351st Bomb Group

1. Check to see that all Pilots know Assignment.
2. Time Schedule:

   Lead Box			High Box
   Stations –	0640		Stations -	0640
   Start Engines –	0740		Stations -	0740
   Taxi -	0750		Taxi -	0750
   Take Off -	0805		Take Off -	0805
   Leave Base -	0840		Leave Base -	____

3. Target – Chateauroux Airdrome, France
4. Bomb Loading: High Box – 500# Lead Box – 500# Low Box - 500#
   Gasoline Loading – 400 in Tokyo's, no Bomb Bay [Tanks]
   Delay Bombs in # 6 ship in each squadron.
   Chaff – _____   Nickels [Propaganda Leaflets]– _____
5. Wing Formation – 94th C.B.W. – Lead in 1st Division.
   Lead Box – 351st.  High Box – Composite Low Box – 401st
   Composite Box – Lead Sqdn. 315st High Sqdn. 351st Low Sqdn. – 401st
6. Fighter Cover:
7. Group Assembly is: Normal – Buncher
8. Navigator - _____
9. S-2 - _____
10. Weather - _____
11. Code Words –

    PFF Bombing –	_____
    Visual Bombing -	_____
    I.P. [Initial Point of Bomb Run] -	_____
    Authenticator –	Bear Cat
    Recall -	_____

12. Special Instructions – Last Resort - Any airdrome not near populated district. There will be no indiscriminate bombing.
    C.W. Lead will fire RY flare once a minute from Splasher #11 to Selsey Bill.
    Weather Ship will be Riding Whip - 832-N.
13. Lead Crews Report to Target Room.
14. Dismiss all but Pilots and Co-Pilots.
15. Call Signs:

    	Call Sign	Flares	Tail Letters
    351 A	Ragweed Red	RY [Red Yellow]	J
    351 B			J
    401 A	Ragweed White	R [Red]	S
    Composite	Ragweed Pink	G [Green]	S
    94th C.B.W.	Ragweed	RY [Red Yellow]	J S
    1st C.B.W.	Goonchild	RR [Red Red]	A L
    40th C.B.W.	Bullpen	YY [Yellow Yellow]	B G H
    41st C.B.W.	Fatgal	GG [Green Green]	C K P

16. 	Call Sign	Channel
    U.S. Fighters	Denver One	C (U.S.)
    Bombers	Goldsmith One One	C
    Grnd. Control	Tackline	_____
    R.A.F. Fighters		C
    Bombers		_____
    Grnd. Control		_____

17. Colors of the Day
    Time	Color	Letter	Challenge
    0700 – 1300	R – RR	B	L
    1300 – 1900	RR	X	M

18. Special Instructions –
    1. Ships to Monitor Channel "B" – #2 & #3 on Gp. Lead
    2. Ships to Monitor Channel "C" – (U.S.) #5 & #6 Lead Squadron
    3. • Let Down on Splasher # 11
       • Let Down Headings 351 A Low –
       • Let Down Headings 351 B High –
       • Let Down Headings 401 A –
       • No one will ask for flares or break radio silence except CW and Group Leaders and then only in emergency.
19. Taxi Plan –
20. Any Questions?

1. General Narrative. Eighteen aircraft of the lead group took off at 0808 – 0833 hours. The group was almost entirely formed, with the exception of a few aircraft that were late in taking off, at 0830 at 2000 feet over the base.  The 401st Group was picked up over Deenethorpe and the combat wing assembly line was followed as briefed.  The formation flew five miles north of Splasher #12 in order to avoid clouds and reached Splasher #11 two minutes ahead of the scheduled time. At this point the formation S-ed to lose the two minutes. As a result, the arrival at Selsey Bill was as called for on the Flight Plan.  Bombing altitude was reached more gradually than called for. The English Coast was departed at an altitude of 15,000 feet. Bombing altitude was reached five minutes off the English Coast.  The route to the target was followed as briefed and without incident.  Bombs were away at 1101 from 16,020 feet on a heading of 140°, at an IAS [Indicated Air Speed] of 149. The formation over the target is shown on the attached diagram.  Visibility in the target area was good. Photographs indicate good bombing results.  Several minutes after the target it was found that the low group was behind the combat wing formation after making a second bomb run. The formation was S-ed to allow the low group to catch up. As a result, the enemy coast was crossed four minutes late.  The time lost was made up while re-crossing the Channel and proceeding to base.  Enemy opposition, both flak and fighters, was slight. Friendly fighter support was reported as being good.
2. Aircraft Not Attacking. Aircraft 42-30994, Pilot, Lt. Seaman, returned early because of low oil pressure in the #2 Engine. This aircraft was not dispatched.
3. Lost Aircraft. No aircraft were lost.

[Three aircraft from the composite group actually flew in the Lead group. The figures in parenthesis indicate the actual attacking power over the target.]
[Signed] Clinton F. Ball, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer

1. General Narrative. Nine aircraft scheduled to fly in the Composite (High) Group of the 94th Combat Wing took off at 0807 – 0906 hours. As noted in the Combat Wing Leader’s Narrative, all ground crews were pressed for time in loading and servicing the ships.  One of the three scheduled aircraft that did not take off was the High Group Leader’s aircraft. By the time the lead team had made a change to another aircraft, the formation was between Cottesmore and Loughborough on the combat wing assembly line.  As indicated on the Track Chart, the lead aircraft of the high group reached Selsey Bill one minute behind the combat wing leader. He took his position as High Group Leader at 0959 in mid-Channel.  Up to the time of the arrival of the High Group Leader, a poor formation had been flown by the group. However, a good formation was achieved before the enemy coast was reached.  As indicated in the formation diagram and the attached explanation, only five aircraft bombed as representatives of the lead and high squadrons of the composite group. All five aircraft flew in the lead squadron.  Bombs were away at 1102. Results are indicated as being generally good – photo coverage being incomplete. A near miss on a hangar and bursts on the landing field are shown on the few photographs available.  The route followed was the same as that taken by the lead group. The route of the High Group Leader after a late take off is indicated on the Track Chart.
2. Aircraft Not Attacking. Aircraft 42-29848, Pilot Lt. Scarlett, returned early due to low oil pressure in the #3 engine. This aircraft was not dispatched.
3. Aircraft Lost. No aircraft were lost.

Three aircraft indicated above as having attacked the target with the composite formation actually flew in the lead group. The figures in parenthesis indicate the actual attacking power over the target.

1. The take-off was accomplished with some difficulty due to the late take-offs of some aircraft. All crews were pressed for time for loading and servicing their ships with the result that several aircraft took off late.
2. Assembly with the 401st Group was accomplished as scheduled, but the composite (high) group remained unformed due to the fact that the leader of the group was very late getting off.
3. The route to the English Coast was flown without incident and we departed there at 14,500 feet behind the 2nd Division. As we crossed the enemy coast the 1st Combat Wing pulled up in close left echelon with us. The formation of this (94th) Combat Wing improved greatly from just prior to this time with the arrival of the high group leader and the subsequent forming of his group.
4. The route to the target was as briefed. Two enemy aircraft were seen. Friendly fighter support was good. The bomb run was good; AFCE [Auto Flight Control Equipment] and ABC were used with good results.
5. Several minutes after the target it was reported that the low group was quite far behind, having made a second bomb run. This report was delayed due to very poor interphone communication in the lead aircraft. The formation was slowed down and S-ed, and the combat wing reformed in good shape.
6. In the vicinity of Paris, a formation of six FW-190’s attacked the low group, making one head on attack before being engaged by P-38’s.
7. Two bursts of flak were seen in the vicinity of Rouen. Let down was made from the enemy coast to 2,000 feet just after the English Coast and the combat wing was dispersed to return to base by groups.
8. VHF [Very High Frequency] communication was generally good.
9. Weather over the target was five-tenths, with large breaks in the immediate target vicinity.
10. Twenty-four aircraft from this group were over the target. All returned.

1. The 351st high group took off as briefed and assembled over the field. My ship and also the deputy lead ship were unable to take off due to failure of the aircraft to check out on the ground.
2. My take off was at 0848; and I joined the 94th Combat Wing at Point Z. Only my lead and low squadrons formed on me. The rest of the route to the target was as briefed. At the IP the low group was so far back that I decided to bomb second, and did so. The bombing results were good. We formed back on the lead group right after bombing and came back to England as briefed. At the English Coast we broke up the wing formation and returned to base in groups.
3. A formation of six Fw-190’’s made a pass at the low group, and was engaged by P-38’s afterwards. The fighter cover was good and we saw only two bursts of flak.
4. VHF was good; and we had no trouble hearing the combat wing leader.
5. We lost no aircraft.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0810 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0830 hours at 2,000 feet.
   3. Formed CBW at 0850 hours at 3,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0850 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 0950 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 3/10ths. Tops 12,000 feet.
      2. Visibility 6 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 330 degrees. 40 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. D.R. [Dead Reckoning] & PILOTAGE
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. PILOTAGE FIX AND GEE FIX
   9. Joined task force at X hours at X feet.
   10. Departed English Coast at 0945 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1010 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: None hours.
       2. Coming back: 1215 hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 330 degrees.
       2. 40 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: WIND BETWEEN TWO FIXES.
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 1049 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 140 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 16,020 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1101 hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: VISUAL, CAVU [Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited]
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: FLUXGATE POWER UNIT OUT.
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix - TARGET
       2. Time 1101 hours.
   17. Comments: VERY GOOD MISSION

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0848 hours.
   2. Group formed at SEE COMMENTS hours at _____ feet.
   3. Formed CBW at SEE COMMENTS hours at _____ feet.
   4. Began climb at SEE COMMENTS hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 0945 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 3/10ths. Tops _____ feet.
      2. Visibility 8 miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 330 degrees. 55 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. PILOTAGE, GEE
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. PILOTAGE
   9. Joined task force at 0957 hours at 16,600 feet.
   10. Departed English Coast at 0946 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 1018 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: 1026 hours.
       2. Coming back: 1139 hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 330 degrees.
       2. 55 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: PILOTAGE
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1054 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 132 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 17,000 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 1102½ hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: PILOTAGE NO CLOUDS – GROUND HAZE.
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: None
   16. Gee:
       1. (1) Coordinates of furtherest fix 48°50'N - 00°15'W
       2. (2) Time 1015 hours.
   17. Comments: DID NOT TAKE OFF TILL 0848. GROUP FOLLOWED BRIEFED ROUTE. TOOK OVER LEAD OF GROUP AT 0959.

Group: 351st Lead   Target: Chateauroux
Method of Bombing: Visual   Altitude: 16,000 feet
Wind Direction: 330°   Wind Velocity: 55K
Direction of Attack: Mag. Heading 140°

1. The I.P. was reached at 1053 as briefed and a general heading taken toward target. Ground haze and a course directly into the sun made the target difficult to see. However, target was sighted and necessary information from A.B.C. Computer was placed in sight and bombs were “away” at 1101 after a run of about 45 seconds. The sighting was good and good results were observed. The run was continued after Bombs Away for photographs.

Bombardier - Capt. William A. Winter   Pilot - 1st Lt. Donald A. Gaylord Navigator - Capt. Ralph Menees
Aircraft # Q825 [42-37825] Take-off - 0848  Landed - 1410
Objective - Air Field at Chateauroux, France
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - Hangar on East Corner of Field
Initial Point - As briefed
Method of Attack - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - _____    Composite Group - _____
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - _____   Composite Group - _____
Range Sighting only, Group - _____    Composite Group -_____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 500 # G.P.’s AN-M43
Number of Bombs Loaded - 12    Released - 12
Fusing, Nose - 1/10    Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Good
Mean Temp. Metro -5 Actual -5
Winds - Altitude - 16,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 330° Actual 330°  Velocity - Metro 52 Actual 52
Temp C. - Metro -16° C. Actual -18° C.

Group: 351   Target: Chateauroux
Method of Bombing: Group   Altitude: 17,800 feet
Wind Direction: 330°   Wind Velocity: 52 MPH
Direction of Attack: Mag. Heading 132°
Total Bombs Carried: 132
Total Bombs at Target: 132
Total Bombs Hitting Target: 132
Total Bombs Accounted For: 132
Total Bombs Unaccounted For: - _____

1. Brief Narrative:
    Target was easy to pick up and a long run could have been made except that the Lead Group interfered with the run. Couldn’t make a good run because of the Lead Group’s S-ing caught prop wash and was always over-running.
    Bombs were dropped on the briefed M.P.I. [Mean Point of Impact] and considerable damage was done. Two of the hangars were seen to be burning out of control long after we left the target.
    Bombs being toggled out by the other Bombardiers in the High Group caused an over in the bomb pattern. If bombs could have been salvoed, pattern would have been 100% better.

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Lyttle, William B.   Pilot - Captain Kelley, Harold G Navigator - Captain Matthews, Nelson E.
Aircraft # 509 [42-31509]  Take-off - 0848  Landed - 1410
Objective - Airfield at Chateauroux, France
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - As briefed
Initial Point - As briefed
Method of Attack - Group
Number of Attacking A/C in Group - 11    Composite Group - _____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own sighting operation - one
Deflection and Range sighting, Group - _____   Composite Group - _____
Range Sighting only, Group - _____    Composite Group - _____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 500 # M43 G.P. [General Purpose]
Number of Bombs Loaded - 132    Released - 132
Fusing, Nose - 1/10    Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Type of Release - Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Good
Mean Temp. Metro -5 Actual -5
Winds - Altitude - 16,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 330°  Actual 330°  Velocity - Metro 52  Actual 52  
Temp C. - Metro -16° C. Actual -18° C.

1. The target was the aerodrome at Châteauroux/ La Martinerie, France. Photo coverage was excellent for the Lead Group, but only one plane in the Composite Group took photos.
2. The pattern for the Lead Group is long and drawn out, with the main concentration being directly on the No. 2 and No. 3 hangars. The hangars are covered with bursts and the actual MPI seems to be very nearly as briefed. The pattern measures 4,952 feet by 1,754 feet and seems to be in two parts. One part of this pattern thoroughly blankets three of the four hangars, and the other part bursts in the landing area.
3. Accurate damage assessment is difficult due to the large number of bursts on the target; a partial damage estimate is as follows:
   1. Two direct hits on No. 1 hangar.
   2. Two direct hits, one near miss on No. 2 hangar.
   3. Three direct hits, an explosion, and a near miss on No. 3 hangar.
   4. Two near misses on No. 4 hangar.
4. The pattern of the Composite Group is incomplete. It measures 2,264 feet by 1,415 feet and is loose and scattered. Thirty-four bursts can be plotted, and a near miss on a hangar can be seen. Other bursts are in the landing field.

1. No leaflets were carried.
2. Crews report that bombing results were most excellent, many of them having seen the hangars on fire and smoke issuing from them. At this time photo evidence is not available. Crews observing the bombing results were at altitudes ranging from 16,000 to 17,000 feet. An explosion in a large hangar was observed ten minutes after bombs away.
3. Enemy fighter opposition was weak against this group flying a lead box and two squadrons of a high composite box. From 10 to 15 ME 109’s and FW 190’s were seen at three points during the mission. A few ME 109’s attacked A/C of this CW around the IP and at the enemy coast on the way in. Most of the attacks were made by both S/E [Single Engine] types between 1210 and 1225 hours just northwest of Paris on return. Most attacks were from head-on and tail from below and out of some cloud cover. There were a few attacks on both boxes from head-on above and level. A break in fighter escort just northwest of Paris enabled the only persistent attacks to be made. Some FW 190’s had white cowlings resembling P-47’s, some were yellow nosed, and others were painted a mottled grey with either white or black bellies. The majority of enemy attacks were made on the low group of the CW. E/A [Enemy Aircraft] made rolling attacks from 12 o’clock level and high on the low group or made passes in line abreast from level head-on.
4. No flak burst near this group but flak was observed in the distance at a few points. Near Vendôme at 1045 at 16,200 feet four or five bursts fair for height but very poor for deflection were observed. There were two bursts just before the target at 1100; they were accurate for height but poor for deflection. About 40 bursts were observed in the distance over Chartres at 1156. Meager flak was seen over Dreux, about 10 miles to the west of our formation, at 1200.
5. Weather was very good for bombing, 2/10ths clouds being reported.
6. Four long flat topped buildings, with a railroad running along-side, were seen just east of Selles St. D. [Selles-Saint-Denis]. At Romorantin, just west of Selles St. D. [Selles-Saint-Denis] a large building that looked like an A/C factory was seen. Some crews reported that the buildings at Selles St. D. [Selles-Saint-Denis] covered a very large area and seemed to be a new troop encampment. Others reported that it appeared more like factories. The Lisieux Folleville Airfield was seen and reported to have no activity. One crew reported having seen planes take off from Chateauroux after the bombing. Chateaudun was seen with no evidence of attack. An airfield north of Oréans was seen being bombed. A B-17, too far away from our formation to be identified was seen going down in a spin shortly before the target.
7. Fighter support was generally as briefed and very good. There was, however, a period from around 1210 to 1225 during which no escort appeared to disperse the S/E [Single Engine] Enemy A/C [Aircraft] attacking at that time. A few sneak attacks from out of cloud cover low were made despite the escort, but friendly fighters dispersed most of these.

1. Enemy tactics and friendly fighter escort have been covered in Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Narrative Teletype. No further report is forthcoming.

Target - Chataeuroux, France    Time Bombs Away: 1101 hours
1. Route followed. - Courseuilles-sur-Mer - Thury - Harcourt - Champigny - Ecueilles - Target - Chanteau - Biville-sur-Mer
2. Visibility at Target. - Scattered cloud   Contrails - None
3. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Lead: 351, High: Composite, Low: 401
4. General Axis of attack (Lead A/C) - 140 Degrees Magnetic.
5. Length of Straight and Level Bomb Run: 90 seconds
6. Evasive Action Taken? - None
7. Turn after Bombing. - Left turn to 355° Magnetic
8.(a)Number of A/C Damaged By A/A [Antiaircraft] Gunfire: 0
 (b)Number of A/C Lost to A/A Gunfire: 0
9. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control used:
 (a) Route out: Vendome, 16,200 feet, 1045, 4 or 5 bursts, height fair, deflection poor. Just before target, 16,000 feet, 1100 - 2 bursts, height good, deflection poor.
 (b) Target: None
 (c) Route back: Orleans, 16,200 feet, 1150 - moderate, height good, deflection poor.
Chartres, 15,300 feet, 1156 - 40 bursts, height good, far off to left.
Dreux, 16,000 feet, 1200 - meager, height poor, 10 miles to left.
Rouen, 16,000 feet, 1222, 12 bursts, height poor, far away.
All bursts black, and too far away to determine type of fire control.
10. Comments, Phenomena: None
11. No. of A/C Carrying "Window" [Chaff]: None
Observed Results: None

Target - Chataeuroux, France    Time Bombs Away: 1102 hours
1. Route followed. - Courseulles-sur-Mer - Thury - Harcourt - Champigny - Ecueilles - Target - Chanteau - Biville-sur-Mer.
2. Visibility at Target. - Scattered cloud  Contrails - None
3. Position of Group in relation to other Groups: Lead: 351, High: Composite, Low: 401
4. General Axis of attack (Lead A/C) - 132 Degrees Magnetic.
5. Length of Straight and Level Bomb Run: 90 seconds
6. Evasive Action Taken? - None
7. Turn after Bombing. - Left turn to 355° Magnetic
8. (a)Number of A/C Damaged By A/A [Antiaircraft] Gunfire: 0
 (b)Number of A/C Lost to A/A Gunfire: 0
9. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control used:
 (a) Route out: None
 (b) Target: None
 (c) Route back: Chartres, 17,000 feet, 1140 - moderate, 15 miles to left.
Rouen, 17,000 feet, 1228 - 30 bursts, far away to left.
10. Comments, Phenomena: None
11. No. of A/C Carrying "Window" [Chaff]: None
Observed Results: None

1. The following comments were made at interrogation after the mission of this date:
508 Squadron:
A/C 192-R: [42-31192] Not enough time before take-off. – Lt. Nelson.
A/C 702-A: [42-31702] Why wasn’t 702 ready? - Lt. Tynan.
A/C 882-L: [42-29882] More gas could have been carried to insure safe return. We were very low on gas. – Lt. Johnson.
509 Squadron:
A/C 863-Y: [42-29863] Disorder and trouble in getting equipment; too short a time between briefing and take-off. – Crew.
A/C 384-T: [42-31384] EM [Enlisted Men] mess has good lunch but poor evening meal. We need good meal at evening. – Whole Crew.
A/C 914-S: [42-39914] Better meals for EM on return from missions. - Crew.
A/C 760-M: [42-39760] Too crowded and confused in drying room under new system; not enough time to change and get to plane. – Crew.
510 Squadron:
A/C 763-A: [42-31763] No morning classes following day of mission. – Lt. Miller.  More time before briefing. Lt. McClelland.
A/C 853-P: [42-39853] During missions have hot meal in the evening. – Lt. Winton.  No ground school until noon following day of mission. – Lt. Ross.  If flight plan not followed, announce over VHF. – Lt. Winton.
A/C 835-N: [42-39853] Trucks are still too slow in bringing crews in from planes. – Lt. Raser.
511 Squadron:
A/C 714-R: [42-31714] Transportation very poor. – Lt. Nesmith.
A/C 694-V: [42-31694] Serve good meal when flying personnel return. – Crew. A/C not gassed; had to wait. – Crew.
A/C 038-R: [42-38038] Called too late before briefing. – Lt. Nay.

[Signed] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-30994, 508th Squadron, returned early because the oil pressure on the #2 Engine dropped to 35 PSI. Investigation disclosed an air lock in the oil pump. Relief valve was removed and Oil pressure is normal.
   2. Airplane No. 42-29848, 510th Squadron, returned early because the oil pressure on #3 Engine dropped to 55 PSI, according to the Pilot’s statement. Investigation disclosed normal oil pressure, but a defective #3 carburetor.
2. Battle Damage: None.

1. Abortives:
   1. Aircraft No. 42-29848, 510th Squadron, returned early because the oil pressure on #3 Engine dropped to 55 PSI, according to the Pilot’s statement. Investigation disclosed normal oil pressure, but a defective #3 carburetor. This report is also included in the Mission Summary Report of the Lead Combat Box.
2. Battle Damage: None.

1. The following armament malfunctions and failures were reported by the Lead Combat Box upon completion of the Mission of 5 February, 1944:
   1. A/C 42-31384 – Top turret sight bulb burned out. Power signal light out.
   2. A/C 42-39760 – Top right inboard station had to be salvoed.
   3. A/C 42-31711 – Ball turret door handle broken off.
   4. A/C 42-3141 – One rack salvoed.
2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The following armament malfunctions and failures were reported by the Composite (High) Combat Box upon completion of the Mission of 5 February, 1944:
   1. A/C 42-39835 – Left tail gun would not feed properly.
   2. A/C 42-29835 – Ball turret door sprung.
2. 2. The necessary repairs and adjustments have been made.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 5,540 rounds of Caliber .50 ammunition by aircraft of the Lead Combat Box on the Mission of 5 February, 1944.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported an expenditure of 4,385 rounds of Caliber .50 ammunition by aircraft of the Composite (High) Combat Box on the Mission of 5 February, 1944.

1. Following is the disposition of bombs by aircraft of the Lead Combat Box in the Mission of 5 February, 1944.

1. Following is the disposition of bombs by aircraft of the High Combat Box on the Mission of 5 February, 1944.

NOTE: 3 A/C Scheduled to fly in the High Group flew with the Lead Group. Their Bombs are included in the Lead Group Report.

[Signed:] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer

Aircraft No. F-9848 Squadron - 510th – High Group   Pilot - Lt. J.C. Scarlett
Time of Abortive - 1005  Location when Aborted - At Point Z
Reason - #3 Engine oil pressure down to 55, Engine coughing and Engine was feathered.
Enemy Opposition Encountered - No
[Signed] J.C. Scarlett, 2nd Lt. Altitude When Aborted: 16,600 ft. Disposition of Bombs: Dropped Bombs in Channel.

Aircraft No. T-994 Squadron - 508 – (Lead Box)   Pilot - 508 – (Lead Box)
Time of Abortive - 0949  Location when Aborted - 50°22’N - 01°53’E
Reason - Oil Press. On # Two Eng. Fell to 20 lbs. – Oil temp. went up so feathered Eng. Late T.O. – did not contact group
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
[Signed] R.A. Seaman Altitude When Aborted: 16,000 Disposition of Bombs: Delayed Action – Jettisoned – 50°22’N - 01°53’E at 0949 Hrs.

Aircraft No. G-850 Squadron - 510 – High   Pilot - Lt. S.L. McCluskey
Time of Abortive - _____  Location when Aborted - _____
Reason - Blew Expander Tube
Enemy Opposition Encountered - _____
[Signed] Sterling L. McCluskey, 1st Lt., A.C. [Air Corps]
F.T.O. [Failed Take Off - Handwritten in Large Letters]

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing] Lead Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 3141–H, 8023–P, 1192–R, 1711–F, 1702–A, 9882–L, 0994–T*
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 1384–T, 9863–Y, 9760–M, 9914–S, 7845–F, 8032–P*
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 7825–Q, 1238–A, 1714–R, 1694–V, 7492–B*

   
   

   b. 94th C.B.W. [Combat Wing] High Composite Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 9849–V
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 1721–S, 1763–A, 9835–N, 9850–G, 9831–H, 9853–P*, 8038–R, 9848–F, 1612–B, 1509–V,
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 9835–Y
   * Denotes Delay Fuzing

2. Target: Z-247
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 Call Sign	W/T PUV R/T Daisychain		Squadron	510 Call Sign	W/T UQW R/T Paramount
   Squadron	509 Call Sign	W/T LBT R/T Ridingwhip		Squadron	511 Call Sign	W/T MGX R/T Thickfrost

4. Lead Box: Taxi – 0750;     Take-Off – 0805;     E.T.D. Over Field – 0840

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   0945	16,000 Ft	Selsey Bill

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   1237	16,000 Ft	50°00'N - 01°15'E

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1305	10,000 Ft	Beachy Head

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return): 1410 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "N"
10. Bomb load of Each A/C: Lead Box
    508 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P.[General Purpose], Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    509 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    510 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    511 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: High Box
    508 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    509 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    510 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
    511 Squadron: 12 x 500 pound G.P., Fuse - 1/10 Nose, 1/100 Tail
12. Fuel Load of each A/C:
    A/C with TOKIO TANKS: 1700 Gallons A/C without TOKIO TANKS: _____ Gallons
13. Group Leader:
    a. Lead box: Name: E.A. Romig Rank: Col. A/C: 7825-Q Sqdn. 511th
14. b. High box: Name: H.G. Kelley Rank: Capt. A/C: 1721-S Sqdn. 510th
15. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    [None]   
16. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:
17. Lead Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	3141–H	0913	1429	509	1384–T	0807½	1420
    	8023–P	0808	1432		9863–Y	0810	1424
    	1192–R	0832	1412		9760–M	0830	1425
    	1711–F	0822	1433		9914–S	0830½	1427
    	1702–A	0811½	1433½		7845–F	0808½	1427½
    	9882–L	0812	1434		8032–P	0809	1428
    	0994–T	0902	1051
    511	7825–Q	0809½	1419
    	1238–A	0815	1421
    	1714–R	0825	1421½
    	1694–V	0833	1422
    	7492–B	0831	1423

18. High Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	9849–V	0834	1411	510	1721–S	F.T.O.
    					1763–A	0906	1432
    					9835–N	0807	1435
    					9850–G	F.T.O.
    					9831–H	F.T.O.
    					9853–P	0841	1410
    					8038–R	0829	1426
    					1509–V	0857	1408
    					1612–B	0826	1409
    					9848–F	0846	1207
    511	9835–Y	0853	1410½

    
    

    F.T.O. - Failed Take Off
    
    Report Compiled By Leo A Curley, T/Sgt.
    
    

    Sqdn.	A/C Letter	Designation	Box	Remarks
    510	721–S	F.T.O.	High	ASI [Air Speed Indicator] Meter out.
    510	850–G	F.T.O.	High	Blew Expander tube.
    510	831–H	F.T.O.	High	Runaway Supercharger.
    508	994–T	Abortive	LEAD	Low Oil Pressure #2 Engine.
    510	848–F	Abortive	High	Low Oil Pressure #3 Engine.
    511	5812–O	Abortive	High	Lost place in formation and couldn't regain same.

1. Twelve aircraft were scheduled to fly two squadron positions in the composite group formation. The formation diagram indicates those aircraft that did take off as in their scheduled positions. There was only a semblance of a group formation until the group leader appeared after a late take off.
2. Of the twelve scheduled aircraft, three, including the group leader’s aircraft, failed to take off; one aborted before becoming dispatched; and three flew with the lead group when it appeared that there would be no high group leader. Five aircraft were left to fly in the lead squadron of the composite formation, as indicated in the diagram showing the formation over the target.

[Signed:] Robert B. Stratton, Captain, Air Corps, Statistical Officer

F.T.O. - Failed Take Off Kelly - 1721 S - F.T.O., Changed to 1509 V - Lt Grunow's plane.
McClelland - 1763 A - Flew with Lead Group
Raser - 9835 H - Flew with Lead Group
Nay - 8038 R - Flew with Lead Group
McCluskey - 9850 G - F.T.O.
Borchert - 9831 H - F.T.O.

Kelly - 1509 V - Late Take-off
Scarlett - 9848 F - Abortive