351st Bomb Group

Group Mission #238

Credited Mission #232

Briefing Outline:

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Kassel Railway M/Y [Marshalling Yard]
   3. PFF Primary: None
   4. Visual Secondary: 
   5. PFF Secondary: Kassel Railway M/Y [Marshalling Yard]
   6. Last Resort: Allendorf Explosive Factory
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 0930
   Stations:	- 0710 0705
   Start Engines:	- 0720 0715
   Taxi:	- 0730 0725
   Take Off:	- 0745 0740
   Target Time:	- 1109
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1543

   
     Deadline for Last Take-Off - 1000.
     Gasoline 2,600 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	10 x 500 G.P. [General Purpose] + 2 M-17's [Incendiary Bomb]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same (O-799 Parnell [Carrying] Delay Action [Bombs])
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual – Salvo. P.F.F. – 140 Ft. on Kassel; 80 Ft. Last Resort.
   
   
5. Chaff: Release chaff 10 mins. before target & continue for 12 mins. Each A/C – 288 units.
   
   
6. Division Formation:

   Disposition of Forces		Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	401	Kassel	1125
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	351	Kassel	1127
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW	457	Kassel	1129
   "A" Force	40 A	Kassel
   	40 B	Kassel
   	94 A	Kassel
   	94 B - 351st	Kassel
   	94 C	Kassel
   "B" Force	41 A, B, C	Soest
   	1st A, B, C	Soest
   2nd Div.		Bebra Trans. M/Y [Marshalling Yard]
   3rd Div.		Hanau Trans. M/Y Giessen Trans. M/Y

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Lead & Deputy Lead.
   REMARKS:
    This is too early in the morning!
   
7. Fighter Cover: 10 Gps. of P-51’s - 2 Gps. Close Cover - c/s [call sign] - Balance 1-5.
   
   
8. Other Forces: Scouting Forces - Buckeye Red (6 P-51's) - Buckeye Blue (6 P-51's)
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	11,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	12,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	10,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	11,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	11,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   
   Combat Wing Assembly Time: We leave buncher at 0853.
   Division Assembly Time: We leave coast at 0933.
     Bomb at 26,500'.
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - Cutler T-461 Low - Lenze M-900 High - Hammond P-432
     c. Camera A/C  F-124, C-753, F-566
      to return at  Enemy coast out.
     d. Spares to turn back at Belgian coast.
     e. REMARKS: Caution to leaders on hi winds at bunchers at assemblies.
      Primaries expected to be overcast.
      Buckeye Red will scout for us.
      If shot down, kindly crash at A-70 or A-83 (Vincennes [near Paris], Laon Couvron [75 miles NE of Paris])
    
      BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Baker	RG [Red Green]	Major Gorham
    401st	Woodcraft Able	RY	Capt. Lewis
    457th	Woodcraft Charlie	RY	Capt. Doherty
    1st Div. Air Commander			Lt. Colonel Riordan
    94th CBW Air Commander			Capt. Lewis

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 1
    Bombers	Vinegrove 1-4
    Grnd. Control	Mohair

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Clacton – Zero Hour		L - Koblenz
    C.P. 2 - 51°14’N-02°55’E - Zero + 19		I - Marburg
    [Ostend, Belgium]		N - Paterborn
    C.P. 3 - 50°13’N-06°17’E - Zero + 51		O - Kassel
    [Brandscheid, Germany]		T - Fulda
    C.P. 4 - 50°13’N-06°17’E - Zero + 197		Y - Hamm
    [Brandscheid, Germany]		P - Mulhausen
    _____		E - Frankfurt

    Remarks: Reference Altitude: 22,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All except
    2. Channel “B” - S-512, G-070, P-258
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] R-714
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] L-515
    5. Channel “D” - Air Sea [Rescue] except for leaders.
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Expected Runway on return. ____
    2. Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____
       
       

Operational Narrative – 94th “C” CBW:

1. Date of Mission - 4 December, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  Kassel, Germany (PFF Secondary Target).
   2. Force: 94th “B” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including two flying spares and two PFF ships flying as lead and deputy lead, were dispatched on the mission.
   3. Position: Briefed and flew as second group in the 94th Combat Wing and fifth in the "A" Task Force.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Group Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major John D. Gorham, Jr.
      	Pilot:	Captain John T. Eickhoff
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Frederick S. Kelley
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. John Androkitis

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Vernor R. Weatherman
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Harold A. Schulte
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Thomas C. Kyser
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Arnold Schiffman

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Joseph S. Angelini
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Charles T. Molitor
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Stanley J. Goodman
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Harold E. Akers

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: Carried out as planned at the King's Cliffe buncher at the briefed altitude of 11,000 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: The briefed route was flown over England. Departure from the assembly point was made on time (0953) and the control points before Clacton were reached with no more than one minute's variance from the briefed times. The 94th "B" was then flying behind the "A" and "C" Groups. Departure from the English coast was made two minutes late (1035) at an altitude of 17,500 feet, the briefed altitude.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The briefed Division Assembly Line was flown. The 94th "B" Group got into its proper position in the formation with a minimum of difficulty after cutting short the turn at the coast. The Belgian coast was crossed at the briefed point at 1053 - one minute late. The formation had reached an altitude of 20,500 feet, which was the briefed height for the crossing of the Belgian coast.
   4.  Flight to Target: Shortly after leaving the coast, the Division Leader followed a course that went to the south of the briefed route with a gradually increasing [sic] in divergency. At 5009-0617, when the divergency from course was four minutes to the south (the formation was on time, however) a gradual return to the briefed course was made by the Division Leader. The 94th "A" and "B" Groups followed in trail. The briefed course was contacted again at 5009-0743 at the briefed time (1135). The formation was also at the briefed altitude of 26,500 feet. Instead of leading the "A" Task Force on the briefed turn to the left towards the target, however, the Division Leader took up a southeasterly heading for seven minutes and then turned to the northeast, heading for Frankfurt. In the vicinity of Mainz, the 94th "B" Group, assuming that the Division Leader was off of course, took up a northwest heading in order to avoid flak and to make good the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]. At 1156, the 94th "B" Group was at 5035-0805, slightly to the right of course. From that point on a gradually decreasing variance between the briefed and actual routes were flown. The "B" Task Force was at that time flying on the 94th "B's" briefed route. The briefed IP was reached at 1217 - 21 minutes late at the briefed altitude of 26,500 feet. After the 94th "B" turned at Mainz, the other formations made a similar maneuver to the north.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The target at Kassel, Germany was attacked by PFF methods. Bombing was done in group formation from the briefed altitude of 26,500 feet (Lead Squadron). The briefed turn was made at the IP. Cloud cover in the target area was ten-tenths. No interference was encountered on the bombing run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] functioned satisfactorily. The target was attacked at 1228 - 22 minutes late.
   6.  Flight From Target: As a result of its departure from the Task Force, the 94th "B" Group was alone after the target. In order to have the protection of other groups in the event of fighter attacks, the turn after the target was made towards formations seen to the south of the target rather than on the briefed course. These aircraft were evidently groups of the "A" Task Force which had selected an IP east of the briefed point and attacked Kassel ahead of the 94th "B" Group. This maneuver took the 94th "B" Group to the left of the briefed course, where a gradual return to the briefed course was flown, following the preceding formations. Due to the presence of another combat wing on the left of the 94th "B" Group, it was impossible to make the briefed turn to the left at 5035-0800. In order to once again return to the briefed course, the 94th "B" Group crossed over above the aforementioned combat wing shortly before reaching Koblenz and contacted the briefed course at 5009-0742. From that point, the preceding formations were followed to the right of course. A message from Cycle Relay indicated that a direct return to base should be flown rather than flying the usual route to the stand-off positions. As a result, the Belgian coast was crossed to the right of course at 1532½ - and at an altitude of 10,000 feet. A course direct to base was flown, the English coast being crossed north of Clacton. A direct return to base was flown without incident. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
   7.  Fighter Support: As briefed.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. A moderate, scattered and inaccurate flak barrage was encountered at the target. Weather was found to be from eight to ten tenths on the route in and in the target area. The Scouting Force was satisfactory. The maneuvers of the Division Lead Group in the previously mentioned deviations from course subjected the following groups to some unexpected and unnecessary flak.

  [Signed] Clinton F. Ball, Lt Col, Air Corps, Operations Officer

Statistical Summary:

	94th “C” COMBAT BOMB WING FORMATION
	Lead Box	High Box	Low Box	TOTAL
No. of A/C Failing to Take Off	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Airborne	13	13	12	38
No. of A/C Airborne Less Unused Spares	12	12	12	36
No. of A/C Sorties	12	12	11	35
No. of A/C Attacking	12	12	11	35
No. of A/C Not Attacking	0	0	1	1
Name of Primary Target	KASSEL, GERMANY (PFF TARGET)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target	12	12	11	35
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs	112 x 500# GP	119 x 500# GP	109 x 500# GP	340 x 500# GP
	23 x 500# M-17	24 x 500# M-17	22 x 500# M-17	69 x 500# M-17
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C Lost - Total	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Lost - Flak
No. of A/C Lost - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C Lost - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C Lost - Accident
No. of A/C Lost - Unknown
Time of Take Off	0835	0836	0837
Time of Attack	1228	1228	1228
Average Time of Flight	8:21	8:29	8:38
Altitude of Release	25,250’	25,750’	24,650’
Visual or PFF	PFF	PFF	PFF
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy	MODERATE AND INACCURATE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter	0	0	0	0
Enemy Resistance – Bombers	0	0	0	0
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft	0	0	0	0
Degree of Success	RESULTS UNOBSERVED

PFF A/C were borrowed from Groups as follows: None
PFF A/C were loaned to Groups as follows: None

PFF AIRCRAFT		POSITION
42-97687		LEAD		Attacked
44-8455		DEPUTY LEAD		Attacked

[Lead Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on KASSEL, 4 DECEMBER, 1944

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O [Take Off] at 0835 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0935 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 11,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1016 hours at Norwich.
   4. Route over England was not flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1035 hours at Clacton.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. Circled south of Mainz up between Mainz and Frankfurt to I.P.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] and Pilotage, Mickey and Gee.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 54°.
      3. Actual Drift 17° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 26,500.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1228.
      6. Wind used for bombing 325°/80 knots.
      7. Methods of target identification. Gee and Mickey [Radar].
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths [cloud coverage].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 75° Course.
   10. Group rally was accomplished at Target at 1228 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 51°26'N 09°51'E at 1234 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at 51°09'N 10°01'E at 1238 hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed. Circled into and around Coblenz. Received orders to proceed home to base, missing Cromer.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee and Mickey [Radar].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: Good
       2. Gee : Good
       3. Radio Compass: Good
       4. Fluxgate: Good
       5. Other Equipment Good

  [Signed:] F.S. Kelley, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Lead Squadron

[High Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on KASSEL, 4 DECEMBER, 1944

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0836 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0935 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 12,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1016 hours at Norwich.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee, Pilotage.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1035 hours at Clacton.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. Diverted at Control 3 and made big circle down around by Frankfurt.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning] and Gee.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 5150 0934.
      2. True heading over target. 50°.
      3. Actual Drift 15° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 27,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1228.
      6. Wind used for bombing 290°/140knots.
      7. Methods of target identification. ____
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths [cloud coverage].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 50° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at Target at 1228 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 51°26'N 09°51'E at 1234 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at 51°09'N 10°01'E at 1238 hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.  Circled into an then around Coblenz. Received orders to proceed straight to Base missing Cromer.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: None
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: Cageing device didn't work.
       5. Other Equipment OK

  [Signed:] T.C. Kyser, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, High Squadron

[Low Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on KASSEL, 4 DECEMBER, 1944

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0837 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0935 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1016 hours at Norwich.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1035 hours at Clacton.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. Deviated after Control pt. 3 went south of course over Mainz then to I.P.
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 60°.
      3. Actual Drift 15° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 25,900.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1227½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 280°/120 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. None - Dropped on lead ship.
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths [cloud coverage].
      10. Axis of withdrawal 45° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at Target at 1228 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 51°26'N 09°51'E at 1234 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at 51°09'N 10°01'E at 1238 hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed. Circled into and around Coblenz. Received orders to proceed home to base missing Cromer.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR [Dead Reckoning], Gee and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: None
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment ___

  [Signed:] S.J. Goodman, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Low Squadron

Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 4 Dec. 1944
Field Order # 572
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th "B" Group
Target - Kassel, Germany (PFF)

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group Formation. Mag. [Magnetic Compass] heading of Lead was 062°, High 056°, Low 066° at 1228 hours.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

Bombardier - 1st Lt. Androkitis, John
Pilot - Major Gorham, J.D. Jr., & Capt. Eickhoff, J.T.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Kelley, Frederick S.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-687  Take-off - 0832 Landed - 1705
Objective - Kassel, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - Marshalling Yards (PFF)
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: One
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 8 x 500 G.P.[General Purpose] AN-M43, 2 x M17's & 2 Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - Fast PFF

Information at Release Point:  Bombing was in Group Formation

Altitude of Target - 640'		Magnetic Heading Ordered 063° Actual 062°
True Altitude Above Target - 25,250		True Heading 67°
Indicated Altitude - 26,500		Drift, Estimated 10° Right - Actual 8° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target +1197		True Track 75°
Altimeter Setting 29.92		Actual Range 18,866.3
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150K		Bomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 228K		Time of Release 1228
Ground Speed Est. 330 Actual 208 Kts.		Length of Bombing Run - 53 miles
Wind Direction Metro - 270° Actual - 315°		Intervalometer Setting - 140 Feet
Wind Velocity Metro 100 Actual 90		C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 126.2  Trail - 60   ATF - 42.01		A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. 74.8 Actual .70		Manual Pilot ____

Type of Release - 140' Train
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -13.5 Actual -13.5
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 315°  Velocity - Metro 100  Actual 90
Temp C. - Metro -38° C. Actual -38° C.

Narrative Teletype Report:

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. There are no strike photos available due to 10/10 clouds over target and no observations of strikes were made by the crews. Pathfinder units worked well in locating the target but there was a great deal of unaccounted for interference.
3. No enemy aircraft were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. A moderate, scattered and inaccurate barrage was encountered at the target. There was moderate flak at Koblenz, good for height but poor for deflection. Moderate flak was observed at Frankfurt. Meager fairly accurate flak was encountered in the vicinity of Limburg. Meager inaccurate flak was encountered at St. Goar and Gochem.
5. Weather was 8 - 10/10ths en route in and target area and route out.
6. Numerous barges were seen on the Rhine River at 5002N - 0744E.
7. Pathfinder units were employed. Fighter support was as briefed and the Scouting Force was satisfactory. One of our single engine fighters was seen going into a spin at 5040N - 0740 E

Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge

Combat Crew Comments:

    508th Squadron:
A/C 753-C: I can't see any necessity for tail men in Low box to have to pull 200 miles per hour. - Lt. Wiese.
A/C 711-F: Poor lead formation - 22 minutes late over target.
      Why did we let down to 500 feet over the Channel in very rough air when the weather forecast was 1/10 at 3000 feet?
      - Lt. Galloway.
A/C 567-G: Squadron climbed too fast and had to draw terrific power to maintain formation.
      Excellent formation for about an hour shortly after target. - Lt. Kale.

    509th Squadron:
A/C 640-C: The high flight of the lead squadron flew too far out and to [Sic] high causing serious prop wash to the Low Low flight
      of the high squadron.
      Climb was 140 m.p.h. for too long a period. Why did we do the S-ing out of the target area? - Lt Clagget.
A/C 432-P: Formation was very poor; there were many stragglers from other Groups ahead of us going into target. Our formation
      was O.K. - Lt. Hammond.
      What is the point in taking a tour of Germany? - Lt. Hammond.
A/C 169-N: Very bad Group lead. - Lt. Crews.
A/C 591-U: Formation as a whole was very poor today.
      Very poor leading by lead of low low flight, high Squadron. - Lt. Mueller.
A/C 566-F: Good formation over target, but very poor - rest of formation. - Lt. Goldsborough.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 512-S: Good formation for this Squadron. - Lt. Miller.
A/C 515-L: Excellent bomb release for the Lead Squadron - should make a good pattern. - Lts. Cramer, Gode and Lubozynski.

  [Signed:] Robert P. Ramsey, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence].

Mission Summary Report:

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 43-38277, 508th Squadron, returned early. The Pilot stated that #2 Engine was leaking oil badly. Investigation revealed that #2 Engine had failed internally and oil was being thrown out the breather.
   2. Airplane No. 42-31384, 509th Squadron returned early as planned.
   3. Airplane No. 43-38694, 511th Squadron returned early as planned.
2. No battle damage was received.

  [Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. 43-38277 - "O" Squadron - 508 Low  Date - 4 Dec. 1944

1. PILOT'S STATEMENT:
   1. Reason for abortive #2 Engine lost oil rapidly - started to smoke - feathered
   2. Place and altitude 50°48'N - 03°39'E - 18,000 [Feet]
   3. Time 1100
   4. Position in formation ____
   5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
   6. Remarks Lead - Low Section - Low Sqdn.
     (Pilot's Signature) William B. Zimmerman

“J” Form:

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th "B" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, D–7957, F–7124, H–8280, L–7515, N–7665, R–7714, S–7512, T–8461, U–7216
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (Z–7687, O–8455 PFF) (C–8694 Spare)

   
   

   b. 94th "B" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: B–7349, C–8753, D–8405, F–1711, G–8567, K–8130, L–7956, M–7905, O–8277, P–7258, Y–6108, (Q–8799 DA*)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

   
   [* - DA - Delayed Action Bombs]

   c. 94th "B" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, F–6566, G–6078, L–7676, N–7169, O–7595, P–8432, Q–8116, U–8591 (T–1384 Spare)
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: Q–8080, G–8070, P–2676

2. Target: GH-637A
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T JRH R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T MTG R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T TNH R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T TWV R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0725; 0825 Take-Off – 0740; 0840 E.T.D. Field – 0740; 0840
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   0916	8,000 Ft	Orfordness

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   0933 1033	15,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [10 miles NE of Dunkirk, France]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   0953 1053	12,000 Ft	54°30'N-08°50'E [10 miles NE of Dunkirk, France]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1355 1455	2,000 Ft	Cromer

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1543 1643 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 [planes] - 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bombs]
    Low Squadron: 12 [planes] - 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bombs]
    High Squadron: 13 [planes] - 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bombs]
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2600 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Box: Rank & Name: Major Gorham A/C No & Sqdn. Z-7687 PFF (511)
    Low Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Angelini A/C No & Sqdn. B-7349 (508)
    High Box: Rank & Name: Lt. Weatherman A/C No & Sqdn. Q-8080 (511)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By Maksimik, John, S/Sgt.

Formation Chart:

94th "B" Combat Bomb Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off & Over Target
				510th Squadron
				Gorham–Eickhoff A/C 42-97687 Z PFF
			Cutler A/C 43-38461 T		Purcell A/C 44-8455 O
	Marsey A/C 43-37957 D						McGee A/C 43-38465 A
Oakes A/C 42-31714 R		Cramer A/C 43-37515 L				Gonske A/C 43-37665 N		Miller A/C 43-37512 S
	Barnhart A/C 44-8280 H						Gottschalk A/C 43-38694 C Spare*
Hickel A/C 42-97216 U		Carle A/C 42-107124 F					Rossen A/C 43-38585 K Special Spare*

[* - Spare A/C 694-C Pilot Gottschalk & 585-K Pilot Rossen Returned as planned.]

94th "B" Combat Bomb Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off & Over Target
				509th Squadron
				Weatherman A/C 43-38080 Q
			Hammond A/C 43-38432 P		Coulam A/C 43-38116 Q
	Knight A/C 44-6078 G						Crews A/C 42-97169 N
Schimpf A/C 43-37676 L		Cronin A/C 43-37595 O				Stryker A/C 42-102676 P		Barker A/C 43-38070 G
	Claggett A/C 43-38640 C						Rice A/C 42-31384 T Spare
Mueller A/C 43-38591 U		Goldsboro A/C 44-6566 F				Hammett A/C 44-6579 J Special Spare		Smith A/C 43-37524 D Special Spare

[* - Spare A/C 384-T Pilot Rice, 579-J Pilot Hammett & 524-D Pilot Smith Returned as planned.]

94th "B" Combat Bomb Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off
				508th Squadron
				Angelini A/C 42-97349 B
			Lenze A/C 43-37900 M		Ballard A/C 43-38405 D
	Zimmerman A/C 43-38277 O						Olson A/C 44-6108 Y
Galloway A/C 42-31711 F		Kale A/C 43-38567 G				Buttel A/C 43-37956 L		Wishnewsky A/C 42-97258 P
	Sullivan A/C 43-38130 K
Parnell A/C 43-38799 Q		Wiese A/C 43-38753 C

94th "B" Group Low Squadron Formation Over Target
				508th Squadron
				Angelini A/C 42-97349 B
			Lenze A/C 43-37900 M		Ballard A/C 43-38405 D
	Kale A/C 43-38567 G						Olson A/C 44-6108 Y
Galloway A/C 42-31711 F						Buttel A/C 43-37956 L		Wishnewsky A/C 42-97258 P
	Sullivan A/C 43-38130 K
Parnell A/C 43-38799 Q		Wiese A/C 43-38753 C

Lt Kale 43-38567-G replaced Lt Zimmerman 43-38277-O who aborted.

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 0930 BST [British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0415; Officers 0445 Stations: 0705 Start Engines: 0715 Taxi: 0725 Take-Off: 0740  Leave Base: 0740 [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0315; Officers 0345]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]

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