’N - 04°6’E, when it was discovered that four men had fainted because of lack of oxygen. A/C 866-S turned back two minutes before the IP when his No. 3 engine was knocked out, causing him to lose altitude. The course to the target was just slightly South of that briefed, a 360° turn being made at the Island of Texel. 13 A/C bombed the target on a Mag. Heading of 39° with bombs away at 1204. The course back to the Base was approximately ten miles North of the briefed course and the formation landed at the home Base at 1510. The Low Box suffered one very seriously wounded man and two men missing. The former is the tail gunner from A/C 7845, who was injured in the head by a 20 mm shell. The two missing men were the Bombardier and the Radio Operator of A/C 866-S. It is believed that the Bombardier mistook the warning signal for the bail-out signal and left the plane about 25 miles SE of Emden; the Radio man was wounded in the leg and bailed out in the vicinity of Zuidlaardermeer Lake. This Box suffered no A/C losses.
3. Approximately 20 to 25 E/A, consisting principally of ME 109’s with a few FW 190’s, JU 88’s, and ME 110’s were reported. Attacks were not heavy, most of the E/A seeming to be staying low to wait for stragglers. No rocket guns were fired against this Box but they were seen being fired at other formations. A few FW 190’s resembling P-47’s in the way they were painted were seen. This Box had four combat claims with preliminary judgment placing them as 3 probables and 1 no claim. Fighter support was very good, especially before the target.
4. A few bursts of flak, poor for height and deflection, were encountered over Texel Island on the way in. Meager flak, too far out of range to the left to have any effect, was observed near Oldenburg. Flak at the target was intense and accurate for both height and deflection, the majority of bursts being black with some white seen high above the Group. On the route out flak from the vicinity of Wilhelmshaven was observed; this was far out of range. A few inaccurate bursts were encountered over the Frisian Islands.
5. Three-tenths clouds were in the target area but visual bombing was possible.

Target - Bremen
1. Route followed. - Texel Island - Cloppenburg - 3 mi. W. of Wallhöfen - 3 mi. W of Varel - Hage - between Juist and Norderney Islands.
2. Visibility at Target. - Good - 2-3/10ths low cloud. Thick, non-persistent contrails.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 13
4. General Axis of attack. - 47 degrees True
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 1 min.
6. Turn after bombing. - Left turn to approximately due North
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: High Group of 94th CBW
8. What evasive action was taken? - Irregular right and left turns, maximum 5 degrees
9. A short description of Flak en route. - At the target, our formation flying at 25,000 feet at 1200-1209 encountered intense black and white flak, accurate for height and deflection; this may have been a barrage. There appeared to be an even greater concentration of bursts at about 23,000 – 26,000 feet, and a barrage of white bursts well above our formation. En route, flak was first encountered over Texel Island at 1126; it was meager and inaccurate, being to the right and behind our formation. Moderate, fairly accurate flak, possibly a predicted concentration, was encountered near Neuenbürg. A few bursts were seen coming from Emden, but our formation was well out of range. Meager inaccurate flak was encountered over Hage Aerodrome. A salvo of 6 inaccurate bursts was fired from Norderney Island at 1237. Meager inaccurate flak was observed at 1246, evidently fired from a ship in the North Sea. A/C 9749, which left the formation over Holland and came back alone, encountered about 20 bursts, accurate for height and deflection, over Egmond at 1128.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. -

Target - Bremen
1. Route followed. - Texel Island - Cloppenburg - Target - 3 miles W of Wallhöfen - 4 miles S. of Varel, between Juist and Norderney Islands.
2. Visibility at Target. - 2-3/10 clouds. Thick, non-persistent contrails starting at 21,000 feet.
3. No. of A/C over Target: 13
4. General Axis of attack. - 50 degrees True
5. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing? - 1 min.
6. Turn after bombing. - Left turn to 3 degrees True
7. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Low Group of 94th CBW
8. What evasive action was taken? - 5° right and left turns
9. A short description of Flak en route. - A few scattered bursts were encountered over Texel Island on the route in. This was inaccurate for both height and deflection. Approaching the target meager flak was observed to the left at Oldenburg. This was estimated as a 10 gun battery, and this group was not within range. In the target area flak was intense for height and deflection. The majority of the bursts were black, but several clusters of white bursts were observed three to four thousand feet above the formation. Meager flak was observed over Wilhelmshaven on the route out, but this group was well out of range. A few inaccurate bursts were seen over Norderney Island.
10. Any other comments, phenomena, etc. - In target area flak bursts were seen that seemed to expand with secondary bursts, which made them larger than normal.

1. The following is a summary of combat crew comments as reported at interrogation:
A/C F-848 [42-29848] Quite bad ice and frost on pilot’s windows and bombardier’s windows, even though window was open. – Lt. Saville.
A/C D-761 [42-39761] P-51’s were coming in too close. Seemed as though they were making an attack. Also they were coming in out of the sun. – All Gunners.
A/C 9860 [42-29860] Overall Division operation was bad. Too much prop wash and one group flew under this one just before bombs away. Wing leading was poor. – Lt. Evans. Food was not good. – EM of crew.
A/C O-823 [42-39823] Formation was poor, never did form wing. – Lt. Bender.
A/C S-824 [42-5824] Too much interchanging of heated equipment. – Lt. Anderson. Complains of 401st formation. – Lt. Anderson.
[Signed:] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. The following is a summary of combat crew comments as reported at interrogation:
A/C N-835 [42-39835] More cookies needed. – EM of Crew.
A/C S-866 [42-30866] We were pulling 2300 RPM, 42 in. of mercury – and still couldn’t keep up. Formation should be slowed down. – Lt. Peters. Flimsy was torn up when we prepared to bail out, so we did not know how to contact fighters. Pilot should be briefed on how to contact them. – Lt. Peters. It would be good if coast were patrolled by fighters. Also, there should be some way of jettisoning side windows. - Lt. Pugsley.
A/C 7774 [42-37774] Lead formation late leaving little time to get into combat formation. – Lt. Logan. No blankets in ship. – Sgt. Capobianco.
A/C 7832 [42-37832] Poor navigational instruments, fluxgate compass. – Lt. Perle.
A/C 0499 [42-30499] ME 110 gunner shot U.S. parachutist. – Sgt. Simons.
A/C G-858 [42-29858] Meals in mess halls are very poor. – All gunners.
[Signed:] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. The following is a summary of hot news as reported at interrogation:
A/C K-093 [42-3093] Flying at 27,000 feet at 1206 hrs., reported a B-17 from the 401st. Group also at 27,000 feet and about 2 minutes after the target on a heading of 207° Mag. completely on fire. No parachutes were seen.
A/C 7774 [42-37774] Flying at 20,000 feet on a heading of 261°, reported seeing a dinghy at an approximate position of 53°08’N - 01°42’E.
A/C H-857 [42-39857] Flying at 25,500 feet, reported seeing 2 B-17’s at 1204 and 1207 respectively having left the formation and burning. The first one was seen still flying level, with no parachutes seen; the second, going down and burning, had 6 parachutes leave it.
A/C G-858 [42-29858] Flying at 26,000 feet at approximately 1206, reported a B-17 leave the formation about 4 minutes on route back, and go down burning with 3 parachutes seen.
[Signed:] John L. Scott, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Abortives.
   1. Airplane No. 42-5756, 509th Squadron, returned early because of #2 engine failure.
   2. Airplane No. 42-30780, 509th Squadron, returned early because of #2 cylinder and exhaust stack blown, on #3 engine. Engine will be changed.
   3. Airplane No. 42-39853, 510th Squadron, returned early because of a runaway propeller on #2 engine. Propeller governor is being changed.
   4. Airplane No. 42-29849, 511th Squadron, returned early because of #3 engine failure.
   5. Airplane No. 42-29877, 511th Squadron, returned early because a crew member became ill.
   6. Airplane No. 42-29749, 509th Squadron, returned early because of insufficient fuel to complete the mission.
2. Battle Damage.
   1. None.

1. Abortives.
   1. Airplane No. 42-30866, 508th Squadron, returned early because of excessive battle damage which knocked out #3 engine.
   2. Airplane No. 42-30994, 508th Squadron, returned early because four crew members passed out for lack of Oxygen according to the pilot’s statement. Investigation disclosed no failure of any kind.
   3. Airplane No. 42-29831, 510th Squadron, returned early because of #1 Supercharger failure.
   4. Airplane No. 42-39834, 511th Squadron, returned early because of Oxygen leakage in the Navigator’s compartment. Investigation revealed a defective Oxygen pressure gauge.
2. Battle damage.
   1. Airplane No. 42-30866, 508th Squadron. Two flak holes in RH stabilizer and elevator. Five flak holes in top of LH wing (inboard and outboard wing panels). One flak hole in leading edge of LH wing between fuselage and #2 nacelle. One flak hole in leading edge of LH stabilizer. One flak hole in bottom of LH inboard wing panel. One flak hole in bottom of RH outboard wing panel. One flak hole in pilot’s window. Two flak holes in LH side of fuselage, rear of waist windows. One flak hole in LH side of fuselage, forward of waist windows. One flak hole through vertical stabilizer. Two flak holes through rudder.
   2. Airplane No. 42-6151, 508th Squadron. One .50 cal. hole through cowl flap and ring cowl on #4 engine.
   3. Airplane No. 42-37832, 509th Squadron. One shell case hole through RH elevator. One shell case hole in LH aileron. One shell case hole in top of LH inboard wing panel near fuselage.
   4. Airplane No. 42-30499, 509th Squadron. Two .50 cal. Holes through RH stabilizer and elevator.
   5. Airplane No. 42-37845, 509th squadron. One 20 mm. hole in tail gun enclosure. One 20 mm. hole through outboard wing panel.
   6. Airplane No. 42-3093, 510th Squadron. One flak hole on LH side of ring cowling on #2 engine.
   7. Airplane No. 42-39857, 511th Squadron. One flak hole in LH side of tail gunner’s compartment. One flak hole in leading edge of RH outboard wing panel. One flak hole in top of #2 nacelle.

1. The following malfunctions and failures were reported upon the completion of the Mission of 20 December, 1943:
   1. 42-29860 Bomb rack malfunction.
   2. 42-31192 Chin turret hydraulic hose broken.
   3. 42-3517 Bomb rack malfunction.
   4. 42-29925 Left waist gun frozen.
   5. 42-29848 Right waist gun frozen.
   6. 42-39853 Left ball turret gun solenoid malfunction. Bomb rack malfunction.
   7. 42-31162 Ball turret creeps down; chin turret sluggish at altitude.
   8. 42-3136 Intervalometer failure.
2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The following malfunctions and failures were reported upon the completion of the Mission of 20 December, 1943:
   1. 42-29858 Tail guns frozen.
   2. 42-37714 Chin turret hydraulic hose broken.
   3. 42-39835 Bomb rack malfunction.
   4. 42-3093 Bomb rack malfunction. Bomb bay door malfunction.
   5. 42-39857 Right inboard rack selector burned out. Fuses loose. Right bombing Control Rod bent.
   6. 42-39780 Bomb rack and bomb bay door malfunctions. [This A/C number is incorrect. According to the "J" Form 42-39780 failed to take off and formation charts do not show that plane number on the mission.]
2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported the following expenditure of ammunition on the Mission of this date: 5890 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported the following expenditure of ammunition on the Mission of this date: 9915 rounds of .50 caliber. (Includes estimated expenditure of 1000 rounds for A/C not yet returned to base.)

1. The following data indicates the disposition of bombs on the Mission of this date:

1. The following data indicates the disposition of bombs on the Mission of this date:

1. Following Deficiencies and Disabilities as determined by interrogation:
A/C 866 [42-30866] Lead in rheostat in upper turret broken. Majority of equipment jettisoned.
A/C 925 [42-29925] Leak in oxygen system. – Lt. Lynch.
A/C 714 [42-37714] Electrical equipment too cold. – Sgt. Lowe.
A/C 858 [42-29858] Malfunction of the rheostat in the ball turret. – Sgt. Dolan.
A/C 823 [42-29823] Left shoe burned out, plug used satisfactorily. – Sgt. Anderson.
A/C 825 [42-37825] Malfunction of rheostat control knob ball turret.
A/C 824 [42-5824] Shoes burned out. – Sgts. Curcio & Sharp.
A/C 517 [42-3517] Electric suits burned out. – Lts. Windes & Light.
A/C N835 [42-39835] O.K.
A/C H857 [42-39857] Left glove too hot. – Sgt. Marison. Suit cord burned out. – Lt. Sheppard.
A/C 860 [42-29860] Suit burned out. – Sgt. Langstaff. Left shoe burned out – Plug in muff used. – Sgt. Swarthout.
[Signed:] Ernest J. Cater, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Group Equipment Officer

Aircraft No. Z-9749 Squadron 509 – High   Pilot - Lt. W. R. Illies
Time of Abortive - 1115  Location when Aborted - 53°07'N - 05°47'E
Reason for Abortive: Indicated lack of fuel
Enemy Opposition Encountered - Some flak over Egmond
[Signed] Walter R. Illies Altitude: 27,000 feet Disposition of Bombs: Salvoed into Channel
Handwritten Addendum: Lt. Illies, 749-Z, [landed at] Nuthampstead, Out of Gas, 1405, Did not get to Target

Aircraft No. 42-30994-T Squadron 508 - Low   Pilot - Lt. Johnson
Time of Abortive - 1116  Location when Aborted - 52°05’N - 04°26’E
Reason - Four men passed out from lack of oxygen.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Lt. Gosta Johnson Altitude: 27,000 feet Disposition of Bombs: Armed

Aircraft No. P-9853 Squadron 510 – High   Pilot - Lt. Winton
Time of Abortive - 1130  Location when Aborted - 52°58’N - 04°42’E
Reason for Abortive: Oil pressure in #2 engine dropped to 15#. Feathering mechanism wouldn’t work and prop ran away except under 135 MPH indicated and it would drop to 1200 RPM then.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - Flak bursts at coast of Holland
[Signed] Bruce F. Winton, 2nd Lt. AC [Air Corps] Altitude: 26,500 feet Disposition of Bombs: Salvoed in North Sea at 1145

Aircraft No. H-9831 Squadron 510 - Low   Pilot - Lt. Eickhoff
Time of Abortive - 1110  Location when Aborted - 53°00’N - 04°00’E
Reason for Abortive: Nos. 1, 2, 3 superchargers would give only 23 inches and No. 3 was vibrating
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] John T. Eickhoff 1st Lt. AC [Air Corps] Altitude: 26,800 feet  Disposition of Bombs: Brought them back

Aircraft No. 42-30780 Squadron 509 (High)   Pilot - Lt. C. T. Dowling
Time of Abortive - 1010  Location when Aborted - 53°00’N - 01°20’W
Reason for Abortive: Cylinder Head #3 engine blown
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Carl T. Dowling Altitude: 16,500 feet Disposition of Bombs: Brought Back

Aircraft No. 42-29849 Squadron 511 (U) High   Pilot - Capt. D. M. Norris
Time of Abortive - 1105  Location when Aborted - 52°48’N - 03°04’E
Reason for Abortive: Lost No. 3 engine
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] [No Signature] Altitude: 24,500 feet Disposition of Bombs: In the Channel

Aircraft No. 42-39834 F Squadron 511 – Low   Pilot - Lt. G. W. Mears
Time of Abortive - 1043  Location when Aborted - Cromer
Reason for Abortive: Navigator’s regulator broke. Entire oxygen system drained out too fast to remain at altitude for entire flight. No. 2 supercharger ran away & couldn’t stay in formation.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] G. W. Mears Altitude: 16,000 feet  Disposition of Bombs: Returned

Aircraft No. 42-29877 – X Squadron 511 High   Pilot - Lt. L. J. Maginn
Time of Abortive - 1126  Location when Aborted - Kings Lynn
Reason for abortive: Tail gunner sick – unable to continue mission. Tail gunner claimed he was unable to leave tail when pilot told him to go to waist.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] Lewis J. Maginn Altitude: 22,000 feet Disposition of Bombs: Pins were replaced

Aircraft No. 42-5756 Squadron 509 (R) High   Pilot - Lt. L. L. Lewis
Time of Abortive - 0900  Location when Aborted - 52°20’N - 00°05’W
Reason for Abortive: #2 engine failure – Steady loss of oil from #2.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - X X
[Signed] Lloyd L. Lewis, 2nd Lt., AC [Air Corps] Altitude: 13,000 feet Disposition of Bombs: Brought Back

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing] Lead Box
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 3517–O, 9849–V, 1192–R	(3)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 9860–W, 0780–T, 5756–R, 9749–Z	(4)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 9925–L, 9823–O, 9853–P, 9763–D, 9848–F	(5)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 7780–G, 9849–U, 9877–X, 5824–S, 9761–D, 3136–P, 1162–V	(7)
   b. Low Box
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 9858–G, 6151–M, 7774–N, 0866–S, 0944–T	(5)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 0499–Q, 9812–U, 9630–S, 7845–F, 7832–N	(5)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 9780–S, 9835–N, 3093–K, 7714–T, 9831–H	(5)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 7825–Q, 9857–H, 9834–F, 9835–Y	(4)

2. Target: GR-3586
   
3. W/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 Call Sign	JMX Daisy Chain		Squadron	510 Call Sign	TJS Paramount
   Squadron	509 Call Sign	MLW Riding Whip		Squadron	511 Call Sign	WYG Thick Frost

4. High Box: Taxi – 0810;     Take-Off – 0825;     E.T.D. Over Field – 0825
5. Low Box: Taxi – 0830;     Take-Off – 0845;     E.T.D. Over Field – 0845

6. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   1036	21,000 Ft	Cromer

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1216	27,000 Ft	Juist Island

8. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1402	5,000 Ft	Cromer

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1435 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: G
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: High Box
    508 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    509 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    510 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    511 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
12. Bomb load of Each A/C: Low Box
    508 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    509 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    510 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
    511 Squadron: Max. M-47A-1 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]
13. Fuel Load of each A/C: 1700 Gallons
14. Group Leader:
    a. High box: Name: N.M. Lynch Rank:1st Lt. A/C: L-9925 Sqdn. 510
15. b. Low box: Name: D.A. Gaylord Rank: 1st Lt A/C: Q-7825 Sqdn. 511
16. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    Raymond L. Cobb Lt. Col. L-9725 510th
17. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:
18. Lead Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	3517–O	0828	1530	509	9860–W	0835	1534
    	9849–V	0841	1531½		0780–T	0838	1212
    	1192–R	0842	1535		5756–R	0840	0943
    					9749–Z	0839	Nuthampstead
    510	9925–L	0825	1526	511	7780–G	0831	1542
    	9823–O	0827	1529		9849–U	0834	1205
    	9853–P	0826	1317		9877–X	0832	1107
    	9762–D	0830	1531		5824–S	0836	1522½
    	9848–F	0829	1528		9761–D	0910	1544
    					3136–P	0837	1543
    					1162–V	0833	1536

19. Low Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	9858–G	0845½	1510	509	0499–Q	0851	1521
    	6151–M	0846½	Raynham		9812–U	0852	Ludham
    	7774–N	0851½	1514		9630–S	F.T.O.*
    	0866–S	0850	1254		7845–F	0903½	1502
    					7832–N	0903	1522
    510	9780–S	F.T.O.*		511	7825–Q	0845	1519
    	9835–N	0848	1524		9857–H	0846	1520
    	3093–K	0848½	Glatton		9834–F	0847	1118
    	7714–T	0926	1519½		9835–Y	0929	1520½
    	9831–H	0849	1230
    *F.T.O.	Failed Takeoff

    Report Compiled By Leo A Curley, T/Sgt.
    
    

    Sqdn.	A/C Letter	Designation	Box	Remarks
    509	5756–R	Abortive	High	#2 Engine Trouble.
    509	0780–T	Abortive	High	Cylinder Head #3 Engine Blown.
    511	9877–X	Abortive	High	Personnel failure - Tail Gunner sick.
    511	9834–F	Abortive	Low	Oxygen Leak - #2 Supercharger Ran Away.
    511	9849–U	Abortive	High	Lost #3 Engine.
    510	831–H	Abortive	Low	#1,2,3 Superchargers give only 23" [Manifold Pressure] - #3 Engine Vibrating.
    510	853-P	Abortive	High	Oil Pressure #2 Engine dropped couldn't feather prop.
    508	0994–T	Abortive	Low	Four men passed out due to lack of oxygen.
    509	749–Z	Abortive	High	Landed Nuthampstead for refueling.