351st Bomb Group

1. Roll Call and Aircraft Assignment.
2. Check to see that all Pilots know Assignment.
3. Time Schedule:

   High Box		Lead Box
   Stations – 0635		Stations - _____
   Start Engines – 0735		Stations - _____
   Taxi - 0745		Taxi - _____
   Take Off - 0800		Take Off - _____
   Leave Base - _____		Leave Base - ____

4. Target, Loading and Gasoline Load:
   High Box - M-47-A1's [Incendiaries], [Fuel Load] 1 Bomb bay [tank in Non-Tokyo Planes], 700 gals. in Tokyo's
   Lead Box - Max. 500# GP [General Purpose], [Fuel Load] 1 Bomb bay [tank in Non-Tokyo Planes], 700 gals. in Tokyo's
   Target - Frankfurt, Secondary Coblenz.
   
   
5. Operations - Wing Formation - 94th C.B.W [Combat Wing] - 4th in 1st Division.
   Lead Box 351st A   High Box - Composite - 351st Low Sqdn.   Low Box - 401st
   
   

   Diversions -	1st Division
   	2nd Division
   	3rd Division
   	Mediums

   
   Fighter Cover - Area Support plus cover of [P-]47s, [P-]38s, Spits [Spitfires], & [P-]51s on 3rd Division.
   
6. Navigator -
7. S-2 [Intelligence] –
8. Weather -
9. Special Instructions -
   Lead Group - Delay fuses in [Planes] 834-F, 848-F, 136-P
   Spares - Rutherford, Neuberg, Litsinger, Taylor, McCarthy.
   1. Group Assembly - Deenethorpe Buncher - Lead 10,000', High - 12,000'
   2. Signals for Bombing - PFF [Pathfinder Force Aircraft] will fire a yellow flare a bomb bay doors open.
      PFF code at IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] is Doughnut.
   3. Pictures (Photos) -
   4. Deputy Leaders are - Nesmith, 2nd McCluskey. Read Field Order poop on VHF talking.
   5. Lead Crews Report to S-2 [Intelligence] for Additional Instructions
   6. Bombardiers, Navigators and Radio Operators report to Special Briefing.
10. Dismissal of all but Pilots and Co-Pilots

11. 			[Radio]
    	Call Sign	Flares	Channels	Tail Letter
    94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing]	Ragweed	RY [Red Yellow]	A
    351st A Lead	Ragweed Red	RY	A	J
    351st B		G	A	J
    401st	Ragweed White	R	A	S
    Composite Group	Ragweed Pink		B
    Air Commander			B
    1st C.B.W.	Goonchild	RR	B	A, L
    40th C.B.W.	Bulpenn	YY	B	B, G, H
    41st C.B.W.	Fatgal	GG	B	C, K, P
    U.S. Fighters	Denver Two		C
    Bombers	Goldsmith Two Four		D
    Grnd. Control	Tackline		D
    R.A.F. Fighters	Garlic Two		C
    Bombers	Goldsmith Two		C
    Grnd. Control	Spicecake

    
    
12. Colors of the day:

    Time	Color	Ident.	Challenge
    0700 - 1300	RG [Red Green]	C	O
    1300 - 1900	R-RR	B	M

13. Special Instructions -
    
    1. [Planes] To Monitor Channel "A"- All ships except following
       [Planes] To Monitor Channel "B"- 1238-A, 834-F
       [Planes] To Monitor Channel "C"- 857-H, 831-H
       [Planes] To Monitor Channel "C" RAF Fighters- 517-O, 654-B
    2. Let-Down - [Compass] Heading from Splasher #6
       351st A - 275° Mag [Magnetic Compass Heading]
       Composite - 305° Mag
       401st - 290° Mag
       VHF Authenticator - Fruit Cake
       VHF Recall - Black Bag
       
14. Taxi Plan - Flying Control.
15. Any Questions?

1. General Narrative. Twenty-two aircraft of the lead group took off as scheduled at 0800 – 0821 ½ hours. Formation of the group and of the combat wing assembly was completed over Deenethorpe at 10,000 feet as planned and at 0855, departure was made on course with the 351st and 401st Groups flying the lead and low combat boxes, respectively; and with the high combat box made up of two squadrons from the 401st and one squadron (low) from the 351st.
    Considerable difficulty was encountered in completing the formation over the overcast, which was present from 1,000 feet to 4,500 feet, and, as indicated by the formation diagrams, all of the attacking aircraft did not fly in the 94th Combat Wing formation.
    The formation flew wide of Point A and made a cut off on route because the formation was three minutes behind schedule. Splasher 7 was reached on time at 0941 at 21,000 feet.
    The arrival and departure at Clacton, plus the formation of the task force was made on time at 0948 ½ at an altitude of 21,000 feet.
    The PFF A/C aborted at mid-Channel and it was thus necessary to place the 94th Combat Wing behind the 1st Combat Wing in order to drop its flares.
    The enemy coast was crossed at the briefed point at the scheduled time. The route followed was slightly south of course and as a result the actual IP was 50°25’N - 08°10’E instead of the briefed point at 50°30’N - 08°00’E.
    It had been necessary to make several S-es in an attempt to permit the 1st Combat Wing to take the lead on the route in. This met with no success, and as a result it was necessary to make a 360° turn at the IP and then follow the 1st Combat Wing on the bomb run.
    The bomb run was made on AFCE with groups in trail. Bombing was done through a ten-tenths undercast on the flares of the 1st Combat Wing. Bombs were away at 1127 – twelve minutes late because of the aforementioned maneuver to get behind the 1st Combat Wing.
    After the bomb run had been completed, the low (401st) Group informed the Combat Wing Leader that it had not dropped its bombs on the primary and wished to return for a second run. It was considered wiser to try to locate a target of opportunity through breaks in the clouds. As a result, the course followed was ten miles south of the briefed course.
    Vicious enemy fighter attacks were encountered shortly after leaving the target, with ME 210s or 410s creating a majority of the damage. The low group was informed that it could jettison its undropped bombs if necessary and the route out was followed to bring the formation over the enemy coast at the briefed point.
    The return route was flown with three combat wings abreast – the 94th on the left. Shortly before reaching the enemy coast, an “S” was made to place the 94th Combat Wing between the other two (1st and 40th) and thus depart the enemy coast at the briefed point.
    The English Coast was reached at 1328 – eight minutes behind schedule. Poor weather conditions were encountered over England. The 94th Combat Wing flew directly to Splasher 6 and Norwich, and then attempted to let down by squadrons through holes in the overcast. In some cases this had to be done by individual aircraft, and as a result, the aircraft of the 351st Group reached base in squadron formations and individually. Landings were made from 1407 to 1520, with all aircraft returning safely.
    The low squadron of the composite (high) combat box was in position as noted in the formation diagrams throughout the mission.
2. Aircraft Not Attacking. (Lead Box). Twenty-two aircraft, including three spares, took off and formed as indicated in the attached diagram. It is noted that at least four aircraft did not fly with the lead group formation as planned, due to the cloud cover encountered between base and formation altitudes. Aircraft 42-30866, a flying spare, could not contact the formation after having lost it in the cloud cover. This aircraft returned to base from a point ten miles off Clacton and is not classified as dispatched. Aircraft 42-97492, a flying spare, returned to base from off the English Coast after failing to contact the formation. Aircraft 42-37780, scheduled as a flying spare, stayed with the formation throughout the mission.  In addition to aircraft 42-37780, eighteen aircraft of the lead group completed the mission. Aircraft 42-29850 returned to base from Deenethorpe when the #3 Engine was feathered because of low oil pressure.  Of the nineteen aircraft over the target, one, 42-30994, was unable to release one of its bombs. The formation over the target is included in the attached diagram.  No aircraft were lost.
3. Aircraft Not Attacking. (Composite Squadron). Eight aircraft of the low squadron of the (high) composite group took off and assembled over Denethorpe.  Aircraft 42-38032, a flying spare, returned to base when it appeared as though the formation was complete.  Aircraft 42-31384 returned from 51° 20’ N, 02° 02’ E after it was unable to locate the formation.  Aircraft 42-37845 returned early from 51° 20’ N, 02° 10’ E when it could not locate the formation.  The remaining five aircraft went on to bomb the assigned target without mishap. Those aircraft known to have flown with other groups are indicated on the formation diagram.  No aircraft were lost.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0800 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0855 hours at 10,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 855 hours at 10,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0855 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1009 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 10/10ths. Tops 4,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 5 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 80 & 280 degrees. 65 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning]
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds.
   9. Joined task force at 0948½ hours at 21,000 feet.
   10. Departed English Coast at 0948½ hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 10091 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: None hours.
       2. Coming back: None hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 280 degrees.
       2. 40 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: “GEE”
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 1109 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 140 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 24,000 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1127 hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: PFF
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: COMPASS BAD, GEE BAD
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix _____
       2. Time _____ hours.
   17. Comments:

Group: 351st
Target: Frankfurt
Method of Bombing: P.F.F.[Pathfinder Force]
Altitude: 24,000
Direction of Attack: 320°
Wind Direction: 280°
Wind Velocity: 46 MPH

Brief Narrative: The P.F.F. ship had to abort in mid-channel. At the I.P. a 360° turn was made and this group fell in behind the 1st Combat Wing and bombed on the flares of the 1st Combat Wing. Bombs were away at 1127. The Squadron flying in the Composite Group dropped on the Group Leader and “Bombs Away” took place at 1127.

[Signed] Harvey H. Wallace, Captain, Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

1. This Group took off at 0806 and assembled on the Deenethorpe Buncher at 10,000 ft. We departed on time on a course for Sleaford, which was crossed on time, on course for Swaffham. The Combat Wing was formed by the first point, except for a few individual A/C, who joined later. The run to Swaffham was cut off short and a heading for Splasher #7, the first point in the Division Assembly Line, was assumed to reach that point on time.
2. At the Division Assembly Line the rendezvous with the 1st Combat Wing failed to develop and V.H.F. [Very High Frequency (Radio)] contact with the 1st Combat Wing was not obtained. The 40th Combat Wing had notified us that they were two minutes ahead of schedule. The coast out was crossed exactly on time, and visible contact with the lead pair of wings at this point was made. Approximately halfway across the Channel, the PFF [Pathfinder Force] A/C [aircraft] aborted. Soon after, the 1st Combat Wing of four groups was discovered a few miles to the right and rear. Continual double drifts to the left were made, to enable the 1st Combat Wing to move into the lead position of the second pair of combat wings. Most of the efforts were useless because the 1st Combat Wing followed the “ess” instead of moving forward. In the vicinity of the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] the condition still persisted.
3. At this point it was decided to execute a 360° turn and bomb in trail of the 1st Combat Wing on their flare markers, since the 40th and 41st Combat Wings were too far ahead to bomb on. This 360° maneuver finally gave the 1st Combat Wing the opportunity to bomb first and the 94th to follow in trail, bombing on their flares. The 360° also put our boxes in trail, with the addition of one box of A/C from the 91st Bomb Group, which also went in.
4. The run was made on AFCE [Automatic Flight Control Equipment (Autopilot)] almost in trail with the 40th Combat Wing. Flak over the target was of the barrage type, but approximately 1500 feet low and ahead. Chaff from the 1st Combat Wing seemed this fire [sic]. Chaff was dropped by the Lead Group of the 94th Combat Wing. I believe it effectively disrupted the Flak defenses. Immediately after this Wing crossed the defenses a very heavy concentrated barrage burst to the rear and low.
5. After the withdrawal, the low box called to report that they had not seen the bombs drop from the lead box and hence failed to bomb. In order to rally with the 1st Combat Wing and also seek a target of opportunity for the low group we crossed behind and to the left, but the expected break in the undercast failed to develop. Also, enemy fighters began to queue up, so, the target of opportunity attempt was abandoned. The Wing closed up and took position on the left flank and abreast of the 1st Combat Wing.
6. Fighter attacks on the lead box were mostly from 10 o’clock high by twenty (20) Twin-Engine Fighters, reported as ME 210s. Most attacks were pressed home on the low box. The Wing at this point consisted of four groups, the 91st box flying as high box, the Composite as high-high box. Several A/C of the low box were seen to go down with single engine. FW 190s following up.
7. From the vicinity of Liege out, the 40th, 1st, and 94th flew abreast until 10 miles East of Dunquerque [Dunkirk]. A 90° turn to the right followed by one to the left put the 94th between the 40th and 1st, thus enabling us to leave the coast at the briefed point.
8. A letdown by squadrons in trail was attempted North of Splasher #6, but cloud conditions prevented even this. Each squadron executed an Instrument procedure letdown in the following order: Lead, High, Low. The briefed letdown headings for boxes were used as headings.
9. All of the 351st A/C returned to base, some reforming into squadrons after the [cloud] penetration, the remainder coming back individually.

Bombardier - Capt. H.H. Wallace   Pilot - Major C.F. Ball Navigator - 1st Lt. R.H. Schwartz
Aircraft # 42-29849  Take-off - 0806  Landed - 1445
Objective - Frankfurt
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - P.F.F. [Pathfinder Force A/C to determine target.]
Initial Point - P.F.F.
Method of Attack - P.F.F.
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: -    Composite Group -
No. A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation:
Deflection and Range sighting, Group -    Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group -    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes -
Number of Bombs Loaded -    Released -
Fusing, Nose - 1/10    Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - P.F.F

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Not Seen
Mean Temp. Metro -6 Actual -6
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Est. 290° Actual 280°  Velocity - Est. 46 Actual 46  Temp C. - Est. -35° C. Actual -35° C.

1. One A/C [Aircraft] carried leaflets on today's mission dropping them over the briefed target. Twenty-five large parcels of Type G-17.
2. There was 10/10ths cloud cover, therefore bombing results were unobserved and unphotographed.
3. From 25 to 50 e/a [enemy aircraft] were encountered by this Group flying a lead box and a high squadron of the Composite Box of the Combat Wing. Attacks took place from around the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1110 hours to the target area and for about 20 minutes thereafter. No direct passes were made on the High Squadron of the Composite Box, but the Lead Box was subjected to close attacks by Me 109's, FW 190's, Ju 88's, Me 110's, Me 210's, and 410's, FW 189's and Do 217's. The majority of the attacks were made from above and head-on, but numerous attacks also came from low and level from the tail and the left side. Most of the TE [Twin Engine] A/C were equipped with rocket guns which they fired from close range from a formation of four planes abreast. The single Engine A/C simulated fighter escort formations and queued up in lines astern before making their head-on passes. Some of the SE [Single Engine] A/C were silver in color and others were painted black. It is believed that there were numerous Me 410's employed in the attacks because of their great speed and their ability to press attacks through the bomber formations. Rocket attacks were from close range.
4. About six inaccurate bursts were observed by our formation flying at 24.000 feet while crossing the coast near Nieuport at 1011. No more flak was observed until reaching the target. Here, flak was reported by most crews to be intense but inaccurate for both height and deflection, although some crews reported meager to moderate flak and some found the accuracy good for height or deflection or both. Reports indicate that a barrage was sent up about 1,000 feet below our formation, plus a few scattered bursts at our altitude. Many crew members thought that chaff which was dropped from our planes had considerable effect on the flak. Causing it to burst below and behind our formation. One crew in the Composite Group observed intense but very inaccurate flak apparently being fired from Mannheim after they turned from the target. On the way out at 1249 moderate inaccurate flak was observed near Brussels.
5. The crews reported low clouds with tops at about 5,000 feet and above this altitude visibility was unlimited. In their words, "It was ideal weather for bombing through clouds."
6. Six to eight ground rocket flares were reported over the target area at 1125. They trailed a spiral of white smoke as they started downwards. An Me 110 trailed the formation out of range and when friendly escort left this enemy A/C turned away. Right after this enemy A/C attacks were pressed. Where we crossed the coast three miles SW of Nieuport, Belgium the enemy shot up from the ground yellow and green flares. The crews reporting these were certain they came from ground installations and not from our A/C. A FW 190 dropped parachute bombs over the target.
7. The Pathfinder A/C assigned to our Lead Group left the formation at mid-channel and our lead bombardier bombed on the smoke markers left by the PFF A/C in the preceding Combat Wing. Fighter support was excellent except for the twenty-five minute period when our Combat Wing had none. Attacks began at the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. None of our A/C was lost.

Detailed description of reasons why A/C did not attack:
A/C 42-29850 (Lead Box) – Pilot claimed that oil and fuel pressure dropped on #3 Engine. Investigation revealed no deficiencies. Aircraft was also test flown and the engine checked out satisfactorily. Was not dispatched [Did not leave England]. Flying time: 1:24.

A/C 42-31384 (High Box) – Pilot unable to locate formation. The flux-gate compass was out and the radio compass inoperative. Investigation revealed that the navigator had previously removed the flux-gate compass from the aircraft and had not re-installed it. The radio compass checked out satisfactorily when tested by communications personnel. Flying time: 2:56. Was not dispatched.

A/C 42-37845 – Returned early due to inability to locate the formation. Flying time: 3:17. Aircraft was dispatched.

[Signed] Robert B. Stratton, 1st. Lt., Air Corps, Statistical Officer

Enemy Air opposition for the mission to Frankfurt was moderate, some 25 to 50 e/a [enemy aircraft] having been encountered by this Group flying both a Lead Box and a High Squadron of the High Box of the Combat Wing. No direct passes were made at the High Squadron of the High Box, but the Lead Box encountered opposition from a point near the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1110 over the target and back for about one half hour after bombs away. First e/a encountered were ME 109’s and FW 190’s which made determined passes from above and head-on and continued down through the formation to attack the Low Group. Since there was a gap in Fighter Escort cover from the IP to the Target, TE [Twin-Engine] ME 110’s, JU 88’s, ME 210’s and 410’s, FW 189’s, and DO 217’s appeared and fired rockets, often from very close range, from head-on, level and above and from the tail from below and level. It appears that ME 410’s were employed by the enemy since what appeared to be a 210 at first glance soon showed a high enough rate of speed to fly through the formation without exposing themselves to our guns with the characteristic vulnerability of the ME 210. One crew reported that an FW 190 released parachute bombs from above the bombers in an effort to break up the formation. The SE [Single Engine] fighters were generally silver or black and some had red markings. Fighter escort was good for area cover. From the IP to the target, however, there was no cover and as a result heaviest attacks were experienced.

[Signed] Charles A. Hillway, 1st Lt., Air Corps, E/A Tactics Officer

Target - Frankfurt, Germany    Time Bombs Away: 1127 hours
1. Route followed. - 3 miles South of Nieuport [Nieuwpoort] – 8 miles South of Spa - Limburg (at this point a 360° turn to the left was executed) – Target – Undenheim – Hody – 3 miles South of Nieuport [Nieuwpoort]
2. Visibility at Target. - 10/10ths cloud Contrails: None
3. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: 351st Lead, Composite High, 401st Low
4. General Axis of attack (Lead A/C) - 140° Degrees Magnetic.
5. Length of Straight and Level Bomb Run: 90 seconds
6. Evasive Action Taken? - Right and left turns before Bomb run.
7. Turn after Bombing. - Right turn to 185°
8. (a)Number of A/C Damaged By A/A [Antiaircraft] Gunfire: 9
 (b)Number of A/C Lost to A/A Gunfire: None
9. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control used:
 (a) Route out: Nieuport [Nieuwpoort], 1011, 24,000 ft. – 6 black bursts, inaccurate for height and deflection.
 (b) Target: Reports varied from meager to intense, but most reported intense. Reports on accuracy also varied; most reported inaccurate for both height and deflection; some reported poor for height, good for deflection, some vice versa. Probably barrage, Low.
 (c) Route back: Intense but very inaccurate flak apparently fired from Mannheim, just after turn away from target. Brussels, 1240, 24,000 ft. – meager, inaccurate for height and deflection.
10. Comments, Phenomena: One crew in composite group, low sqdn., reported 5 or 6 bursts, 3 or 4 times as large as ordinary flak, with 3 or 4 flaming pieces dropping out of each burst. The tail gunner, who reported this, said the bursts occurred very near the tail, and the black smoke hung in the sky for some time.
11. No. of A/C Carrying "Window" [Chaff]: 18
Observed Results: Most of the flak at the target was low and poor for deflection. One crew observed much flak bursting over the target after our formation had turned away, when there were no ships in the target vicinity. Most crews were impressed with effectiveness of chaff.

1. The following comments were made by crew members at interrogation of this date:
508 Squadron
 A/C 517-O [42-3517]: Had hard time keeping in formation; climbing too fast, cruising too fast. Formation very poor. - Lt. Blaisdell.
 A/C 994-T [42-30994]: Fighter cover not as briefed. When needed cover, they weren’t around. When high element dropped chaff they just threw whole bag and did not bother to break it up. - Lt. Apperson.
 A/C 824-S [42-5824]: The best job of leading I ever saw - Lt. Watson.
509 Squadron
 A/C 005-G [42-38005]: Taking of equipment from locker with no authority or permission displeasing. - Lt. Brooksby, Lt. Perle.
 A/C 749-Z [42-29749]: All equipment, even equipment signed for personally, was taken out of lockers in drying room; this caused much confusion and difficulty in preparing for flight. – Lt. McLawhorn and whole crew.
 A/C 760-M [42-39760]: All air corps equipment had been taken by clean-up detail. – Crew.
 A/C 845-F [42-37845]: Too much ammo loaded in this G-model, made ship sluggish. – F/O Wolcott. Deenethorpe crowds the air, jams frequency. – Lt. Jacoby.
510 Squadron
 A/C 925-L [42-29925]: Poor transportation. Equipment poor: electric shoe too big to fit in flying boot. - Sgt. Koscielny.
 A/C 028-Q [42-38028]: No 360° turns in target territory. – Pilot
 A/C 831-N [42-29831]: Channel C to be held strictly for business; too many talking and too long Conversation. – Pilot.
511 Squadron
 A/C 509-Z [42-31509]: Chaff works OK. – Lt. Robertson.
 A/C 857-R [42-39857]: No water in the ship. It takes too long to get equipment in the drying room before missions. – Lt. Anderson and whole crew.
 A/C 238-A [42-31238]: Need candy on this ship. – Lt. Pryor.

[Signed] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Some of the above plane's squadron letters are not the same as the letters on the J Form. We believe the squadron letters on this document for A/C 749, 831 & 857 are incorrect.]

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-30866, 508th Squadron, returned early as scheduled.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29850, 510th Squadron, returned early, Pilot claimed the oil and fuel pressure dropped on #3 Engine. Investigation revealed no deficiencies, aircraft was also test flown and engine checked out satisfactorily.
   3. Airplane No. 42-97492, 511th Squadron, returned early as scheduled.
2. Battle Damage.
   1. Airplane No. 42-30994, 508th Squadron, Flak hole on top off #4 Engine nacelle, damaged oil feathering line and bent push-rod housing on #6 cylinder. Small flak hole in skin of leading edge of left wing between #1 and #2 Engines.
   2. Airplane No. 42-39835, 510th Squadron, Two .303 caliber holes in left wing tip, skin and corrugation damaged. Small flak hole in #1 air duct. One .303 caliber hole in leading edge of wing near #3 Engine nacelle, skin corrugation and fuel tank damaged.
   3. Airplane No. 42-29848, 510th Squadron, Small flak hole in leading edge of right wing near fairing of wing. One .303 caliber hole in left wing underside between 31 and #2 Engine nacelles. Skin, Corrugation and fuel tank damaged.
   4. Airplane No. 42-5824(??), 511th Squadron, Flak hole in skin of fuselage right side above ball turret. Flak hole in fuselage just below co-pilot’s window. Two flak holes through left side of fuselage near waist window, skin damage only. Two flak holes in right horizontal stabilizer. Flak went in side of navigator’s compartment, under co-pilot’s seat and out side of fuselage, Skin, Structural, and electrical wiring damaged.
   5. Airplane No. 42-3509, 511th Squadron, Small flak hole in right wing tip, skin damage only. Small flak hole in dorsal fin.
   6. Airplane No. 42-29849, 511th Squadron, Small flak hole in #3 oil tank. Flak hole in right horizontal stabilizer. Small flak hole in fabric of left aileron.
   7. Airplane No. 42-39857, 511th Squadron, Right wing and flap torn by rocket. Damage to structural members, skin, fabric and corrugation. Small flak hole in side of right bomb bay door.
   8. Airplane No. 42-31238, 511th Squadron, Flak hole in right wing damage to skin, corrugation, and main gas tank. Flak hole in right horizontal stabilizer and elevator. Left wing flap badly damaged by flak, skin, and structural members damaged.
   9. Airplane No. 42-37780, 511th Squadron, Small flak hole in skin of left wing near #1 Engine nacelle. Small flak hole in #2 supercharger. Small flak hole in skin of left wing trailing edge near fuselage.

   TOTAL A/C DAMAGED		FIGHTER & FLAK		FLAK		ROCKET & FLAK
   9		2		6		1

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-31384, 509th Squadron, returned early, the Pilot was unable to locate the formation. The Fluxgate compass was out and the Radio Compass was inoperative. Investigation revealed that this crew’s navigator removed the fluxgate compass from the aircraft and did not re-install it. Also the Radio compass checked out satisfactorily when tested by communications personnel. There was not a “GEE” box installed on this aircraft before the mission.
   2. Airplane No.42-37845, 509th Squadron, returned early due to the Pilots inability to locate the formation.
   3. Airplane No. 42-38032, 509th Squadron, returned as scheduled.
2. Battle Damage.
   1. None

1. The following armament failures and malfunctions were reported upon completion of the mission of 29 January, 1944:
   1. A/C 42-30994 – Inboard racks did not release. Short in solenoid.
   2. A/C 42-37780 – Ball turret would not turn right in azimuth.
   3. A/C 42-3517 – Reticle in chin turret out.
   4. A/C 42-38028 – Vickers unit leaking.
   5. A/C 42-29863 – Right nose gun trigger bar bent.
   6. A/C 42-31192 – Reticle in chin turret out.
2. The necessary adjustments and repairs have been made.

1. The following armament failures and malfunctions were reported upon completion of the mission of 29 January, 1944:
   1. A/C 42-38005 – Had to use emergency bomb release.
   2. A/C 42-30499 – Left nose gun trigger bar bent,
2. The necessary adjustments and repairs have been made.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 13,430 Rounds of Caliber .50 Ammunition for the Mission of 29 January, 1944.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 1,845 Rounds of Caliber .50 Ammunition for the Mission of 29 January, 1944.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 13,430 Rounds of Caliber .50 Ammunition for the Mission of 29 January, 1944.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 1,845 Rounds of Caliber .50 Ammunition for the Mission of 29 January, 1944.

1. Following are deficiencies and disabilities as determined by interrogation:
508th Bomb Squadron
 A/C 994 [42-30994] : Right shoe burned out. - Sgt. Kusluch. Right glove burned out. - Lt. Proctor
 A/C 136 [42-3136] : Right shoe burned out. Sgt. Wallace.
510th Bomb Squadron
 A/C 925 [42-29925] : Need smaller shoes. Sgt. Simons
 A/C 849 [42-29849] : Suit burned out. Lt. Smith.
 A/C 848 [42-29848] : Gloves and shoes burned out. Sgt. Leach.

Aircraft No. T-42-31384 Squadron 509   Pilot - Lt. Songer
Time of Abortive - 0952  Location when Aborted - 51°20’N - 02°02’E (In Channel)
Reason - Could not find group or wing. Radio Compass not working properly – could not home on Deenethorpe Beacon.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] George Songer
Altitude: 22,000   Disposition of Bombs: Brought all back.


Aircraft No. F-42-37845 Squadron 509  Pilot - F/O Wolcott
Time of Abortive - Failure to join formation  Location when Aborted - 02°10’E - 51°20’N
Reason - Unable to locate formation. Unable to climb rapidly enough for interception.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - Nil.
[Signed] [Signed] Charles E. Wolcott, Air Corps, F/O


Aircraft No. P-42-38032 Squadron 509   Pilot - Lt. Neuberg
Time of Abortive - 10:10  Location when Aborted - 51°30’N - 02°00’E
Reason - Return as planned.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None.
[Signed] R. E. Neuberg
Altitude: 24,000’   Disposition of Bombs: Returned.


Aircraft No. B-42-97492 Squadron 511  Pilot - Lt. Litsinger
Time of Abortive -   Location when Aborted -
Reason - Returned as planned – Flying spare.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None.
[Signed] D. W. Litsinger, Air Corps, 1st Lt.
Altitude:   Disposition of Bombs:


Aircraft No. S-42-30866 Squadron 508  Pilot - Lt. Taylor
Time of Abortive - 9:50  Location when Aborted -
Reason - Did not locate 351 group, we were a flying spare, all group we encountered had a minimum of 20 airplanes.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None.
[Signed] Robert E. Taylor
Altitude: 21,000’   Disposition of Bombs: Returned.


Aircraft No. G-42-29850 Squadron 510   Pilot - Lt. Chalmers
Time of Abortive - 0840  Location when Aborted - Deenthorpe.
Reason - #3 Eng. Feathered – low oil pressure.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None.
[Signed] Robert P. Chalmers
Altitude: 10,500’   Disposition of Bombs: Brought back.


Aircraft No. G-850 [42-29850] Squadron 510th   Pilot - Chalmers CoPilot: Needham
Pilot’s Statement: Oil pressure and fuel pressure on #3 engine dropped & engine started to vibrate.
[Signed] Robert P. Chalmers
Inspection of Airplane or Equipment reveal the following defects or malfunctions: Ship was given ground run and found O.K. - Capt. Holsapple test hopped ship and found it O.K. – Condition could have existed if oil dilution valve suddenly came open. [Signed] Norman S. Snyder, Engineering Officer

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing Lead Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 9654–B*, 3517–O, 0994–T, 1192–R, 0886–S
   Sqdn 509th A/C: NONE
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 0838–R, 9831–H*, 9848–F*, 8028–Q, 9762–D*, 9835–N, 9925–L*, 1509–V
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 9850–G*, 9849–U*, 1238–A, 3509–Z, 9834–F, 9857–H, 5824–S, 3136–P, 7492–B
   b. Low Sqdn. of High Group
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 9863–Y, 7845–F, 1384–T, 8005–G, 9760–M, 9749–Z, 0499–Q, 8032–P
   42-29848 of 510th Sqdn. & 42-3136 & 42-39834 of 511th Sqdn. are carrying Long Delay Action Bombs.
   * Denotes Non-Tokio Aircraft

2. Target: GH-577
   
3. W/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 Call Sign	TWH DAISYCHAIN		Squadron	510 Call Sign	NTN PARAMOUNT
   Squadron	509 Call Sign	SHQ RIDINGWHIP		Squadron	511 Call Sign	PPX THICKFROST

4. Lead Box: Taxi – 0755;     Take-Off – 0810;     E.T.D. Over Field – 0810
5. Low Box: Taxi – 0745;     Take-Off – 0800;     E.T.D. Over Field – 0800

6. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   0949	21,000 Ft	CLACTON

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1848	26,000 Ft	51°05'N - 02°35'E

8. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1959	3,000 Ft	CLACTON

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1353 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: Lead Box
    508 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P.[General Purpose], Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    510 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    511 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail NON TOKYOS CARRYING 6 X 500 LB. GP. 1/10 - 1/40
12. Bomb load of Each A/C: Low Sqdn.
    509 Squadron: Max. M47A1 I.B.'s [Incendiary Bombs]
13. Fuel Load of each A/C:
    A/C with TOKIO TANKS: 2500 Gallons A/C without TOKIO TANKS: 2100 Gallons
14. Group Leader:
    a. Lead Box: Name: Clinton F. Ball Rank: Major A/C: U-9849 Sqdn. 511
15. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    NONE
    Flying Spares - 508th - 0866-S; 509th - 0499-Q, 8032-P; 511th - 7492-B, 7780-G
16. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:
17. Lead Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	9654–B			509	NONE
    	3517–O
    	0994–T
    	1192–R
    	0866–S
    510	0838–R			511	9849–U
    	9831–H				1238–A
    	8028–Q				3509–Z
    	9762–D				9834–F
    	9835–N				9857–H
    	9925–L				5824–S
    	1509–V				3136–P
    					7492–B
    812-PFF	3491-G				7780–G

18. Low Sqdn. High Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    509	9863-Y
    	7845–F
    	1384–T
    	8005–G
    	9760–M
    	9749–Z
    	0499–Q
    	8032–P

    Report Compiled By Rocky Civizzio, T/Sgt.
    
    

X - Nickles [Leaflets], * - Delay Fusing, (FS) - Flying Spare FTO - Failed Take Off

SPARES:
A/C # Letter Sqdn.
8023  P  508
9849  V  508

X - Nickels [Leaflets], * - Delay Fusing, (FS) - Flying Spare
Brochert A/C # 9762 D Flew with 388th Group; Roper* A/C # 3136 P Flew with 95th Group; Walby A/C # 42-31509 V flew with 379th Group
SPARES:
A/C # Letter Sqdn.
8023  P  508
9849  V  508

SPARES:
A/C # Letter Sqdn.
9914  S  509

McLawhorn A/C # 42-29749 Z flew with the 92nd Group; Illies A/C # 42-39760 M flew with 91st Group