351st Bomb Group

1. 1. TARGETS: 
   2. Visual Primary: Kassel (Marshalling Yards)
   3. PFF Primary: Same
   4. Visual Secondary: Same
   5. PFF Secondary: Same
   6. Last Resort: Allendorf (Explosives)
   
   

2. TIMINGS:
   Zero Hour:	- 1000
   Stations:	- 0750
   Start Engines:	- 0800
   Taxi:	- 0810
   Take Off:	- 0825
   Target Time:	- 1208
   ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1454

   
     Gasoline 2,500 Gallons
   
   

3. LOADING:
   Lead -	10 x 500 G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 – 1/100 [Fuses] plus 2 M-17 IB [Incendiary Bombs]
   High -	Same
   Low -	Same
   Composite -	___

   
   
4. Intervalometer Settings: Visual or P.F.F. – 80 FT.
   
   
5. Chaff: 360 units - Commence Release 12 min. before target, continue for 15 minutes. - Carpet Normal.
   
   

6. Disposition of Forces	[Bomb Group]	Target	Time of Departure
   “A” Gp. in 94 CBW [Combat Bomb Wing]	351	Kassel	1011 (Clacton)
   “B” Gp. in 94 CBW	457	Kassel	1012
   “C” Gp. in 94 CBW	401	Kassel	1013
   1 Div. Lead	94 A	Kassel	1011
   2nd CBW	40 A	Kassel	1014
   3rd CBW	1 A	Kassel	1017
   4th CBW	___	____
   2nd Div.	9 Grps.	Kassel M/Y	0955 (Cromer)
   3rd Div.	9 Grps.	Kassel M/Y	1027 (Southwald)

   
   PFF A/C to fly as: Group Lead & Group Deputy Lead and High Squadron Lead.
   REMARKS: ____
   
7. Fighter Cover: 3 Gps. of P-51’s For Close Support.
   
8. Other Forces: 10 Groups of P51's for 1 Division - Close Support.
   
   
9. Assembly:

   Lead at	10,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   High at	11,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   Low at	9,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher
   401st at	10,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher
   457th at	11,500'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher
   Composite at	____	feet on	____	Buncher

   Combat Wing Assembly Line: Kings Cliffe (Crowland - Clacton).
   Division Assembly Line: Clacton to 52°37’N-04°37’E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]
   
   
10. Navigator - _____
    
    
11. S-2 - _____
    
    
12. Weather - _____
    
    
13. Special Instructions:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      They are: Lead - F-705, High - C-640, Low - S-512
     c. Camera A/C   N-592, U-591, F-711
      to return at  Channel on Return.
     d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
     e. REMARKS: 3 Mosquitoes [RAF Fighter Plane] will precede Woodcraft Able Leader in target area by 5 minutes to drop chaff.
      C/S [Call Sign] (Maypole one - Channel "B").
      The High Grps. will fly directly over & guide on Low Grps.
      On bomb run, the High Groups will fly slightly in trail of their respective Low Grps.
      If the Primary Target is attacked the Low Groups should turn sharp left after bombing to allow the High Groups as much unimpeded bomb run as possible.
    
     BREAK!!  PILOT’S STAY!
    
    
14. CALL SIGNS:

    	CALL SIGN	FLARES	NAME
    351st	Woodcraft Able	RG [Red Green]
    401st	Woodcraft Charlie	RY
    457th	Woodcraft Baker	RY
    1st Div. Air Commander	Lt. Col. Burns		W-C Able Leader
    94th CBW Air Commander	Lt. Col. Burns

    
    

    Fighters	Balance 2
    Bombers	Vinegrove 2-1
    Grnd. Control	Mohair

    
    

    Control Points:		Fighter Reference Points:
    C.P. 1 - Clacton		H - Dummer Lake
    C.P. 2 - 52°37’N-04°37’E		O - Steinhuder Lake
    [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]		S - Paderborn
    C.P. 3 - 52°37’N-07°51’E		T - Kassel
    [Nortrup, Germany]		E - Giessen
    C.P. 4 - 50°30’N-07°57’E		L - Koblenz
    [Bilkheim, Germany]

    Remarks: Base Reference Altitude: 22,000’
    
    
15. Ships To Monitor [Radio Channels A, B, C & D]
    1. Channel “A” - All A/C [Aircraft] except:
    2. Channel “B” - H-435, L-515, O-277
    3. Channel “C” - 67th F.W. [Fighter Wing] K-585
    4. Channel “C” - 8th A.F. [Air Force] F-566
    5. Channel “D” - All A/C available except Z-376, L-045, D-957, B-349 which have 8th AF in "D" channel in place of A/S [Air Sea] rescue.
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL:
    1. Runway on Take Off. 07
    2. Expected Runway on return. ____
    3. Emergency Airfields on Continent. ____
       
       Division break-up 05°00'E.
       Instrument Let-down - SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] (High - Wittering, Low - Peterboro).
       After Take-off turn left to heading of 350° (SOP #8).
       

1. Date of Mission - 15 December, 1944.
   1. Target Attacked:  The Secondary Target at Kassel, Germany, was attacked by PFF methods.
   2. Force: Thirty-eight aircraft, including two flying spares and three PFF ships flying as Lead, Deputy Lead and High Squadron Lead, were dispatched.
   3. Position: The 94th "A" Group was briefed and flew as the Lead Group of the First Division.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Division Lead
      	Air Commander:	Lt. Col. Robert W. Burns
      	Pilot:	Captain Dwane S. Anderson
      	Navigator:	Captain Edward B. Maltby
      	Bombardier:	Captain William B. Lyttle

      
      

      	High Squadron Lead
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Richard B. Moulton
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Richard L. Stewart
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Irl L. Irwin
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. George H. Plaut

      
      

      	Low Squadron Lead
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Robert P. Redman
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Robert L. Cutler
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. John W. Bury
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Eldon L. Stear

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: Carried out without difficulty at the King's Cliffe buncher at the briefed altitude of 10,000 feet.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made 30 seconds early (0933½). The course followed was slightly inside of the briefed course upon leaving the assembly area. The 94th "B" and "C" Groups fell in behind the 94th "A" Group without difficulty. Because of unbriefed winds, the formation was six minutes ahead of time before reaching the departure point from the English coast. A double drift to the left was made in order to lose time and as it was evident that Clacton would still be reached two minutes early, the maneuver resulted in an "S"; the intention being to depart from Clacton. However, the Low Squadron would have encountered cloud interference, and in skirting this, the formation went to the south of the briefed route.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: Departure from the English coast was made at Clacton, at an altitude of 15,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed altitude. The increase in altitude was necessary in order to keep the formation out of the cloud cover, which increased in altitude from the vicinity of Cambridge to within the enemy coast. The formation was to the right of the briefed Division Assembly Line, while the following groups were observed to the left and on the vicinity of the briefed line. The 94th "A" flew a course which permitted it to gradually close in to the briefed route, but shortly before the Dutch coast was crossed a formation from the Third Division crossed in front of the 94th "A" Group, thus causing to enter the Dutch coast slightly to the left of course. The Dutch coast was crossed one minute late (1057) at an altitude of 23,000 feet, 5,000 feet above the briefed altitude. The increase in altitude of the cloud cover was necessary for the difference between briefed and actual altitudes and was responsible for further climbs later. The 94th "A" Group was in its briefed position of Lead Group of the Division Formation.
   4.  Flight to Target: The formation flew to the left of the briefed course after crossing the Dutch coast. A gradual return to the briefed route was flown and it was contacted in the vicinity of 5237-0751. A divergency [sic] to the left of course was later flown in order to avoid any possible flak from the Dummer Lake area. Shortly after crossing the Zuider Zee, 5/10ths cirrus at 23,000 to 25,000 feet, with tops at 29,000 feet was encountered. The visibility in the cirrus itself was 500 yards, but the lower cloud layer could be distinguished below the cirrus. After the divergency [sic] from course in the Dummer Lake area, the formation flew gradually back to the briefed course and reached the briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] at 1156 - two minutes late, at an altitude of 28,000 feet, 2000 feet above the briefed altitude.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The target at Kassel, Germany was attacked by PFF methods. The Lead Squadron performed its own sighting operation and the Low Squadron dropped on the bombs of the Lead Aircraft. The turn was made at the briefed IP. Heavy haze and light clouds were encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] functioned satisfactorily. The High Squadron performed its own sighting operation. The briefed turn was made at the IP. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. Due to poor visibility, the C-1 Pilot was not used. The target was attacked at 1207½ - 30 seconds early, from an altitude of 27,800 feet.
   6.  Flight From Target: The formation followed the briefed route with minor divergencies [sic] on the withdrawal. The Belgian coast was crossed to the left of course at an altitude of 7,500 feet. The English coast was crossed south of Felixstowe at an altitude of 7,500 feet. The briefed route was contacted before reaching Cambridge and followed to base, the High and Low Squadrons first going to their stand-off positions.
   7.  Fighter Support: Good.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Weather was 10/10ths over the target area and most of the route. The Scouting Force was not contacted by the 94th "A" Group. It was also impossible to contact the weather ship over England. The Mosquito Screening Force made its rendezvous on time at the same altitude as the formation. Ten inaccurate burst [sic] of flak were observed after the turn over the target.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: There were no failures to attack. Two flying spares returned as planned.

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0823 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0935 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 0945 hours at Crowland.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. 
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee, Radio, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1016 hours at Clacton.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Mickey [Radar], DR [Dead Reckoning] and Gee.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 130.
      3. Actual Drift 6° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 27,800.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1207½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 234°/40 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. PFF
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths cloud coverage.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 212° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 51°01'N 09°15'E at 1212 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 51°01'N 09°15'E at 1212 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning], Mickey and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0824 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0915 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 0950 hours at Crowland.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. With exceptiion of large DD [Double Drift] for timing just before leaving English Coast.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning], Air plot.
   6. Division formation was joined at 1016 hours at Clacton.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, Mickey [Radar], DR [Dead Reckoning] and Air Plot.
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. 
      2. True heading over target. 136°.
      3. Actual Drift 10° Left.
      4. Altitude over Target 28,800.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1206½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 260°/55 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Mickey
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 
      10. Axis of withdrawal 202° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, Mickey and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0825 hours.
   2. Group formed at 0915 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 10,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at Crowland hours at 0939.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Did not hit Crowland and Swung SW of CP [Control Point] 1 (This was done to lose time).
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1042 hours at 52°07'N 03°12'E [47 miles West of The Hague, Netherlands].
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was (not) as briefed. Actual IP was a little SW of Briefed IP.
      2. True heading over target. 156°.
      3. Actual Drift +5°.
      4. Altitude over Target 27,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1208.
      6. Wind used for bombing ____.
      7. Method of target identification. Gee
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths cloud coverage.
      10. Axis of withdrawal 255° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at Over Target at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at 51°07'N 09°20'E at 1212 hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at 51°07'N 09°10'E at 1212 hours.
   13. Flight home was was not as briefed.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, DR [Dead Reckoning] and Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were not as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: None
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment OK

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Lead Sqdn. performed own PFF sighting operation with the Low Sqdn. dropping on the lead on a mag. heading of 141°.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. ____
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? Heavy haze and light clouds.
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Lead Squadron, 94th "A" Div. Lead Bombardier - Capt. Lyttle, William B.
Pilot - Lt. Col. Burns, R.W. & Capt. Anderson, D.S.
Navigator - Capt. Maltby, Edward B.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-376  Take-off - 0815 Landed - 1515
Objective - Marshalling Yards at Kassel, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point -  As Briefed
Method of Attack -  Squadron - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 24   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ONE
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 10 x 500 Lb. AN-M43 G.P. [General Purpose]; 2 x M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On PFF

Information at Release Point:  Low dropped on lead on Mag. Heading 141°.

Type of Release - Train 80'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15.5 Actual -15.5
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 20°  Actual 290°  Velocity - Metro 20  Actual 30K
Temp C. - Metro -38° C. Actual -39° C.

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  PFF
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? High Sqdn. performed own PFF sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10ths Clouds
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Due to Poor Visibility, C-1 Pilot Was Not Used.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

High Squadron, 94th "A" Div. Lead Bombardier - 1st Lt. Plaut, George H.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Moulton, Richard B.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Irwin, Irl A.

Aircraft B-17G   Y-374  Take-off - 0824 Landed - 1524
Objective - Marshalling Yards at Kassel, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point -  As Briefed I.P.
Method of Attack -  Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ONE
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: Lead A/C   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - ____   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 10 x 500 Lb. AN-M43 G.P. [General Purpose]; 2 x M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb] & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On PFF

Information at Release Point:

Type of Release - Train 80'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -15.5 Actual -14
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 20°  Actual 260°  Velocity - Metro 20K  Actual 55K
Temp C. - Metro -38° C. Actual -40° C.

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. No photo evidence available due to 10/10ths cloud over target. The lead bombardier was able to kill the drift and was given range periodically by the Mickey Operator [Radar] and he believes the bombs dropped in the target area, which was Kassel, the secondary PFF target. The low squadron bombed on the lead squadron PFF A/C [Aircraft] and their bombs should drop in the target area also. The high squadron believe their bombs were a mile to the right of the briefed PFF target.
3. No enemy A/C were sighted and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Some crews reported as many as 10 inaccurate bursts just after the turn over the target. Meager flak was observed 10 miles south of our course over the Zuider Zee, and in the vicinity of Zwolle.
5. Weather was 10/10ths over the target area and most of the route. Some breaks in the clouds in the vicinity of Brussels.
6. At 52°20'N - 06°00'E [Epe, Netherlands] crews reported seeing several contrails going to approximately 30,000 feet. These are believed to be made by V-2 rockets. One of these believed rockets was thought to rise from a point 20 miles due East of Kablenz; others were thought to be launched from the Zuider See [sic] area. Four boats thought to be cargo vessels were sighted 51°14'N - 02°55'E [Ostend, Belgium].
7. PFF units were employed and worked well for the lead squadron, but not too well for the high. Fighter support was good. The Scouting Force was not heard by our Group. None of our A/C is missing.

    508th Squadron:
A/C 799-Q: Lead of High Squadron flew too low causing out A/C to fly in prop wash during the entire mission. - Lt. Galloway.
A/C 711-F: Formation of 508th was poor. - Lt. Parnell. Lead ship of the high squadron flew too low
      didn't allow enough room for the low-low flight of the high sq. on cross overs. - Lt. Parnell.
A/C 956-L: Good lead in high squadron-lead element. - Lt. Wiese.

    510th Squadron:
A/C 595-O: Assembly altitude was 10,000 and should have been 18,000. Weather was pretty rough at assembly. - Lt. Oakes.
A/C 714-R: Nose gunner in this ship today had never flown in mechanical ship before and didn't know much about it; he should be
      taught more. - Lt. Handy.

    511th Squadron:
A/C 705-F: Good formation. - Entire Crew.
A/C 045-L: If there ever was an SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] mission, this was it. - Lt. Traczewitz.

1. Abortives and Flying Spares:
   1. Airplane No. 43-38130, 508th Squadron, returned early as planned.
   2. Airplane No. 42-31384, 509th Squadron, returned early as planned.
2. Battle Damage:
   1. None
   
   

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (Z–8376 PFF),
   Sqdn 509th A/C: F–6566, (T–1384 Spare),
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: A–8428, C–8694, F–7705, G–8070, H–8435, K–8585, M–8650, N–8592, P–2676, (L–8045 PFF)

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: M–7964, U–8591
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, D–7957, F–7124, O–7595, G–7862, K–7252, L–7515, N–7665, R–7714, S–7512, U–7216
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: (U–8374 PFF), A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, F–1711, G–8567, J–7978, L–7956, O–8277, Q–8799, Y–6108, (K–8130 Spare)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None

2. Target: GH-637
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T PRR R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T KSB R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T UOB R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T MLR R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0810; Take-Off – 0825; E.T.D. Field – 0825
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1011	10,000 Ft	Clacton

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1056	18,000 Ft	52°37'N-04°37'E [Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1348	9,000 Ft	51°16'N-03°03'E [De Haan, Belgium]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1416	6,000 Ft	Felixstowe

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1454 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 13 [Planes] 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 + 2 M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb]
    Low Squadron: 12 [Planes] 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 + 2 M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb]
    High Squadron: 13 [Planes] 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 + 2 M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb]
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2500 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. R.W. Burns A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8376 PFF (508)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: 1st Lt. R.P. Redman A/C No & Sqdn. D-7957 (510)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: 1st Lt. R.B. Moulton A/C No & Sqdn. L-8358 (509) [This A/C was replaced by 44-8374 U]
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By D.W. Grasmehr, Sgt.