351st Bomb Group

1. Check to see that all Pilots know Assignment.
2. Time Schedule:

   High Box			Lead Box
   Stations –	0710		Stations -	_____
   Start Engines –	0810		Stations -	_____
   Taxi -	0820		Taxi -	_____
   Take Off -	0835		Take Off -	_____
   Leave Deenethorpe -	0938		Leave Base -	____

3. Target – Wilhelmshaven  Last Resort - Any Airdrome, City or Industrial area positively Identified as being German
4. Bomb Loading: High Box – M47's Lead Box – 500# Low Box - 500#
   Gasoline Loading – One Bomb Bay Tank. 700 in Tokyo's
   Chaff – Two wings ahead will drop chaff   Nickels [Propaganda Leaflets]– None left
5. Wing Formation – 94th C.B.W. – Fifth in 1st Division.
   Lead Box – 351st.  High Box – Composite Low Box – 401st
   Composite Box – Lead Sqdn. 315st High Sqdn. 351st Low Sqdn. – 401st
6. Fighter Cover:
   • • 4 Grps. of P-47's (To limit of their Range.)
     • 1 Grp. P-38's Target to Range limit.
     • 1 Grp. P-51's Area Target Support..
7. 3rd Division will precede 1st Div. to the same by 23 min.
   2nd Division will be at Emden (B-24's) about 30 min. ahead of 1st C.B.W. [Combat Wing]
   4 min. intervals between C.B.W. 1st CBW guide left on 94th C.B.W.
   C.B.W.'s will leave Cromer flying in column of 2 CBW's abreast to I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] or Turning Point where they will assume normal CBW interval. After Bombing will form the same. Remain in that formation throughout withdrawal.
   Group Assembly is: Buncher - Lead 10,000 ft.  High 12,000 ft.
8. Navigator - _____
9. S-2 - _____
10. Weather - _____
11. Code Words –

    PFF Bombing –	Green Horn
    Visual Bombing -	Sweet Heart
    I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] -	_____
    Authenticator –	Pop Corn
    Recall -	_____

12. Special Instructions – Delay Bombs in 702-A, 384-T, 492-B
    IFF not to be turned on until within 50 miles of English coast. R/T security and interphone broadcast will be Guarded.
    If PFF [Pathfinder Force Aircraft], That ship will move forward from #2 to C.B.W. Lead for bombing.
13. Lead Crews Report to Target Room.
14. Dismiss all but Pilots and Co-Pilots.
15. Call Signs:

    	Call Sign	Flares	Tail Letters
    351 A	Ragweed Red	R Y [Red Yellow]	J
    351 B			J
    401 A	Ragweed White	RY [Red Yellow]	S
    Composite	Ragweed Pink	G [Green]
    94th C.B.W.	Ragweed	R Y [Red Yellow]	J S
    1st C.B.W.	Goonchild	RR [Red Red]	A L (To Right)
    40th C.B.W.	Bullpen	YY [Yellow Yellow]	B G H (Just Ahead)
    41st C.B.W.	Fatgal	GG [Green Green]	C K P (Leading)

16. 	Call Sign	Channel
    U.S. Fighters	Denver Two	C (U.S.)
    Bombers	Goldsmith	Two Five
    Grnd. Control	Tackline	_____
    R.A.F. Fighters		_____
    Bombers		_____
    Grnd. Control		_____

17. Colors of the Day
    Time	Color	Letter	Challenge
    0700 – 1300	RG	L	Y
    1300 – 1900	GY	F	W

18. Special Instructions –
    1. Ships to Monitor Channel "B" – Lead Box 882-L, 994-T, High Box 850-G, 509-V
    2. Ships to Monitor Channel "C" – (U.S.) – Lead Box 749-Z, 845-F, High Box 721-S, 849-U
    3. • Let Down on Splasher # 16
       • Let Down Headings 351 A – 015 degrees mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
       • Let Down Headings 351 B –
       • Let Down Headings 401 A – 345 degrees mag.
       • Let Down Headings Composite – 360 degrees mag.
       • On the assembly get your Altitude before joining. Be sure you cut the leader off on his turns. Element leaders keep your elements in the right position. Stay in there tight. Get there first, so your wingman have someone to form on.
19. Taxi Plan –
20. Any Questions?

1. General Narrative. Thirty-five ships of this group plus one PFF aircraft, took off. The group and wing assemblies were accomplished easily. Twenty-one ships of the lead box took off and fifteen of the composite (high) left the ground. The route over England was difficult because of high clouds which forced an immediate climb that was continued until the vicinity of the I.P. The combat wing leader was forced to penetrate a high overcast which separated his group and the low box. Two 360° turns were executed in order to pick up the stragglers. The climb continued until an altitude of 28,400 feet was reached.  The turn at the I.P. was started by the PFF who, unable to pass the leader, slid under and proceeded on his bomb run. The combat wing made as sharp a turn as possible and bombed on PFF. The run was very satisfactory and much credit is due the PFF crew for solving its problem at that altitude.  Due to an under-cast, let-down from the target was impossible until after passing the Frisian Islands. The let-down commenced but was broken up by a forced penetration through cirrus clouds. Extremely low temperatures and poor weather were factors opposing an efficient mission.  Flak over the target was moderate but accurate, even at the bombing altitude. A concentration was seen over the Frisian Islands, but out of range of this combat wing.  The composite (high) box had very little difficulty as far as weather was concerned, being in the clear at all times. The narrative of this box is exactly identical with that of the lead box.
2. Aircraft Not Attacking – Lead Box. Twenty aircraft, not including the PFF ship, took off and formed the lead combat box of the 94th Combat Wing formation. A/C 42-31694, which was not dispatched, returned to base early because, the pilot reported, the flaps creep down and will not retract electrically. Engineering reports indicate that familiarity with Technical Manuals relative to this situation could have prevented this abortive. A/C 42-97492 and 42-39835, both of which were dispatched, returned early when they could not locate the formation because of clouds. A/C 42-31238, dispatched, returned early because the #3 fuel pressure fell to 7 lbs., according to the pilot’s report. Again, Engineering reports indicate this to be a natural tendency of the gauge and should not have been cause for an abortive. The formation over the target is shown in the attached diagram.  No aircraft are missing.
3. Aircraft Not Attacking – High Box. Of the fifteen aircraft which took off to form the lead and high squadrons the high combat box, twelve were dispatched. One of these, A/C 42-3141, had joined the 1st Combat Wing formation, but at the time of reaching the enemy coast was unable to find a vacant position in the formation, and consequently returned to base. A/C 42-38038 did not attack the target due to a bomb release malfunction. Three aircraft were not dispatched for the following reasons: A/C 42-3517 – No. 2 Engine failure – propeller fell off. A/C 42-31721 – was unable to stay with formation because of weather. A/C 42-29925 – failure of No. 2 Engine.  No aircraft are missing.

1. The Lead and High Groups took off as briefed from Polebrook and assembled on the Deenethorpe Buncher at 10,000 and 12,000 feet respectively. The Wing assembly was accomplished at the Buncher. The climb was begun at the Buncher due to weather conditions, and deviations from the flight plan were made because of cloud formations. Due to weather, departure was ten (10) to fifteen (15) miles south of point “Z” and four (4) minutes early.
2. The 1st Combat Wing was met and contact was lost immediately because of clouds. Two (2) 360° circles were made over the channel to reassemble the Wing. The Wing climbed to 28,300 feet to stay on top of a ten-tenths overcast and bombing was accomplished on PFF Aircraft by forty-six (46) aircraft of the 94th Combat Bomb Wing.
3. After bombing, a let-down was attempted over the North Sea through cirrus haze that became too thick for formation flight. The Wing broke up and came home singly, in pairs, and in squadrons.
4. Two (2) aircraft aborted because they could not locate the formation in the clouds; and two (2) aircraft aborted because of mechanical failure.
5. There was no enemy fighter opposition. Flak was light and accurate over the target.
6. None of our aircraft were lost

1. Take off and assembly was as planned, over the Deenethorpe buncher. A few thin middle clouds were at our assembly altitude, but no unusual difficulties were encountered in forming the group or the group with the wing.
2. I did not endeavor to form close with the lead group as it was apparent there would be difficulties with the several layers of middle clouds. I maintained about 2,000 feet altitude above the lead group, and in so doing, was able to maneuver the high group as a unit during the climb. At no time during the climb were we using excessive M.P.[Manifold Pressure] or R.P.M., but the air speed was a bit slow.
3. On the way to the I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] the wing leader called and said he was going to climb above our briefed altitude, and at the I.P. and bomb run, we were at about 28,800 feet.
4. When the I.P. was called out, I moved the high group to the left, as planned, and the bomb run was made without incident. Flak was light on the high group, but we could see more of it at the lead and low group levels. We bombed on the lead group, which bombed on the stinky [Nickname for the Pathfinder Aircraft].
5. Withdrawal was as planned, and our let-down was started through thin high clouds in which we could fly a wing formation without too much difficulty. However at 21,000 feet, the “soup” thickened and we had to break with the wing. As we continued our let-down, our group dispersed and when we came out at about 10,000 feet, I had only two wing men. I fired all of my remaining flares, but no other ships joined us; so I returned with my two wing men.
6. Our group formation was very good until it was dispersed by the weather.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0843 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0938 hours at 10,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW [Combat Wing] at 0944 hours at 11,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0838 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1124 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 10/10ths. Tops 25,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 8 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude _____ degrees. ______knots per hour. NOT CHECKED OVER ENGLAND
   7. Means of navigation over England. GEE - RADIO
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. NOT CHECKED
   9. Joined task force at _____ hours at _____ feet. DIDN’T JOIN
   10. Departed English Coast at 1020 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1101 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: 1101 hours.
       2. Coming back: 1156 hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 240 degrees.
       2. 75 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: GEE AND AIR PLOT
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 1124 hours.
       2. Mag. [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 332 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 28,300 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1137½ hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: P.F.F. & D.R.[Dead Reckoning] WEATHER 9/10 UNDERCAST
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: NONE
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix 53°31'N - 04°30'E
       2. Time 1303 hours.
   17. Comments: NONE

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0836 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0908 hours at 12,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW [Combat Wing] at 0943 hours at 13,600 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0943 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 1055 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 10/10ths. Tops 5,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 20 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 260 degrees. 70 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. GEE, SPLASHER, & D.R.[Dead Reckoning]
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. GEE
   9. Joined task force at 1022 hours at CROMER.
   10. Departed English Coast at 1029 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1155 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous: ALL THE WAY
       1. Going in: 1149 hours.
       2. Coming back: _____ hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 260 degrees.
       2. 75 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: GEE
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP at 1129 hours.
       2. Mag. [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 330 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 27,980 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1137½ hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: PFF 10/10
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: DEENETHORPE BUNCHER.
   16. Gee:
       1. (1) Coordinates of furtherest fix 52°46’N - 04°45’E
       2. (2) Time 1055½ hours.
   17. Comments:

Group: 351st
Target: Wilhelmshaven, Germany
Method of Bombing: Wing
Altitude: 27,600 feet
Direction of Attack: 332° Magnetic
Wind Direction: 240°
Wind Velocity: 86 MPH

1. The PFF Aircraft took over the lead at the I.P. Bombs were away at 1137½ on a Magnetic Heading of 342°. No results were observed due to 10/10ths Under-cast.

[Signed:] Ernest L. Watts, Captain, Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Bombardier -Capt. E.L. Watts   Pilot - Major J.T. Stewart Navigator - Capt. C.L. Maze
Aircraft # 42-38023  Take-off - 0842  Landed - 1510
Objective - Wilhelmshaven, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - PFF
Method of Attack - PFF
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 16    Composite Group - _____
No. A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation:
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - _____   Composite Group - _____
Range Sighting only, Group - _____    Composite Group - _____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 12 x 500 G.P.
Number of Bombs Loaded - 12 each A/C    Released - 12
Fusing, Nose - 1/10    Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - PFF

Type of Release - Individual
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15°C Actual -15°C
Winds - Altitude - 28,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270° Actual 240°  Velocity - Metro 92 mph Actual 86 mph
Temp C. - Metro -45° C. Actual -45° C.

Group: 351st
Target: Wilhelmshaven, Germany
Method of Bombing: Wing
Altitude: 27,600 feet
Direction of Attack: 332° Magnetic
Wind Direction: 240°
Wind Velocity: 36 MPH

Brief Narrative:
1. PFF A/C dropped his bombs and I dropped my Incendiary 100# M-47A1, four (4) seconds after PFF release line.

[Signed:] Burton K. Davis, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier (High Box)

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Burton K. Davis   Pilot - Major John Carraway Navigator - 2nd Lt. Wayne W, Livesay
Aircraft # 42-37825  Take-off - 0835  Landed - 1452
Objective - Wilhemshaven, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - PFF
Method of Attack - Wing
Number of Planes in Group - 10    Composite Group - _____
Number of Planes in Each Unit Performing Sighting Operations - _____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own sighting operation - _____
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - _____   Composite Group - _____
Range Sighting only, Group - _____    Composite Group - _____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - M-47A1
Number of Bombs Loaded - 42 each A/C    Released - 42
Fusing, Nose - Incendiary    Tail - None
Synchronization - PFF

Type of Release - Individual
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15° C Actual -15° C
Winds - Altitude - 28,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 190° Actual 139°  Velocity - Metro 36 Actual 58
Temp C. - Metro -27° C. Actual -27° C.

1. No leaflets were dropped.
2. 10/10ths clouds prevented crews from seeing bombing results and photographic evidence for this reason is negligible.
3. There were no attacks made by E/A [Enemy Aircraft] on this Group, although some 15 SE [Single Engine] fighters, reported by some crews to be FW 190’s and ME 109’s, were seen above and below the formation. They stayed in cloud protection waiting for stragglers. One A/C from the 3rd Division which turned back by the Dutch coast on the way in was hopped by two SE fighters. The B-17 blew up right after the attack. The fighters were first seen at 1050 at the Dutch coast and were intermittently spotted until going over the Frisian Islands on the way out at 1112 hours.
4. A few crews observed meager inaccurate flak while crossing the coast on the way in near Warmenhuizen. From three to ten inaccurate flak bursts were observed in the vicinity of Neuenberg. At the target at 1138 at altitudes ranging from 27,500 to 28,500 feet flak was meager to moderate and most crews reported that it was accurate for both height and deflection. While crossing Langeoog Island on the way out at 1145 some crews observed a few bursts which were inaccurate for altitude and several miles to the left of the formation.
5. Bad weather was the reason for some of our turn-backs and, after leaving the target, the formation had to let down through clouds from 23,000 to 8,000 feet, naturally breaking up the whole formation. There was icing and frosted windows.
6. Our A/C bombed on Pathfinder smoke bombs. Fighter support was excellent and seen as briefed. See paragraph 3 about 3rd Division A/C being shot down. None of our A/C was lost.

ANNEX. ENEMY TACTICS REPORT
1. See paragraph 3. No further report is forthcoming.

[Signed] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

Target - Wilhelmshaven, Germany   Time Bombs Away: 1137½
1. Route followed. - Warmenhuizen - Sögel - Target - E. end of Langeoog [Island]
2. Visibility at Target. - 10/10 cloud  Contrails - Heavy non-persistent
3. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Lead – 351st, High – Composite, Low – 401st
4. General Axis of attack (Lead A/C) - 342 Degrees Magnetic.
5. Length of Straight and Level Bomb Run: 7 minutes
6. Evasive Action Taken? - None
7. Turn after Bombing. - Left turn to 340° Magnetic
8.(a)Number of A/C Damaged By A/A [Antiaircraft] Gunfire: 3
 (b)Number of A/C Lost to A/A Gunfire: None 9. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control used:
 (a) Route out: Just before target, near Nuenberg – meager, inaccurate for height and deflection. Crossing coast on way in, near Warmenhuizen – meager, inaccurate for height and deflection.
 (b) Target: Most crews reported meager and accurate; some reported moderate; some reported fairly accurate or inaccurate. Black bursts at altitude, some black and white bursts above 28,000 feet. Continuous following.
 (c) Route back: Langeoog Island – meager to moderate, inaccurate – possibly barrage. Over North Sea, 54°20’N - 04°40’E, 7 accurate bursts at 11,000 feet.
10. Comments, Phenomena: A/C Z-749 [42-29749] was forced to descend to low altitude, and encountered intense accurate flak, including some tracer, while crossing between Tessel [Texel Island] and Vlieland at 3,000 feet.
11. No. of A/C Carrying "Window" [Chaff]: NONE
 Observed Results: NONE

Target - Wilhelmshaven, Germany    Time Bombs Away: 1137½ hours
1. Route followed. - Warmenhuizen - Sögel - Target - E. end of Langeoog [Island]
2. Visibility at Target. - 10/10 cloud  Contrails - Dense, non-persistent
3. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Lead – 351st, High – Composite, Low – 401st
4. General Axis of attack (Lead A/C) - 342 Degrees Magnetic.
5. Length of Straight and Level Bomb Run: 7 minutes
6. Evasive Action Taken? - None
7. Turn after Bombing. - Left turn to 340° Magnetic
8.(a)Number of A/C Damaged By A/A [Antiaircraft] Gunfire: 0
 (b)Number of A/C Lost to A/A Gunfire: 0
9. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control used:
 (a) Route out: Just before target, near Neuenberg, 3 to 10 inaccurate bursts.
 (b) Target: Meager to moderate fairly accurate flak at about 28,000 feet. Several crews reported that it was accurate for height, poor for deflection. Bursts were scattered, with some white bursts high continuous following.
 (c) Route back: Langeoog [Island] – meager to moderate, fairly accurate for deflection but low.
10. Comments, Phenomena: None
11. No. of A/C Carrying "Window" [Chaff]: None
 Observed Results: None

1. Following are the comments made by crew members during today’s interrogation:
508th Squadron
A/C A-702 [42-31702] “Why not more than one egg for breakfast”? - Sgt. Dunlap.
A/C T-994 [42-30994] Top Turret glass frosted. – Sgt. Gaitskill. Poor weather to fly in. – Lt. Apperson.
509th Squadron
A/C G-005 [42-38005] Have PFF ship fly formation. – Lt. Clay. Put vent holes in top turret to prevent ice. – Sgt. Jilcott.  Need longer wire for interphone. – Lt. Walaszek.
A/C Y-863 [42-29863] Enlisted men were gotten up too late for breakfast. – EM
A/C L-725 [42-31725] Late breakfast was very poor; we had nothing to eat but powdered eggs. – All gunners.
A/C S-914 [42-39914] “Would like equipment room changed back to way it used to be. – Enlisted men.
A/C Z-749 [42-29749] 509th Ass’t Operations Officer has told crew members that they must dress out at ship instead of in locker room. They object strongly to this. – All crew members.
510th Squadron
A/C J-857 [42-30857] Formation was very poor. – Lt. Lewis.
A/C A-763 [42-31763] Weather was briefed incorrectly. – Lt. Caughlan.
A/C R-038 [42-38038] After target the wing leader went through clouds instead of around. – Lt. McClusky.  “No ground school on day after mission”. – All EM [Enlisted Men]
511th Squadron
A/C Y-835 [42-29835]Bomb bay doors were opened too late – did not have time to open our own doors and drop on Squadron lead.
[Signed] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. V.H.F. Conversation
   1. Absolute radio silence will be maintained except for Combat Wing Leader and Group Leaders and then only when it is absolutely necessary. No one will request flares, reduce air speed, pull up your squadron, etc.
   2. Combat Wing Leaders will relay to their formation and to other wing leaders all information received from the Division Leader and the Division Ground Station which is pertinent to all A/C in flight.
2. Flares
   1. Group Leaders will fire a flare every minute during the group assembly.
   2. The Combat Wing Leader and all group leaders will fire three (3) flares at ten (10) second intervals at each turning point; that is, at points X, A, B, C, D, Z.

1. Following is the summary of hot news as reported at today’s interrogation:
A/C T-510, [42-37714] flying at an altitude of 9,000 feet and on a heading of 240° reported seeing at 1245 hours, a B-17 that had ditched at an approximate position of 53°14’N - 04°10’E. No dinghies were reported being seen.
A/C L-509, [42-31725] flying at an altitude of 1300 feet on a heading of 262° True at 1411 reported seeing one (1) dinghy, possibly two (2), at an approximate position of 52°49’N - 01°50’E.

[Signed:] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Abortives.
   1. Airplane No. 42-3141, 508th Squadron, returned early, had joined 1st Combat Wing formation but was unable to find a position in the formation.
   2. Airplane No. 42-39835, 510th Squadron, returned early because the Pilot lost the formation.
   3. Airplane No. 42-31238, 511th Squadron, returned early, the Pilot claimed the fuel pressure on #3 Engine dropped to seven pounds. Investigation revealed the drop in pressure was due to natural tendency of the instrument system. Acquaintance with proper Technical Orders by Pilot would have prevented this abortive.
   4. Airplane No. 42-97492, 511th Squadron, returned early because of the Pilot’s inability to locate the formation due to weather.
   5. Airplane No. 42-31694, 511th Squadron, returned early because of creeping flaps. Provision is made by the factory for manually cranking of flaps in case of electrical failure. If the flaps creep down the hand crank could have been used and the camera well door closed on top of it. This would have prevented further creeping.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 42-31702, 508th Squadron. Two very small flak holes in leading edge of left horizontal stabilizer, skin damage only.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29749, 509th Squadron. Numerous small flak holes in right side of tail gunner’s compartment. Large flak hole in right side of fuselage near root of stabilizer. Went through fuselage and out on left side near root of left stabilizer. Skin and structural members damaged. Numerous small flak holes right life raft door, damage to door and raft. Flak hole in right wing outer panel near aileron, skin and corrugation damaged. Two small flak holes in right wing inner panel near #4 Engine nacelle, skin and corrugation damaged. Small flak hole through right wing tip, skin and corrugation damaged.
   3. Airplane No. 42-3136, 511th Squadron. Small flak hole in left side of radio compartment, skin damage only.

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-3517, 508th Squadron, returned early because of the loss of #2 Propeller and #2 Engine had failed internally. The engine ran away several times and each time the pilot feathered it, upon the third unfeathering the engine ran away completely and #2 Propeller was lost. This engine is being changed.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29925, 510th Squadron, returned shortly after take-off because sparks were flying out of #2 Engine. Investigation revealed that the exhaust spark plug on #9 cylinder had burnt away causing these sparks to fly.
   3. Airplane No. 42-31721, 510th Squadron, returned early because of the pilot’s inability to locate the formation.
   Battle Damage:
   1. None

1. The following armament malfunctions and failures were reported in the Lead Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944.
   1. A/C 42-31384 – Electrical Release did not work.
   2. A/C 42-30994 – Electrical Release did not work.
   3. A/C 42-30857 – Electrical Release did not work.
   4. A/C 42-38032 – Doors would not open, used emergency release.
2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The following armament malfunctions and failures were reported in the High Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944:
   1. A/C 42-29835 – Ball Turret worked alright in azimuth but was slow and jerky in elevation; also electrical release did not work.
   2. A/C 42-29858 – Electrical release did not work.
   3. A/C 42-37825 – Electrical release did not work.
2. The proper repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 4,470 rounds of Caliber .50 ammunition by the Lead Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 3,185 rounds of Caliber .50 ammunition by the High Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944.

1. Following is the disposition of bombs carried by the Lead Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944.

1. Following is the disposition of bombs carried by the High Combat Box on the Mission of 3 February, 1944.

Aircraft No. S-721 Squadron 510 – High   Pilot - Lt. Chalmers
Time of Abortive - 1040  Location when Aborted - 25 miles East of Cromer
Reason - Unable to keep up with formation – weather (Not Dispatched) [Did not leave English Airspace]
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed:] Robert P. Chalmers Altitude: 23,500’  Disposition of Bombs: Brought Back

Aircraft No. N-835 Squadron 510 – High   Pilot - Lt. Wendt
Time of Abortive - 1100  Location when Aborted - 52°30’N - 5°E
Reason - Forced out of formation in clouds. Tried to catch Group ahead of us but we were unable to do so. Turned back because of fighters.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - Saw enemy fighters - Dispatched
[Signed:] S.L. Wendt Altitude: 23,000’  Disposition of Bombs: Dropped in North Sea

Aircraft No. B-492 Squadron 511 – Lead   Pilot - Lt. D.W. Litsinger
Time of Abortive - about 1105  Location when Aborted - 10 miles over enemy coast
Reason - Weather – on top alone at 24,000’; waited around 15-30 minutes for Group formation; could not find it so turned around.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None – Dispatched
[Signed:] D.W. Litsinger, 2nd Lt., A.C. Altitude: 24,400’  Disposition of Bombs: Time fuses – into Channel

Aircraft No. A-238 Squadron 511 – Lead   Pilot - Lt. G.W. Mears
Time of Abortive - 1053  Location when Aborted - 52°38’N - 4°46’E
Reason - No. 3 fuel pressure gauge dropped off to 7 lbs. after climb through overcast & flaps creeped and had excessive drag. (Couldn’t keep up with formation) - Dispatched
Enemy Opposition Encountered - _____
[Signed:] G.W. Mears Altitude: 23,000’  Disposition of Bombs: B.B. [Brought Back] 12 – 500#’s

Aircraft No. H-141 Squadron 508 – High  Pilot - Lt. Pugh
Time of Abortive - 1040  Location when Aborted - Cromer [Handwritten in – S-2 says 10 mi. off enemy coast]
Reason - Late take-off. Joined 1 CBW No. 10 man in Hi Sq. No one aborted up to enemy coast. Unable to find slot. Dispatched
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None - Dispatched
[Signed:] J.H. Pugh Altitude: 21,000’  Disposition of Bombs: Brought Back

Aircraft No. O-517 Squadron 508 – High   Pilot - Lt. R.J. Roper
Time of Abortive - 1037  Location when Aborted - 60 miles off coast of England
Reason - No. 2 Engine Failure (Prop fell off)
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None - Not Dispatched
[Signed:] Richard J. Roper Altitude: 23,000’  Disposition of Bombs: Dropped in Channel

Aircraft No. V-694 Squadron 511 - Lead   Pilot - Lt. C.P. Lemley
Time of Abortive -   Location when Aborted - Deenethorpe
Reason - Flaps creep down and will not retract electrically - Not Dispatched
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed:] C.P. Lemley, 1st Lt., AC Altitude: 10,000’  Disposition of Bombs: Returned

Aircraft No. L-925 Squadron 510th – High Box   Pilot - Lt. B.F. Winton
Time of Abortive - 923   Location when Aborted - 4 mi. No. of Peterborough
Reason - Sparks coming out of No. 2 engine cowl shortly after take-off - Not Dispatched
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed:] Bruce F. Winton, 1st Lt., A.C. Altitude: _____  Disposition of Bombs: Brought Back

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing] Lead Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 8023–P, 9882–L*, 1711–F, 1702–A
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 8005–G, 1725–L, 7845–F, 9863–Y*, 8032–P, 1384–T, 9914–S, 9749–Z*
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 0857–J, 9835–N
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 1694–V, 3136–P*, 1238–A, 9848–C, 7492–B, 3136–P, 1162–V
   PFF Sqdn 482nd A/C: 2487–E

   
   

   b. 94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing] High Composite Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 9858–G, 3517–O, 9654–B*
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 1612–B, 9850–G*, 8038–R, 1509–V, 9848–F*, 7714–T, 1763–A, 1721–S, 9925–L*
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 7825–Q, 9835–Y*, 9849–U*
   * Denotes Non-Tokio A/C

2. Target: GH-5475
   
3. W/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 Call Sign	W/T KBH R/T Daisychain		Squadron	510 Call Sign	W/T SVK R/T Paramount
   Squadron	509 Call Sign	W/T TGJ R/T Ridingwhip		Squadron	511 Call Sign	W/T WTS R/T Thickfrost

4. Lead Box: Taxi – 0820;  Take-Off – 0835;  E.T.D. Over Field – 0835

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   1023	17,000 Ft	Cromer

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1138	20,000 Ft	53°46'N - 07°38'E

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1335	2,000 Ft	Cromer

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1413 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
10. Bomb load of Each A/C: Lead Box
    508 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P.[General Purpose], Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail, 1702-A Carrying Delay Fuse
    509 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail, 1384-T Carrying Delay Fuse
    510 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail
    511 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/40 Tail, 7492-B Carrying Delay Fuse
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: Composite Box
    508 Squadron: Maximum # x 100 pound M47A1 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    510 Squadron: Maximum # x 100 pound M47A1 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
    511 Squadron: Maximum # x 100 pound M47A1 IB's [Incendiary Bomb]
12. Fuel Load of each A/C:
    A/C with TOKIO TANKS: 2400 Gallons A/C without TOKIO TANKS: 2100 Gallons
13. Group Leader:
    a. Lead box: Name: J.T. Stewart Rank: Major A/C: 8023-P Sqdn. 508th
14. b. Comp. box: Name: J.B. Carraway Rank: Major A/C: 7825-Q Sqdn. 511th
15. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    C. Carlson Capt. 508th 1711-F 94th CBW (Bomb.)
16. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:
17. Lead Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	8023–P	0842	1510	510	0857–J	0850	1436
    	1711–F	0844	1447		9835–N	0851½	1315
    	0994–T	0845	1448
    	1702–A	0845½	1446
    	9849–V	0906	1507
    509	8005–G	0846	1516	511	1694–V	0851	0942
    	1725–L	0846½	1510½		3136–P	0851½	1509
    	7845–F	0847	1444		1238–A	0852	1238
    	9863–Y	0847½	1456		9848–C	0852½	1526
    	8032–P	0848	1502		7492–B	0858	1331
    	1384–T	0848½	1445
    	9914–S	0849	1532	PFF	3485–E	0844	Alconbury
    	9749–Z	0850½	1501

18. High Comp. Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	9858–G	0840½	1512½	510	1612–B	0835½	1515
    	3517–O	0841	1215		9850–G	0837	1456
    	9654–B	0841½	Attlebridge		8038–R	0837½	1459½
    	3141–H	0905	1155		1509–V	0838½	1434
    					9848–F	0839	1457
    					7714–T	0839½	1454½
    					1763–A	0840	1450
    					1721–S	0916	1325
    					9925–L	0849½	0919
    509	NONE			511	7825–Q	0835	1452
    					9835–Y	0832	1435

    Report Compiled By L.A. Curley, T/Sgt.
    
    

    Sqdn.	A/C Letter	Designation	Box	Remarks
    510	9925–L	Abortive	High	Sparks coming out of #2 Eng. - #2 Eng Chg.
    511	1649–V	Abortive	Lead	Creeping Flaps.
    508	3517–O	Abortive	High	#2 Eng. Failure - Prop fell off.
    508	3141–H	Abortive	High	Late Take-off Joined 1 CBW No Abortives - Returned.
    511	1238–A	Abortive	Lead	Couldn't keep up with Formation - M/A.
    510	9835–N	Abortive	Lead	Weather - Couldn't catch up - turned around when fighters.
    510	1721–S	Abortive	High
    511	7492–B	Abortive	Lead	Weather - waited for & couldn't find formation.