351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Front Line Fortress in Metz, France Area
   3. GH Primary: Front Line Fortress in Metz, France Area
   4. Visual Secondary: 
   5. PFF Secondary: 
   6. Last Resort: Saarbrucken Marshalling Yards
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 0900
   Stations:	- 0555
   Start Engines:	- 0605
   Taxi:	- 0615
   Take Off:	- 0630
   Target Time:	- ____
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1344

   
     Gasoline 2,200 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	8 x 1000# SAP [Semi-Armor Piercing] 4 - 1/10 – 1/10 and 4 - 1/10 – 1/40 [Fuses]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual – Salvo. P.F.F. or GH – Minimum
   
   
5. Chaff: Commence Release 6 mins. before IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] & continue for 15 mins.
   
   
6. Division Formation:

   Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	401st	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	457th	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   1 Div. Lead	41st	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   2nd CBW	94th	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   3rd CBW	40th	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   4th CBW	1st	Front Lines Metz	Dover Zero -05
   2nd Div.	39 Sqdns.	Front Lines 1 mile South of 1st Div.	Zero Hour Dungeness
   3rd Div.	12 Grps.	Front Lines Thionville	Zero Hour -30 No. Foreland

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Deputy Lead of Lead Sq. and Lead of High Squadron.
   REMARKS:
    Time Interval between Groups – 2 minutes.
    Altitude Assignment - 24,500 Ft.
   
   
7. Fighter Cover: Four Gps. of P-51’s.
   
   
8. Other Forces: ____
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	16,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	17,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	15,500'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	16,500'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	15,500'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   
   Combat Wing Assembly Line: ____
   Division Assembly Line: Newmarket to Orfordness to Dover.
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - ____
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - T-461 High - K-585 Low - V-854
     c. Camera A/C - C-567; C-640; P-676
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
     e. REMARKS: Tactical bombing friendly flak at 17,000. 2 mi behind our lines.
      Fire RB [Red Blue] flare on passing SCS-51 Line - Y us, B them.
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:
    

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft C - Charlie	Normal	Capt. Dennis
    401st	Woodcraft A - Able		Capt. Currie
    457th	Woodcraft B - Baker		Maj. Spencer
    1st Div. Air Commander	Cowboy Able Leader		Maj. Booska
    94th CBW Air Commander	Woodcraft A - Able		Capt. Currie

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 2
    Bombers	Vinegrove 2-6
    Grnd. Control	Mohair

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Dover		O - Zwolle
    C.P. 2 - 49°11’N-05°00’E 17.5 mi. west of Verdun, France		P - Verdun
    _____		E - Metz
    _____		R - Luxembourg
    _____		T - Nancy

    
    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 23,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    
    1. Channel “A” - All except:
    2. Channel “B” - U-216; F-516; D-524
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] F-124
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F., L-515
    5. Channel “D” - All available
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. 
    2. Expected Runway on return. 
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. 
    
    

Brief Lead crews to make up their mind at or before primary IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] as to whether they are going to the Primary or Last Resort. This decision should be made by Gee H operator and depending upon his equipment working or not. If Gee H equipment out go to last resort.
Air Commander to use his head - Make decision before starting on primary bomb run as to whether he will bomb primary or last resort as it will be rough if he changes his mind after starting the run. Be sure he is over bomb line when dropping bombs.
If question of gas lasting make run due East and drop bombs when over line rather than try to bring them home.
[Signed] Col. Voorhees

1. Date of Mission - 9 November, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  48°54'N-07°42'E [Near Forstheim, Framce] (Target of Opportunity) was attacked by the Lead and Low Squadrons on an accidental release. Saarbrucken was attacked visually by the High Squadron.
   2. Force: 94th "C" Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including two PFF ships and one GH aircraft (from 384th Group) and two flying spares, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Briefed and flew as sixth group in the Division Formation.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Captain Lee H. Dennis
      	Pilot:	Captain James M. Gibbons
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Benton F. Love
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Frederick S. Ralph

      
      

      	Group Lead (Deputy)
      	Deputy Leader:	1st Lt. Francis W. Gray
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Richard C. Steele
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. William A. Mars
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Herbert D. Friedlander

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader	1st Lt. Wendell Seacrest
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Arthur J. Beveridge
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Howard S. Love
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Leonard L. Schuler

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Paul G. Anderson
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Robert H. Kohler
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Melvin L. Ouder
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Mart G. Smith

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out as planned at the King's Cliffe buncher. The assembly was made at the briefed altitude of 16,500 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made at 0803 at 16,500 feet. Succeeding control points between the assembly area and the departure point from the English coast were reached without variance from the briefed course and time with the exception of the leg between Orfordness and Dover. Scattered aircraft on the briefed route and Glatton forced the 94th "C" to fly to the right of course and gradually close in at Dover.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The Division assembly line was flown as briefed. Departure from the English coast was made at Dover at the briefed time (0855) at the briefed altitude of 19,500 feet. The 94th "C" Group flew its briefed position of sixth in the Division Formation.
   4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was flown to the left of course after the French coast was crossed. This was done in order to stay in the proper position in respect to the preceding formations. Glatton [401st Bomb Group] was below the 94th "C" and it was necessary to fly left of course in order to keep from overrunning it. As a result, the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was slightly undershot and a point past it on the briefed route was used (49°10'N-05°21'E) [Thierville-sur-Meuse about 1.5 miles West of Verdun, France] which was reached at 0946 at the briefed altitude of 24,500 feet.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: Due to the fact that the GH equipment in the Lead aircraft was never operative and the presence of good weather in the area of the IP, the decision was made to make a visual run on the target. However, it was found that a shelf of cloud completely obscured the target. Bombs were not dropped. The deputy took over the lead position with the intention of making a PFF run on the Last Resort Target, Saarbrucken. However, before the mickey [radar operator] was able to make a run on this Last Resort, the formation had passed by the target. A large 360° turn to the right was ordered after passing over the target in order to attack Saarbrucken. However, an accidental release of one bomb in the deputy (the lead) ship caused the Lead and Low Squadrons to drop their bombs on a target of opportunity at 48°54'N - 07°42'E [40 miles SE of Saarbrucken]. Results were not observed. Bombs were dropped at 1017. The High Squadron, not being aware of the bombing by the other two Squadrons, continued on to Saarbrucken, bombing up-wind instead of completing the 360° turn. It was able to bomb by PFF with a visual assist. The selected IP was at 48°55'N - 07°24'E. Six to eight tenths cloud cover was found in the target area. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was not used. Bombs were dropped at 1037 from an altitude of 25,500 feet, PFF with a visual assist.
   6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the Lead and Low Squadrons proceeded directly to the briefed course, and contacted it at 48°41'N - 06°43'E [Near Lagarde, France]. From that point on, the briefed course was followed slightly to the right of course (two miles). After attacking Saarbrucken, the High Box made a sharp turn to the left and followed the briefed course after contacting it at 48°36'N - 06°22'E. This point was reached by the Lead aircraft at 1045 and by the High Squadron at 1057. The High Squadron followed the briefed course very closely on the withdrawal. The Lead Squadron crossed the French coast at the briefed point at 1230 at an altitude of 9,500 feet. The High Squadron had closed up to within two minutes of the Lead Squadron at that point. The English coast was reached at Beachy Head at 1255 at 7,000 feet. From that point the return to base was flown without difficulty. North of London, the High Squadron made a direct return to base because its gas was low. Three aircraft were forced to land for refueling in England, and one in France. All returned to base.
   7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Meager flak, inaccurate to fairly accurate, was encountered. No weather information was received from the Scouting Force. It was believed that a visual run could have been made on the primary target when the IP was reached, but it was found to be covered after the IP and before the BRL [Bomb Release Line]. Hence the decision not to bomb the primary was made. A few crews reported scattered bursts of friendly flak, but found it impossible to determine any fixed pattern. Returns from the SCS-51 indicator were very good.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: The flying spare scheduled with the High Squadron returned as planned. Aircraft 42-97381, pilot, Lt. Ashton, failed to attack the target because of an armament malfunction.

1. The Lead and Low Squadrons of this group dropped their bombs at 1017 hours by an accidental release on a Target of Opportunity near 48°54'N - 07°42' E. Results were unobserved due to 10/10ths clouds.
   1. The Mag. [Magnetic] heading of the Lead Squadron was 266°.
   2. The Mag. heading of the Lead Squadron was 270°.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF method with visual assist.
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron performed own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? 48°55'N 07°24'E
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 6-8/10 cloud cover.
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None.
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Was not used on run.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None.

Bombardier - 2nd Lt. Smith, Mart G., Jr.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Anderson, Paul G.
Navigator - 2nd Lt. Ouder, Melvin L.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-687  Take-off - 0636 Landed - 1359
Objective - Saarbruken, Germany (Last Resort)
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF Method with Visual Assist.
Initial Point - 48°55'N 07°24'E
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: One
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 8 x 1000 Lb. S.A.P.'s [Semi-Armor Piercing] & 1 Smoke Marker
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10 1/10   Tail - 1/10 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - 100' Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -16 Actual ____
Winds - Altitude - 24,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 300°  Actual 315°  Velocity - Metro 90  Actual 83
Temp C. - Metro -41° C. Actual -40° C.

1. The lead and low squadrons of this Group dropped their bombs by accidental release on a target of opportunity near 48°55'N 07°42'E [sic]. Photos show bombs away over 10/10ths clouds and no ground detail is visible. The high squadron bombed the last resort target at Saarbrucken, Germany. Heavy clouds partially obscure the target, and only a few bursts can be plotted.
2. The briefed MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was cloud-covered and the lead bombardier selected an alternate AP [Aiming Point] approximately 3000' SE of the MPI. The bombs that can be plotted hit on and around the alternate AP. Three hits can be seen in the junction point of the Ludwigshaven track of the M/Y [Marshalling Yard] area. A fairly heavy concentration fell in a residential area 1,500 feet south of the M/Y.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. The Lead and Low Squadrons of this Group dropped their bombs by accidental release on the vicinity of Haguenau (DR coordinates: 48°54'N, 07°42'E) with unobserved results. The High Squadron bombed the Last Resort target at Saarbrucken, Germany, by PFF methods with visual assist. The briefed MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was cloud-covered and an alternate aiming point 3000 feet southeast was selected. Bursts are seen on the photos at the edge of the M/Y [Marshalling Yard] at the junction of the Ludwigshaven railroad. Some bursts fell into the northeastern edge of the city along the M/Y. The cause of the accidental release has not yet been determined but is thought to be a bomb rack malfunction.
3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered; no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Meager flak, inaccurate to fairly accurate, was encountered near Thillot, southwest of Metz, and at Metz, Luneville, Saarbrucken, and at the Moselle River at approximately 49°30'N, 06°34'E.
5. Although no weather information was received from the Scouting Force, conditions at the IP seemed to warrant visual run on the primary target; however the target area proved to be obscured by clouds and the Lead was given over to the PFF Deputy Leader. Conditions at the time of Bombs Away were 10/10ths.
6. Nil [No observations of Military importance were observed.]
7. Several of our A/C landed elsewhere due to shortages of fuel but are returning to base. No weather information was received from the Scouting Force. The PFF A/C, the Deputy Leader of the Lead Squadron and the Leader of the High Squadron, were employed for PFF bombing as explained in paragraph 2 above. A few of our crews report observing scattered bursts of friendly flak, but they found it impossible to determine any fixed pattern. Returns from the SCS-51 indicator were very good. Fighter support was as briefed.

    509th Squadron:
A/C 964-M: Nobody in ball turret, tail gun, or waist position for long periods in A/C O-595.
      No one in ball turret of A/C F-566 for an hour after bombs away. - Major Korges.
      SCS-51 did not operate; nobody fired flares. - Major Korges.
A/C 640-C: We see no reason for circling around and leaving Division line for 45 minutes. - Lt. Claggett.
A/C 116-Q: Group formation was very poor today. - Lt. Knight.
A/C 384-T: Molesworth ship joined formation and screwed up formation. - Lt. Barker.
A/C 696-Z: The system of one truck for several ships works very badly; we were almost late on take off today because of poor
      transportation. - Lt. Gallamore.
A/C 156-R: Molesworth ship pulled into formation and messed up high element. - Lt. Basehore.
      Air speed too slow during formation. - Lt. Basehore.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 465-A: Truck driver who took our gunners to plane this morning did not know where the plane was located; they toured the
      base for an hour and finally had to go to Ops. to find out where it was. - F/O McIntosh.
A/C 862-G: Why couldn't forming be done over the continent on this early morning dark missions. Lt. Lovett.
A/C 124-F: We should have more gas after this; we ran short. We got back with 50 to 60 gals. - Lt. Carle.

    511th Squadron:
A/C 592-N: The squadron Leader took us off from the rest of the formation to bomb target and came into target up wind. -
      Lt. Boettcher.
A/C 676-P: Formation was very poor. - Lt. Fox.
      Fighter escort kept peeling off and coming through our formation exactly like enemy fighters. - Lt. Fox.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 43-38650, 511th Squadron returned early as planned.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. Airplane No. 43-38080, 511th Squadron. flak hole through right flap near base of wing, skin, flap, flap torque tube and stringer damaged. Small flak hole left side of fuselage near waist window skin damage only.
   
   

   TOTAL A/C DAMAGED		MINOR DAMAGE		DAMAGE BY FLAK
   1		1		1

1. The following malfunctions were reported on the Mission of 9 November, 1944.
   1. A/C 44-8045 - (PFF) Premature release of one bomb reported. Ground check reveals intervalometer inoperative in Train. Tests made with bomb sight installed fail to show any reason for bomb releasing. Intervalometer tested at bomb sight department, and they report intervalometer would not cause premature release. No loose wires were found in bombing circuits, nor were any switches found to be malfunctioning. This aircraft has no previous malfunctions.
   2. A/C 42-97381 - Failed to attack target. Ground check shows doors did not open far enough to close switches on the bombing circuits. Doors should have been completely opened with crank.

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th "C" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: T–8461, G–7862, B–6082, A–8465, L–7515, F–7124, U–7216, K–7252, H–8280, C–2576, (S–7512 Spare)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF)
   Sqdn 427th - 303rd BG: (GH A/C - Z–8038)

   
   

   b. 94th "C" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410
   Sqdn 509th A/C: P–8432, V–7854, Q–8116, O–7595, N–7169, M–7964, T–1384, R–6156, G–6078, Z–7696, C–8640
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

   
   

   c. 94th "C" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (Z–7687 PFF), U–7381, K–8585, H–8435, A–8428, X–7571, P–2676, F–7705, D–7524, Q–8080, J–6579, N–8592, (M–8650 Spare)

2. Target: Target No. 5 Metz Area
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T WBA R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T WXY R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T KBW R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T KYH R/T PARTNERSHIP
   Squadron	427 [Call Sign]	W/T TDA R/T NEWROW

4. Taxi – 0615; Take-Off – 0630; E.T.D. Field – 0630
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   0855	19,500 Ft	Dover

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   0900	20,500 Ft	50°55'N-01°42'E [Escalles, France]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1233	8,000 Ft	50°13'N-01°33'E [Le Hourdel, France]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1240	5,000 Ft	Beachy Head

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1344 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 8 x 1000 SAP [Semi-Armor Piercing] - 1/10 x 1/10 [Fuses] And 4 Bombs 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses]
    High Squadron: 8 x 1000 SAP [Semi-Armor Piercing] - 1/10 x 1/10 [Fuses] And 4 Bombs 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses]
    Low Squadron: 8 x 1000 SAP [Semi-Armor Piercing] - 1/10 x 1/10 [Fuses] And 4 Bombs 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses]
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2200 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    a. Lead Box: Rank & Name: Capt. Dennis A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8038 GH A/C (427)
    b. Low Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Secrest A/C No & Sqdn. P-8432 (509)
    c. High Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Anderson A/C No & Sqdn. Z-7687 PFF (511)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    Lt. Col. Laidlow Z-7687 (511) PFF

Report Compiled By Rocky Civizzio, S/Sgt.