351st Bomb Group

1. Airplane and Crew Assignment Check.
   C.O.’s Comment: ____
   
   
2. Time Schedule:

   Lead Box
   Stations –	0605
   Start Engines –	0615
   Taxi -	0625
   Take Off -	0640
   Last Take Off -	___

   
   
3. Targets: Brussels - Melsbroek
   Primary: Melsbroek Airdrome, Brussels
   Secondary: Any airdrome
   Last Resort: ___
   
   
   
4. Loading:
   High Box: 38 x 100# GP’s [General Purpose]
   Lead Box: All
   Low Box: All
   Nickels [Propaganda Leaflets] in Ship # - None
   
   
5. Gasoline Loading:
   Tokyos [Planes with extra wing fuel tanks]: Normal
   Non-Tokyos:
   Remarks: Woodbridge for low gasoline.
   4 hour mission.
   
   

6. Wing Formation	94th (A) CBW	94th (B) CBW	Comp. Group	Comp. CBW
   Lead	351st
   Low	401st
   High	457th

   
   
7. Division Formation:

   Position	CBW [Combat Wing]	Target	Departure Time at Coast
   Lead	94th	Brussels A/D [Airdrome]	0830
   2nd	40th	Brussels A/D	0833
   3rd	1st	Coke Ovens, Brussels	0836
   4th	41st	Brussels A/D	0839
   5th
   6th
   7th
   8th
   2nd Division		Tours & NoBall, Courcelles - Belgium	0830
   3rd Division		Reims, France	0830
   Marauders [B-26]
   RAF [Royal Air Force]

   Remarks: Join any 1st Division formation.
   
   
8. Fighter Cover: Complete.

   • [Force]	[Latitude & Longitude]	[Time]
     _ Groups,	___	at ___
     _ Groups,	___	at ___
     _ Groups,	___	at ___
     _ Groups,	___	at ___

     
     
9. Group Assembly is:

   Box	Altitude	Place
   Lead [351st]	11,500'	Deenethorpe Buncher
   401st	10,000’	Deenethorpe Buncher
   457th	13,000’	Deenethorpe Buncher

   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
12. Weather - _____
    
13. Special Instructions to Navigators, Bombardiers:
    Chaff released 4 units every 10 seconds from 2 minutes before IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] to Target.
    
    
    
14. Squadron Leaders and Group Deputy report to Target Room. All but Pilots Dismissed.
    
15. (A) Code Words –

    PFF Bombing Weather –	BAVIT
    Visual Bombing -	Hang Dog
    Authenticator –	Milk Run
    Recall -	Love Yoke Jig Mike
    Division Lead	_____

    
    
    (B) Call Signs:

    	Call Sign	Flares	Tail Letters
    351st A	Woodcraft Red	RY [Red Yellow]	J
    351st B
    401st A	Woodcraft White	R	S
    401st B
    457th A	Woodcraft Blue	G	U
    457th B
    Composite
    1st C.B.W.
    40th C.B.W.
    41st C.B.W.
    Composite C.B.W.

    (C)

    U.S. Fighters	Denver	(1-1 to 1-5)
    R.A.F. Fighters	Garlic One
    Bombers	Goldsmith One-Five
    U.S. Grnd. Control	Tackline
    R.A.F. Grnd. Control	Spice cake

    Remarks: Radio silence by all except CW Lead.
    
    (D)

    Colors of the Day
    Time	Color	Letter	Challenge
    0200 – 800	G-G	G	B
    800 – 1400	G-Y	H	W

    
    
    (E) Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. - All except:
    2. - 149-X, 725-L & Leader.
    3. - 169-N, 144-R
    4. - Air Sea Rescue VHF D/F
       
       
16. Let-Down on Splasher Deenethorpe, if overcast.
    351st A 020° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
    351st B   ° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
    401st A 360° Mag.
    457th A 040° Mag.
    
    
17. Flying Control. –
    1. Taxi Plan.
    2. Emergency Fields.
    3. Landing Aids.
       
       
18. Special Instructions:
    
    
    

1. General Narrative. The take-off was made on time and the assembly at Deenethorpe was accomplished as briefed. The Groups were in Wing Formation by departure time from Deenethorpe, which was made on time. The route over England was flown as briefed and the 351st Bomb Group arrived at the division Assembly Line five (5) minutes early. A 270° turn was made in order to kill time. The formation left the English coast on time and on course. From VHF conversation which was overheard, the entire Division was apparently in the proper formation.
    Low stratus cloud was sighted in the target area when enemy territory was reached. It was impossible to at first determine if the target was clearly visible or not, so the bombing run was made as briefed. The bombardier picked up the target too late to bomb and so the 351st Group executed a large 360° turn, coming in after the last group in the Division. The High and Low Groups of the 94th Combat Wing formation bombed on the first run and executed a short 360° turn behind us, coming out behind the 1st Division formation and ahead of the 351st Group Formation. On the second run, the 351st Group approached on a different heading which permitted a better view of the target, and bombed successfully. Although the target and MPI [Mean Point of Impact] were smoking considerably from previous hits, it was possible to see some of our bombs strike across the MPI. The group was in good formation at the time of bombs away.
    Accurate flak was encountered on the first run, but on the second run, it was much lighter and very inaccurate. One plane in the 351st Group was seen to feather two engines shortly after the target and it slowly fell back. A flare was fired for fighter support and it was later observed that friendly fighters were covering him.
    The return trip was flown as briefed, with slight exceptions in time and route shown on the Track Chart. The aforementioned straggler returned safely to base shortly after the main group formation had landed.
   
2. Aircraft Not Attacking. Twenty (20) aircraft, including one flying spare took off in the formation as indicated on the following diagram. Aircraft 42-39835, pilot Lt. McIntyre, the flying spare, returned as planned. Aircraft 42-97191, pilot Lt. Miller, returned after forty-six (46) minutes of flying time with the report that the elevator was loose. The same crew took off in aircraft 42-38146, but was unable to locate the formation and so returned to base.
    The remaining eighteen (18) aircraft were dispatched and continued to attack the target.
3. Aircraft Lost. No aircraft were lost on the Mission of 10 April, 1944.
   
4. Air Commander and Group Leader. Lt. Colonel Robert W. Burns and Captain Douglas T. Harris, flying in aircraft 42-31955, were the Air Commander and Combat Wing Leader respectively.
   
   

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0640 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0730 hours at 11,500 feet.
   3. Formed CBW [Combat Wing] at 0815 hours at 18,000 feet.
   4. Began climb at 0750 hours.
   5. Reached altitude at 0850 hours.
   6. Weather encountered over England:
      1. Clouds 1/10ths. Tops 3,000 feet.
      2. Visibility Unl. [Unlimited] miles.
      3. Wind at altitude 230 degrees. 35 knots per hour.
   7. Means of navigation over England. Radio, GEE and Pilotage
   8. Means of checking Metro Winds. GEE
   9. Joined task force at 0823 hours at Chelmsford.
   10. Departed English Coast at 1003 hours.
   11. Arrived Enemy Coast at 0830 hours.
   12. Fighter Rendezvous:
       1. Going in: ___ hours.
       2. Coming back: ___ hours.
   13. Wind used for bombing:
       1. 230 degrees.
       2. 35 knots per hour.
       3. How determined: Metro
   14. Description of Bomb Run and Method of target Identification:
       1. Reached IP [Initial Point of bomb run] at 0905 hours.
       2. Mag [Magnetic Compass] heading over target 120 degrees.
       3. Altitude over Target 21,500 feet.
       4. Time bombs away 0928 hours.
       5. Method of target identification and weather over target: Identified by pilotage. 3/10th thin cloud just west of target area at 3-5,000’.
   15. Difficulties encountered with Radio, compass, and special equipment: NONE
   16. Gee:
       1. Coordinates of furtherest fix 51°47'N-03°50'E [27 miles SW of The Hague, Netherlands]
       2. Time 0952 hours.
   17. Comments: VERY SATISFACTORY.

Group: 351st Lead Box
Target: Melsbroek A/D, Brussels, Belgium
Method of Attack: Visual
Altitude: 22,000’
Direction of Attack: 120° Mag. Heading
Wind Direction: 234°
Wind Velocity: 39 MPH
Bombardier’s Narrative: We turned at the briefed I.P. and started a run for the target area. On the bombing run the C-1 [Autopilot] became inoperative and I told the pilot to follow the P.D.I.[Pilot's Direction Indicator]. The target could not be readily seen because of ground haze, so short of the target we made a 360° turn and headed in on a magnetic heading of 120°. I preset my drift and the briefed aiming point was sighted on. Synchronization was good and bombs were away at 0928. My left rack failed to release and I jettisoned them in the Channel.

[Signed:] George M. Decker, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. George M. Decker  Pilot - Capt. D. Harris Navigator - 1st Lt. C.A. Cleveland
Aircraft B-17G 1955-K  Take-off - 0640 Landed - 1058
Objective - Melsbroek A/D, Brussels, Belgium
Aiming Point (MPI)[Mean Point of Impact] - South Dispersal Area
Initial Point - ___
Method of Attack - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 20   Composite Group -
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation:
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: 1. Composite Group -
Range Sighting only, Group - 1    Composite Group -
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 38 x 100 LB. M30 G.P.[General Purpose]
Number of Bombs Loaded - 38   Released - __
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - Instantanous
Synchronization - On
Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - Yes
Mean Temp. Metro - 10.5 Actual - 10.5
Winds - Altitude - 22,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 234°  Actual 234°  Velocity - Metro 39  Actual 39
Temp C. - Metro -34° C. Actual -34° C.

1. The target was the A/D [Airdrome] at Melsbroek near Brussels. Photo coverage was fair but somewhat hazy. A tilted camera in the lead ship gave complete coverage.
2. The pattern was scattered and loose with the heaviest concentration in the target area. This concentration measured 2,439 feet by 1,408 feet and all but three of the dispersal buildings are covered with smoke. A direct hit on a building can be seen and a hit on a dispersal shed. The MPI [Mean Point of Impact] of this concentration is 621 feet to the left of the briefed MPI.
3. There are five clusters of bombs that are scattered over an area 8,482 feet long. Little damage will be done by these bursts.

1. No leaflets were carried.
2. Bombing for this Group, flying Lead, was excellent. After making a 360° turn to make a second run, the Group bombed on a magnetic heading of 120° and the pattern runs right across the briefed MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Crews report much smoke over the A/F [Air Field] after turning for home.
3. No E/A were seen by this Group.
4. Meager inaccurate flak was encountered at the coast just south of Nieuport [Nieuwpoort]. Flak at the target was moderate and accurate, continuous following. Several crews saw what they believed were rockets fired from the target area. Flak was observed at a few points on the route back but none of it was accurate for our formation.
5. Weather for the entire mission was satisfactory. It was clear over the Base at take-off and at return. There was some cloud over the target when the Group made its first run, causing the decision to make a second run.
6. Nil.
7. No Pathfinder units were employed. Fighter support was good during the entire mission.

1. No report on enemy tactics beyond that contained in paragraph 3 of the Narrative Teletype [S-2 Intelligence Narrative] is being submitted.
[Signed:] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corp, Group S-2

1. Target: Assigned - Brussels/Melsbroek Bombed - Brussels/Melsbroek
2. Route as Flown. - As briefed, except that last leg of route deviated to the north, coming out between Schouwen and Overflakkee Islands.
3. Weather Conditions - A. at Target. - 2-3/10ths cloud  B. En route - 3-4/10ths at enemy coast, increasing to 5-7/10ths close to target area.
4. Were our A/C "Seen" or "Unseen" targets? (a) At Target - seen (b) Enroute - not known
 Any Condensation Trails? - No
5. Description of Flak, including type of Fire Control: 5. Moderate, black and white, continuous following, accurate for height and deflection. There was a noticeable increase in intensity and accuracy during the second run over the target. Several very accurate guns were pin-pointed at 50°54’N-04°20E, just at the N edge of the city of Brussels.
6. Flak encountered or observed en route. (In the order experienced) -
 Dunkirk, 0852, 20,500 feet – meager (about 12 bursts) inaccurate.
 Chievres, 0903, 21,000 feet – meager (about 15 bursts), height good, deflection poor.
 Antwerp, 0932, 21,400 feet – moderate, height good, deflection poor – off to the left.
 Gilze en Rijen, 0936, 21,400 feet – meager, inaccurate.
 ALL FLAK APPEARED TO BE CONTINUOUS FOLLOWING.
7. Was Chaff carried? - Yes How discharged? As briefed.
8. Position of Group - Lead
9. Group – 351 A/C over enemy terr. – 18 A/C damaged – 8 A/C lost to flak – 0 Time over Target – 0928 Time of bombs away – 0928 Height – 21,800’ Axis of attack – 120° Mag. Bomb run – 120 sec.
10. Comments - Phenomena: Several crews reported as many as 18 rockets fired from Brussels, curving up and then down before reaching our altitude.

    510 Squadron
A/C 721-S: Truck drivers should be more careful. They turn corners so fast that the guns are thrown all over the dirt. – All crew.
A/C 975-O: I think every plane should have two pairs of field glasses, one in nose and one in tail, for observation of other ships in formation. – Lt. Hopkins.
Our Operations did not get us up in time this morning; we did not even get to briefing until it was half over, and had no breakfast. – All EM.[Enlisted Men]
A/C 757-G: Get EM [Enlisted Men up earlier; they did not have briefing and very little breakfast. – Lt. McClelland.
A/C 196-M: Crew was gotten up late for briefing; was refused food at mess hall. Men were unable to have breakfast. – Sgts. Hullender and Petereit.

    511 Squadron
A/C 780-G: Call replacements in time to let them get something to eat. Men had only five minutes before take-off. – All EM.[Enlisted Men]
No more second runs over target at same altitude. – Lt. Lechner.
A/C 153-F: Transportation very poor again before station time. – Whole crew.
A/C 318-S: Waist guns should be staggered; only one of us can wear flak suit. – Sgts. Rybaczewski and Jordan.
I object to having to crank up landing gear; today I was covered with sweat when I got it up. – Sgt. Barton.
Bombardier’s seat should be moved back or shaft of chin turret straightened – it is impossible to use in its present position. – Lt. Loiacono.

    509 Squadron
A/C 144-R: Did not send transportation for us. – Lt. McLawhorn.

[Signed] Robert P. Ramsey, Captain, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence]

1. Abortives:
   1. Airplane No. 42-38146, returned early because the Pilot was unable to locate the formation. (508th Squadron) A/C replaced, 191.
   2. Airplane No. 42-39835, returned early as planned. (510th Squadron)
   3. Airplane No. 42-97191, returned early because of fluttering elevators, according to the Pilot’s statement.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 42-31955, 508th Squadron. Flak punctured leading edge of left wing panel between #1 and #2 nacelles, causing skin damage and damage to de-icer boot. Flak damaged #1 cowl, clipped two spark plug leads and bent rocker box cover. Flak entered right side of fuselage at radio room and chipped off several wires. Two flak holes underside of left wing damaging #2 tank.
   2. Airplane No. 42-31757, 508th Squadron. Shell case hole leading edge of left wing near #1 nacelle. Skin damage to underside of #3 nacelle by flak. Skin damage to side of #2 nacelle by flak. Skin hole underside of left wing panel near #1 nacelle by flak.
   3. Airplane No. 42-97144, 509th Squadron. Two flak holes underside LH stabilizer, skin damage only. One flak hole through RH stabilizer. One flak hole through LH wing tip. One flak hole through RH wing tip. One flak hole entered main tank near #3 nacelle. One flak hole in #1 nacelle, damaging intercooler. One flak hole through body compression strut while doors were open. One flak hole right side of fuselage rear of top turret. One flak hole leading edge RH stabilizer. One small flak hole underside both R and L wing tip. One flak hole underside #1 nacelle.
   4. Airplane No. 42-31725, 509th Squadron. Flak hole in both left and right elevators. One flak hole through Left wing outer panel. One flak hole right side of fuselage under navigator’s window.
   5. Airplane No. 42-97169, 509th Squadron. Two flak holes LH elevator. One flak hole underside LH outer wing panel. One flak hole LH inner wing panel, underside, near inspection plate. One flak hole through inspection plate left side. One flak hole through dorsal fin. One flak hole through rudder. One flak hole through fuselage right side at tail gunner’s compartment. Numerous small flak holes underside of fuselage between ball turret and nose. One flak hole through left aileron. One flak hole leading edge of left wing damaging main spar and compression member. Two flak holes top of left wing outer panel. One flak hole top of fuselage near radio hatch.
   6. Airplane No. 42-97149, 509th Squadron. One flak hole through L elevator. Three flak holes through L wing outer panel. One flak hole through left side of fuselage near navigator’s window. One flak hole through right side of fuselage above waist window.
   7. Airplane No. 42-31988, 510th Squadron. Two flak holes through LH wing inboard panel. Two flak holes through Left wing outboard panel. One flak hole #2 nacelle hitting oil line. One flak hole left side of fuselage under navigator’s compartment damaging electric wiring. Several small flak holes underside both stabilizers and elevators, one control arm bulkhead damaged. One flak hole underside left wing damaging Tokyo. Flak hole #1 nacelle hitting oil line. Several small flak breaks underside LH inboard wing panel.
   8. Airplane No. 42-39835, 510th Squadron. Three small flak holes underside LH wing panel. Two flak holes through rear of #1 nacelle hitting main spar.
   9. Airplane No. 42-37780, 511th Squadron. One flak hole underside of RH wing inboard panel.
   10. Airplane No. 42-39848, 511th Squadron. One flak tear underside of right elevator. Two small flak holes through vertical stabilizer.
   11. Airplane No. 42-97318, 511th Squadron. One flak hole leading edge left wing outboard panel. One flak hole leading edge L wing tip.
   12. Airplane No. 42-38153, 511th Squadron. One flak hole leading edge left stabilizer tip. One flak hole through top of right stabilizer.
   13. Airplane No. 42-31714, 511th Squadron. One flak hole leading edge left wing near #1 nacelle. One flak hole underside right wing inboard panel.
   14. Airplane No. 42-31875, 511th Squadron. Two flak holes leading edge of wing, one on each side of nose. One flak hole #2 nacelle. One flak hole side of #1 nacelle.

   TOTAL A/C DAMAGED		MINOR DAMAGE		BY FLAK		BY FLAK AND FRIEND
   13		13		12		1

1. The following information has been compiled from the Armament Report and the Bombardier’s Narrative.
   1. A/C 472-H Position 1, Element 1, Low Squadron, Pilot – Anderson and Bombardier – Davis states that the electric system on bomb rack and the intervalometer was out. Bombs would not salvo and Pilot used the emergency release with a delay of ten seconds. Ground check revealed the salvo cable was caught in salvo bar.
   2. A/C 848-C Position 2, Element 1, Low Squadron, Pilot – Hoder and Bombardier – Beard could not open bomb bay doors at the proper time. Bombs were released by Pilot with a delay in release of ten seconds. Ground check found that key in shaft was broke.
   3. A/C 780-G Position 3, Element 2, Low Squadron, Pilot – Brooks and Bombardier – Hamel could not open bomb bay doors electrically and Pilot emergency release was used with a delay of fifteen seconds. This apparently was a high altitude malfunction.
2. This Group furnished the Lead Box and the bomb load was 100 LB. M30 G.P. Fusing was 1/10 Nose and Instant Tail.
3. The pattern was 2,439’ x 1,408’ and actual M.P.I. [Mean Point of Impact] is 621’ left of briefed M.P.I.

1. The following armament malfunctions and failures were reported on the Mission of 10 April, 1944.
   1. A/C 42-97472 – The bombardier attempted to salvo before the doors were fully open. The pilot then released the bombs with the emergency release. The ship has been ground checked by the armament officer and the bombardier, and no malfunctions were observed.
   2. A/C 42-39848 – Bomb bay doors opened once and then closed. On the second attempt to open the doors, the key broke in the shaft. Pilot used emergency release to dispose of bombs. The shaft has been replaced.
   3. A/C 42-37780 - Bomb bay doors would not open electrically. The pilot’s emergency release was used. This, apparently, was a high altitude malfunction, as the ship checks out perfectly on the ground. The charging handle on the right nose gun broke off, and has been replaced.

1. The Station Ordnance Officer has reported the expenditure of 3,380 rounds of Caliber .50 ammunition on the Mission of 10 April, 1944.

1. Following is the disposition of all bombs loaded for the Mission of 10 April, 1944.

1. The following deficiencies and disabilities were determined through interrogation:
    511th Bombardment Squadron:
A/C 780-G Mask cracked on seam. – Sgt. J. Fedelem.

[Signed:] Ernest J. Cater, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Group Equipment Officer

Aircraft No. 9835 Squadron - 510   Pilot - McIntyre
Time of Abortive - Approx. 8:50  Location when Aborted - Approx. 2 miles from enemy coast.
Reason - Spare – Returned as planned.
Disposition of Bombs: Brought back
Altitude At Time of Aborting: 20,000’  
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
Remarks:
[Signed] George P. McIntyre



Aircraft No. 38146 Squadron - 511   Pilot - Miller
Time of Abortive - 0905  Location when Aborted - Clacton [-on-sea]
Reason - Couldn’t find our Group due to late take off. All other Groups were full.
Disposition of Bombs: Return
Altitude At Time of Aborting: 18,000’  
Enemy Opposition Encountered - None
Remarks:
[Signed] Carl E. Miller

1. Call Letter and Last Four numbers of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing   351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: 8146–D, 1955–K
   Sqdn 509th A/C: 1725–L, 7149–X, 7144–R, 7169–N
   Sqdn 510th A/C: 1975–O, 1988–C, 7196–M, 0857–J, 1721–S
   Sqdn 511th A/C: 7472–H, 7191–X, 8753–F, 1714–R, 9848–C, 7318–S, 7875–P, 7780–G (Spare)

   
   
2. Target: Boiler & ZB-102
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T MYP R/T SEAGREEN		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T RYJ R/T RANGER
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T PDZ R/T CUPPING		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T KDP R/T UNCLASP

4. "A" LEAD Box: Taxi–0625; Take-Off –0640; E.T.D. Field–0640
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast OUT:
   0830	18,000 Ft	Clacton
   0852	18,000 Ft	51°07'N-02°40'E [Nieuwpoort, Belgium]

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Recrossing Enemy Coast:
   0941	22,000 Ft	51°44'N-03°45'E [Renesse, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of crossing English Coast IN:
   1012	8,000 Ft	Orfordness

8. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1044 Hours
9. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
10. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Low Box
    508 Squadron: 38 x 100 GP [General Purpose] 1/10 Nose x Instantaneous Tail [Fuse]
    509 Squadron: 38 x 100 GP [General Purpose] 1/10 Nose x Instantaneous Tail [Fuse]
    510 Squadron: 38 x 100 GP [General Purpose] 1/10 Nose x Instantaneous Tail [Fuse]
    511 Squadron: 38 x 100 GP [General Purpose] 1/10 Nose x Instantaneous Tail [Fuse]
    
    
    
11. Fuel Load of each A/C:
    A/C with TOKIO TANKS: 1700 Gallons A/C without TOKIO TANKS: ___ Gallons
12. Group Leader:
    a. Lead Box: Name: Robert W. Burns Rank: Lt. Col. A/C: 1955-K  Sqdn. 508th
    
13. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    Robert W. Bowles Lt. Col. 1955-K 509th
14. Actual Times Off and Return by Squadrons and A/C Letters:
15. Lead Box

    Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C No. & Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
    508	1955–K			509	1725–L
    	1757–G				7149–X
    					7144–R
    					7169–N
    510	1975–O			511	7472–H
    	1988–C				7191–X
    	7196–M				8153–F
    	0857–J				1714–R
    	1721–S				9848–C
    	9835–N	Spare			7318–S
    					1875–P
    					7780–G	Spare

    Report Compiled By A.J.B., Sgt.