1 Feb, 1945 Target: Marshalling Yards at Ludwigshaven, Germany

Group Mission #265

Credited Mission #258

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DATE: 1 Feb. 1945

Target: Marshalling Yards at Ludwigshaven, Germany

BRIEFING OUTLINE
BRIEFING OFFICER: (IMPORTANT): READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP

1. TARGETS:
2. Visual Primary and MH & H2X target for today is: M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] - Ludwigshaven [Germany]
3. PFF Primary: ____
4. Visual Secondary: ____
5. PFF Secondary: ____
6. Last Resort: Any military German target positively identified & E of bomb line.

TIMINGS:
Zero Hour:	- 1000		Stations:	- 0805
Start Engines:	- 0815		Taxi:	- 0835
Take Off:	- 0850		Last Take Off:	- 1000
Target Time:	- ____		ETR [Estimated Time of Return]:	- 1620
Depart English Coast at:	1100	22,000' @ Felixstowe

LOADINGS:
Gasoline:	2,500 Gallons
Bombs:	All A/C: 10 x 500 G.P. [General Purpose] 1/10 x 1/100 [Fuses] Plus 2 M-17 IB's [Incendiary Bombs]

Intervalometer Settings: 90' for Visual, M.H. [Micro-H], or H2X
Chaff: 22 min. before target for 24 minutes
Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 576 units.

Disposition of Forces:

2 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart ~~England ___ preceded by ___ Division and~~ followed by the 3rd Division.
1st Division will dispatch 4 CBW's of 3 Groups each.
The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:

A Task Force	Lead	1st A, B,C	Attacking	Manheim
	2nd	41st A, B, C	Attacking	Manheim
	3rd	40th A, B	Attacking	Manheim
B Task Force	4th	40th C	Attacking	Ludwigshaven
	5th	94th A, B, C	Attacking	Ludwigshaven

~~2nd Division targets are~~	____
3rd Division targets are	Wessel (N of Ruhr)

Fighter Cover: 7 Gps. of P-51's
4 Groups of them cover A Force.

Assembly:

Lead at	19,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Green	Flares
High at	20,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Green-Green	Flares
Low at	18,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Red	Flares
401st at	19,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares
457th at	19,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares

Combat Wing Assembly Line: Fakenham to Felixstowe
Division Assembly Line: Felixstowe to Berlin
2 minutes interval between Groups.
Reference altitude: 22,000'

Call Signs:

351st	Woodcraft Able
401st	Woodcraft Charlie
457th	Woodcraft Baker
(B Force) 1st Div. Air Commander	Maj. Hardin
94th CBW Air Commander	Major Roper

Navigator - _____
S-2 - _____
Weather - _____
Communications - _____
Flying Control - _____
Special Instructions:
a. Type of Bombing Formation - If Visual or MH, by Squadrons, in event of MH failure, up to Maj Roper.
b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
c. Camera A/C K-252, R-156, S-512
return at Enemy coast out[bound]
d. Spares to turn back at 03° East.
e. PFF A/C fly as MH Lead & Deputy, High MH Lead, Low MH Lead
f. MH A/C fly as Sqdn. Leads
g. REMARKS: MH will not bomb by MH unless correct beacon codes are received at IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]
In event of MH failure, Group Commander will decide as to Group bombing by H2X or MH
OXYGEN DISCIPLINE!!!!!!!!

BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??

Operational Narrative.

Date of Mission - 1 February, 1945.

Target Attacked: The secondary target at Ludwigshaven, Germany, was attacked by PFF methods.
Force: 94th “A” Group. Thirty-nine aircraft, including four PFF ships and three flying spares, were dispatched.
Position: The 94th “A” Group flew in its briefed position as second group in the “B” Task Force until within the continental coast. From that point on, it led the “B” Task Force.

Lead Teams

	Group Lead
	Air Commander:	Major Leonard B. Roper
	Pilot:	Captain Normal A. Trapp
	Navigator:	1st Lt. Albert W. Luich
	Bombardier:	Captain Robert E. McFarlane

	High Squadron
	Group Leader:	Captain Benjamin F. Nay
	Pilot:	2nd Lt Paschel M. Huff
	Navigator:	1st Lt John P. Curley
	Bombardier:	2nd Lt Wayne A. Grundish

	Low Squadron
	Group Leader:	1st Lt Raleigh G. Knight
	Pilot:	1st Lt Clinton W. Hammond
	Navigator:	2nd Lt Howard S. Love
	Bombardier:	1st Lt Leonard L. Schuler

Narrative.
1. Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out over the Kings Cliffe buncher. The 401st Group passed through the 94th “A” Group twice on the assembly and some difficulty was experienced with prop wash was encountered. The last circle at the assembly point took the formation to the northeast of the buncher. Departure in formation was made at the briefed time (1025) from a point northeast of the buncher at the briefed altitude of 19,000 feet.
2. Route Over England: It was determined, while circling the buncher, that the formation would be about five minutes early at Control Point #1 because of unbriefed winds. After having departed from the assembly area, the Combat Wing Air Commander contacted Foxhole Charlie over VHF to determine whether or not he would be early at the departure point. The answer indicated that Foxhole Charlie, the leader of the “B” Task Force, would be two minutes early at Control Point #1. The briefed route was followed with little divergency from the assembly area to Fakenham. It was then found necessary to make a divergency from the briefed course in order to arrive at the departure point behind Foxhole Charlie. In order to do this, the formation flew to the left of the briefed course between Fakenham and Felixstowe. The briefed departure point, Felixstowe, was reached one minute early (1101) at an altitude of 22,000 feet, the briefed height. It was found that Foxhole Charlie, having made a wrong estimate on his ETA at this point, had gone ahead.
3. Division Assembly Line: The 94th “A” Group departed from the English coast at the briefed point and altitude, and followed the “B” Task Force Lead Group, which was seen ahead. The briefed route was not followed in crossing the channel, the formation making a dog-leg to the right of the briefed course in following the preceding formations. This was evidently done in order to lose time, for the 94th “A” Group crossed the Belgian coast to the right of the briefed point five minutes early (1121) at an altitude of 24,000 feet, 1,000 feet below the briefed altitude.
4. Flight to Target: Inside of the coast, VHF conversation with Foxhole Charlie indicated that he had been twenty-three minutes early at Control Point #2 and was at an altitude of 26,000 feet. He made the decision to let-down to the altitude of the 94th “A” Group after making a 360° turn in order to take over the lead position of the “B” Task Force. The 94th “A” Group meanwhile flew to the left of the briefed course in order to avoid weather on the briefed course and also to lose time which would permit the “B” Task Force Leader to take his briefed position. Further VHF conversation indicated that this could not be done, and it is believed that Foxhole Charlie fell into the “B” Task Force Formation behind one of the 94th Combat Wing Groups. The briefed IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was reached, the formation coming in from the left of the briefed course, ten minutes early (1210) at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the briefed altitude.
5. Description of Bombing Run: It had been found that Micro-H bombing could not be followed as it had been impossible for any of the equipped aircraft to pick up the beacons over England or France. This was due to the master tuning unit of this base being off 100 megacycles. This unit was checked on the mission of this date, but was checked against a faulty wave meter. The Combat Wing Air Commander informed the High and Low Squadrons of the 94th “A” Group that the Secondary Target would be attacked by PFF methods in group formation. The Lead Aircraft performed its own sighting, the High and Low Squadrons dropping on it. The target was found to be completely overcast. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] functioned satisfactorily.
6. Flight From Target: The formation left the target in good formation. The Weather Scouting Force reported that the let-down could be started at Control Point #4. The formation flew to the left of the briefed course to the Belgian coast in order to avoid weather on the briefed route. The departure from the Belgian coast was made to the left of the briefed point at 1514 at an altitude of 8,500 feet. It was necessary to make a variance to the north of the briefed course in crossing the channel in order to avoid weather. The English coast was crossed at Felixstowe, the briefed point, and the formation flew the briefed route in the flight to base. The High and Low Squadrons went to their respective standoff areas before landing. A normal let-down procedure had been followed.
7. Fighter Support: Good.
8. Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak encountered was meager, with good altitude, but poor for deflection. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted and gave helpful weather information.
9. Aircraft Not Attacking: There were four failures to attack. Three aircraft returned to base early, and one failed to attack over the target. Two flying spares returned as planned.

[Signed] Carl C. Hinkle, Jr., Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

	351st Bombardmant Group
	Lead Box	High Box	Low Box	TOTAL
No. of A/C Failing to Take Off	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Airborne	13	13	13	39
No. of A/C Airborne Less Unused Spares	13	12	12	37
No. of A/C Sorties	13	9	12	34
No. of A/C Attacking	13*	8	12	33
No. of A/C Not Attacking	0	4	0	4
Name of Primary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Secondary Target	LUDWIGSHAVEN, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target	13	8	12	33
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs	127 X 500# GP 26 x 500# IB	76 X 500# GP 18 x 500# IB	117 X 500# GP 24 x 500# IB	320 X 500# GP 68 x 500# IB
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C Lost - Total	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C Lost - Flak
No. of A/C Lost - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C Lost - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C Lost - Accident
No. of A/C Lost - Unknown
Time of Take Off	0848	0849	0851
Time of Attack	1229	1229½	1229
Average Time of Flight	7:56	8:07	8:17
Altitude of Release	25,370’	26,130’	24,670’
Visual or PFF	Visual	Visual	Visual
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy	MEAGER, WITH GOOD ALTITUDE, BUT POOR DEFLECTION
Enemy Resistance – Fighter	0	0	0	0
Enemy Resistance – Bombers	0	0	0	0
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft	0	0	0	0
Degree of Success	UNOBSERVED

* - The Flying Spare scheduled with the Lead Sqdn. attacked with the High Sqdn.

PFF A/C were borrowed from Groups as follows: None
PFF A/C were loaned to Groups as follows: None

PFF Aircraft		POSITION
44-8358		GROUP LEAD
42-97651		DEPUTY GROUP LEAD
44-8045		HIGH SQDN LEAD
44-8374		LOW SQDN LEAD

[Lead Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on LUDWIGSHAFEN PFF 1 FEBRUARY, 1945

Flight Plan and Log attached.
Track Chart attached.
Narrative.
1. T/O at 0847 hours.
2. Group formed at 1015 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 19,000 feet.
3. Wing assembly was completed at 1046 hours at 5232N - 0113E.
4. Route over England was ~~(not)~~ flown as briefed.
5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and Pilotage.
6. Division formation was joined at 1101 hours at Felixstowe
7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 12 mi. left of course, wind shift. Group ahead made 360 to lose time and was discovered after they were behind us. Our group went in and bombed ahead of them.
8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee and Mickey
9. BOMB RUN.
  1. Actual I.P. was ~~not~~ as briefed.
  2. True heading over target. 115°.
  3. Actual Drift 5° Left.
  4. Altitude over Target 25,000.
  5. Time Bombs Away 1229.
  6. Wind used for bombing 227°/86 knots.
  7. Method of target identification. Mickey
  8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
  9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths
  10. Axis of withdrawal 190° M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
10. Group rally was accomplished at 4856N - 0850E at 1241 hours.
11. Wing rally was accomplished at 4856N - 0850E at 1241 hours.
12. Division rally was accomplished at Not Observed at ____ hours.
13. Flight home ~~was~~ was (not) as briefed.
14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, Mickey and Pilotage.
15. Winds aloft were ~~(not)~~ called out to the formation.
16. Fighter rendezvous' were ~~(not)~~ as briefed.
17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
  1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
  2. Gee: OK
  3. Radio Compass: OK
  4. Fluxgate: OK
  5. Other Equipment OK

[Signed:] Albert W. Luich, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Lead Squadron

[High Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on LUDWIGSHAFEN PFF 1 FEBRUARY, 1945

Flight Plan and Log attached.
Track Chart attached.
Narrative.
1. T/O [Take Off] at 0849 hours.
2. Group formed at 1026 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 20,000 feet.
3. Wing assembly was completed at 1046 hours at 5232N - 0113E
4. Route over England was ~~(not)~~ flown as briefed.
5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee, Pilotage and DR [Dead Reckoning].
6. Division formation was joined at 1101 hours at Felixstowe.
7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was ~~(not)~~ flown as briefed.
8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, Mickey, D.R.
9. BOMB RUN.
  1. Actual I.P. was ~~(not)~~ as briefed.
  2. True heading over target. 126°
  3. Actual Drift 13° Left.
  4. Altitude over Target 25,800.
  5. Time Bombs Away 1229½.
  6. Wind used for bombing 260°/90 knots.
  7. Method of target identification. PFF
  8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
  9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths.
  10. Axis of withdrawal 194° M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours. In Group Formation
11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
13. Flight home was ~~was not~~ as briefed.
14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, Mickey, D.R. and Pilotage.
15. Winds aloft were ~~(not)~~ called out to the formation.
16. Fighter rendezvous' were ~~(not)~~ as briefed.
17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
  1. Mickey [Radar]: Good
  2. Gee: Good
  3. Radio Compass: Good
  4. Fluxgate: Good
  5. Other Equipment Good

[Signed:] John F. Curley, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, High Squadron

[Low Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on LUDWIGSHAFEN (PFF) 1 FEBRUARY, 1945

Flight Plan and Log attached.
Track Chart attached.
Narrative.
1. T/O [Take Off] at 0850 hours.
2. Group formed at 1025 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 19,000 feet.
3. Wing assembly was completed at 1040 hours at 5250N - 0056E
4. Route over England was ~~(not)~~ flown as briefed.
5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and D.R. [Dead Reckoning].
6. Division formation was joined at 1102 hours at Felixstowe.
7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was ~~(not)~~ flown as briefed.
8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee, D.R.
9. BOMB RUN.
  1. Actual I.P. was ~~(not)~~ as briefed.
  2. True heading over target. 120°
  3. Actual Drift 12° Left.
  4. Altitude over Target 24,300.
  5. Time Bombs Away 1229.
  6. Wind used for bombing 260°/80 knots.
  7. Method of target identification. PFF
  8. Difficulties on bomb run. High Box on right of Lead.
  9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths.
  10. Axis of withdrawal 165° M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
10. Group rally was accomplished at Target at 1229 hours.
11. Wing rally was accomplished at 4903N - 0845E at 1239 hours.
12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
13. Flight home was ~~was not~~ as briefed.
14. Methods of navigation on return route. Gee, Radio and Pilotage.
15. Winds aloft were ~~(not)~~ called out to the formation.
16. Fighter rendezvous' were ~~(not)~~ as briefed.
17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
  1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
  2. Gee: OK
  3. Radio Compass: OK
  4. Fluxgate: OK
  5. Other Equipment OK

[Signed:] Howard S. Love, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Low Box

Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 1 Feb. 1945
Field Order # 618
Squadron or Group - Lead Sqdn., 94th CBW "A" Group
Target - M/Y [RR Marshalling Yard] at Ludwigshaven, Germany

Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)? PFF
Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group formation; High dropped at 1229½ hours on a Mag. Heading of 133° and Low dropped at 1229 hours on a Mag. Heading of 127°. The Lead Squadron made their own PFF sighting operation - dropped at 1229 hours on 122° Mag. Heading.
Was turn made at briefed I.P.? Yes
Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? PFF
Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? Yes
Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] Charles F. Henry, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Group Bombardier.

Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group Bombardier - Capt. McFarlane, Robert E.
Pilot - Major Roper, L.B. & Capt. Trapp, N.A.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Luich, Albert W.

Aircraft B-17G A-358 Take-off - 0850 Landed - 1642
Objective - N/Y at Ludwigshaven, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - PFF
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Group
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36 Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __ Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 8 x 500 Lb. G.P.[General Purpose]; 2 x 500 Lb. I.B.'s; Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10 Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:

Altitude of Target - 320		Magnetic Heading Ordered 110° Actual 122°
True Altitude Above Target - 25,370		True Heading 115°
Indicated Altitude - 25,000		Drift, Estimated 4° Left - Actual 5° Left
Pressure Altitude of Target +372		True Track 110°
Altimeter Setting 29.92		Actual Range 15,362'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150K		Bomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 225K		Time of Release 1229
Ground Speed Est. 276 M.P.H. Actual 236 K		Length of Bombing Run - 59 miles
Wind Direction Metro - 260° Actual - 227°		Intervalometer Setting - 90 feet
Wind Velocity Metro 45K Actual 86K		C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] - X [Used]
D.S. - 127.8 Trail - 59 ATF - 41.72		A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .623 Actual .623		Manual Pilot - ____

Type of Release - Train 90'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -10.25 Actual -10.25
Winds - Altitude - 25,000 Ft. Direction - Metro 260° Actual 227° Velocity - Metro 45 Actual 86
Temp C. - Metro -34° C. Actual -32° C.

Narrative Teletype Report:

No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
The three squadrons of this Group formed the 94th “A” Combat Wing and bombed the secondary target, the Railway bridge at Ludwigshaven, Germany, by PFF methods of the smoke markers of the Lead Squadron. Mickey Operators estimate that their bombs hit between 1 to 2 miles N of the MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. No photos are available as clouds obscured the target.
No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
Flak encountered by this formation was meager, with good altitude but poor deflection. A heavier barrage was observed after this formation had passed over the target area.
10/10ths Frontal clouds were encountered at the coast in having tops up to 24,000 feet, breaking to 4/6/10ths middle clouds and 10/10ths low clouds over the target area. Contrails were light and persistent.
A lifeboat was observed at 5150 N – 0223 E at 1530 hrs. No occupants were seen.
Four PFF a/c were employed by this group on today’s mission. The primary target was to be bombed by Micro-H method, but the beacons could not be picked up and the secondary was bombed by PFF equipment. The PFF equipment worked well. Fighter support was good. The Scouting Force was contacted and gave helpful information. None of our a/c is missing.

Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge

Combat Crew Comments:

508th Squadron:
A/C 349-B: Good lead. – Capt. Lowery.

509th Squadron:
A/C 640-C: Tail gunner on Foreman’s crew stowed guns during entire mission. – Lt. Hammett.

[Signed:] Robert P. Ramsey, Major, Air Corps, Group S-2 [Intelligence].

Mission Summary Report:

Abortives and Flying Spares:
1. Airplane No. 43-37854, 509th Squadron returned early. Pilot reported that #4 propeller governor ran away at altitude. Investigation revealed a faulty governor.
2. Airplane No. 42-97169, 509th Squadron returned early as planned.
3. Airplane No. 43-37665, 510th Squadron returned early. Investigation revealed that #1 engine had failed internally.
4. Airplane No. 44-8280, 510th Squadron returned early as planned.
5. Airplane No. 43-38694, 511th Squadron returned early. Pilot stated that #1 engine had blown an exhaust stack and #3 engine vibrated excessively. Investigation revealed a blown exhaust stack and low compression on #3 engine, necessitating its change.

[Signed:] John W. Freeman, Captain, Air Corps, Group Engineering Officer

Armament Malfunction Report:

1. Aircraft 44-6802 failed to attack target on Mission of 1 February, 1945.
2. Bombing system operates satisfactorily at altitude during ground check, in train, select and salvo.
3. Bomb racks operated satisfactorily at altitude during check flight 2 February, 1945.
4. This aircraft has not previously had any bombing malfunctions and it is the opinion of this department that improper operation was the cause of failure.

[Signed:] Clemert E. Hayes, Captain, Air Corps, Group Armament Officer.

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. N-97169 Squadron - 509 - Low Date - 1 February, 1945

PILOT'S STATEMENT:
1. Reason for abortive #3 manifold pressure and RPM kept fluctuating. #3 ran rough; #3 cylinder Head temp out. We had trouble keeping with the formation. #2 turbo went out. #4 turbo fluctuated.
2. Place and altitude Ostend 25,000'
3. Time 1130
4. Position in formation Flying Spare
5. Disposition of bombs Returned with bombs.
6. Remarks Going out we could keep up by losing a little altitude. When we tried to fly level we couldn't keep up. #3 gas gauge out.
(Pilot's Signature) Walther J. Wefel
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
1. Cause (if mechanical) Internal failure #3 engine.
2. Responsibility Engineering
3. Type of abortive Mechanical.
(Eng. Officer's Signature) [Unreadable]
SQUADRON COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:
1. Responsibility Engineering
2. Action Taken No action taken
(Squadron C.O.'s Signature) John B. Carraway, Lt. Col., A.C.
GROUP S-3's [Operations] STATEMENT:
1. Comments None
2. Action Taken None
3. Credit Mechanical
(Operations Officer's Signature) Carl C. Hinkle, Maj., Air Corps
To Group Commander for information and remarks.

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. V-37854 Squadron - 511 - High Date - 1 February, 1945

PILOT'S STATEMENT:
1. Reason for abortive No. 4 prop ran-away. Could not control. No's 3 & 4 fuel pressures 25.
2. Place and altitude Felixstowe 23,000'
3. Time 1105
4. Position in formation Lead of high flight of High Squadron
5. Disposition of bombs Returned to base.
6. Remarks Poor Formation We also brought back F-705 with an internal failure #3 engine. Kings Cliff - 0930 - 18,000'
(Pilot's Signature) Robert H. Langdon
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
1. Cause (if mechanical) Faulty Propeller Governor
2. Responsibility Engineering
3. Type of abortive Mechanical
(Eng. Officer's Signature)John W. Freeman, Capt. A.C.
SQUADRON COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:
1. Responsibility Engineering
2. Action Taken No action taken
(Squadron C.O.'s Signature) John B. Carraway, Lt. Col. A.C.
GROUP S-3's [Operations] STATEMENT:
1. Comments None
2. Action Taken None
3. Credit Mechanical
(Operations Officer's Signature) Carl Hinkle Jr., Maj. A.C.
To Group Commander for information and remarks.

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. C-38694 Squadron - 511 - High Date - 1 February, 1945

PILOT'S STATEMENT:
1. Reason for abortive: Exhaust on #1 Engine - #3 cylinder blew out - No manifold pressure. #3 engine vibrated excessively.
2. Place and altitude: 5130N - 0200E 23,500'
3. Time: 1113
4. Position in formation: #2 Low element High Squadron
5. Disposition of bombs: Returned to base.
6. Remarks: #1 engine's manifold pressure was reading only 22" Hg. I couldn't hold in formation without blowing other engines and thought best to return since #3 was vibrating and cylinder head temp was excessive.
(Pilot's Signature) Jay H. Maish
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
1. Cause (if mechanical): Blown exhaust stack #2 cylinder of #3 engine.
2. Responsibility: Engineering.
3. Type of abortive: Mechanical.
(Eng. Officer's Signature) John W. Freeman, Capt. A.C.
SQUADRON COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:
1. Responsibility: Engineering
2. Action Taken: No Action Taken
(Squadron C.O.'s Signature) John B. Carraway, Lt. Col. A.C.
GROUP S-3's [Operations] STATEMENT:
1. Comments: None
2. Action Taken None
3. Credit: Mechanical
(Operations Officer's Signature) Carl C. Hinkle Jr., Maj. A.C.
To Group Commander for information and remarks.

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. N-37665 Squadron - 510 - High Date - 1 February, 1945

PILOT'S STATEMENT:
1. Reason for abortive Engine Failure (No. 1) Unable to maintain climbing speed in formation.
2. Place and altitude Between Spalding and Fakenaam - 20,000'
3. Time 1035
4. Position in formation #3 in Low-Low of High Squadron
5. Disposition of bombs Returned to base.
6. Remarks Engine indicates a cracked or blown cylinder head. Reason was: Shot bearing, broken cuno (Oil Filter)
(Pilot's Signature) James E. Blaney
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
1. Cause (if mechanical) Internal failure #1 engine.
2. Responsibility Engineering
3. Type of abortive Mechanical
(Eng. Officer's Signature) John W. Freeman, Capt. A.C.
SQUADRON COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:
1. Responsibility Engineering
2. Action Taken Engine change
(Squadron C.O.'s Signature) John D. Graham Jr.
GROUP S-3's [Operations] STATEMENT:
1. Comments None
2. Action Taken None
3. Credit Engineering
(Operations Officer's Signature) Carl C. Hinkle Jr., Maj. A.C.
To Group Commander for information and remarks.

Abortive Report
Aircraft No. H-280 Squadron - 510 Date - 1 February, 1945

PILOT'S STATEMENT:
1. Reason for abortive #2 ran away at altitude - Lost position with 1, 3, 4 at 46' and 2500 [RPM] (#2 feathered after 20 min. finally)
2. Place and altitude 4935N-0615E
3. Time 1212
4. Position in formation #3 High (ended up)
5. Disposition of bombs Brought Back
6. Remarks Poor Formation (Scheduled as Flying Spare)
(Pilot's Signature) Ralph E. Mahnke, 2nd Lt, A.C.
GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER'S STATEMENT:
1. Cause (if mechanical) Prop Governor #2
2. Responsibility Engineering
3. Type of abortive Mechanical
(Eng. Officer's Signature) John W. Freeman, Capt. A.C.
SQUADRON COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:
1. Responsibility Engineering
2. Action Taken No action taken
(Squadron C.O.'s Signature) John B. Carraway, Lt. Col, A.C.
GROUP S-3's [Operations] STATEMENT:
1. Comments None
2. Action Taken None
3. Credit Mechanical
(Operations Officer's Signature) Carl C. Hinkle Jr., Maj. A.C.
To Group Commander for information and remarks.

“J” Form:

Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group Lead Squadron - 351st Group
Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, G–8954, K–8130, Q–8799, Y–6108,
Sqdn 509th A/C: (A–8358 PFF)
Sqdn 510th A/C: (Y–7651 PFF),G–7862, K–7252, P–8038, (L–7515 Spare)
Sqdn 511th A/C: None

b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group Low Squadron - 351st Group
Sqdn 508th A/C: (U–8374 PFF)
Sqdn 509th A/C: F–6566, M–7964, N–7169, P–7843, Q–8116, R–6156, T–8666, Y–7854, U–8591, (O–7595 Spare)
Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610
Sqdn 511th A/C: None

c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group High Squadron - 351st Group
Sqdn 508th A/C: None
Sqdn 509th A/C: None
Sqdn 510th A/C: N–7665, S–7512, (H–8280 Spare)
Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF), A–8428, C–8694, F–7705, H–8435, J–6579, M–8650, N–8592, Q–8080, X–6802

Target: GH-616

W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T MCY R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T NRC R/T TIPSTAFF
Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T SFM R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T RJB R/T PARTNERSHIP

Taxi – 0835; Take-Off – 0850; E.T.D. Field – 0850
Time: Height: Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)

1102 22,000 Ft Felixstowe

Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
1102	22,000 Ft	Felixstowe

Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
1126	25,000 Ft	51°12'N-02°50'E [3 mi SW of Ostend, Netherlands]

Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
1502	7,000 Ft	51°10'N-02°55'E [3 mi S of Ostend, Netherlands]

Time: Height: Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)

1533 5,000 Ft Felixstowe
E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1620 Hours
MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "H"
Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
Lead Squadron: 10 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/100 & 2 M-17 I.B.'s [Incendiary Bomb]
Low Squadron: Same
High Squadron: Same
___ Squadron:
Fuel Load of each A/C: 2500 Gallons
Leaders:
Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Maj. Roper A/C No & Sqdn. A-8358 PFF (509)
Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Knight A/C No & Sqdn. U-8374 PFF (508)
High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Capt. Nay A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
None

Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
1533	5,000 Ft	Felixstowe

Report Compiled By I.C. Muesing S/Sgt.

Formation Chart:

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off
				508th Squadron
				Roper–Trapp A/C 44-8358 A PFF
			Sullivan A/C 44-6108 Y		Muffett A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
	Parnell A/C 43-38130 K						Lowery A/C 42-97349 B
Wisdom A/C 43-38799 Q		Wiese A/C 43-37862 G				Sugg A/C 44-8410 A		Beringer A/C 42-38038 P
	Buttell A/C 43-37954 G						Murray A/C 43-37515 L Spare
Purvis A/C 43-38753 C		James A/C 42-97252 K

[Lt Murray, the flying spare, filled in Lt Blaney's position in High Sqdn, who aborted.]

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group Lead Squadron Formation Over Target
				508th Squadron
				Roper–Trapp A/C 44-8358 A PFF
			Sullivan A/C 44-6108 Y		Muffett A/C 42-97651 Y PFF
	Parnell A/C 43-38130 K						Lowery A/C 42-97349 B
Purvis A/C 43-38753 C		Wiese A/C 43-37862 G				Sugg A/C 44-8410 A		Beringer A/C 42-38038 P
	Buttell A/C 43-37954 G
Wisdom A/C 43-38799 Q		James A/C 42-97252 K

[Lts Wisdom and Purvis exchanged positions.]

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off
				511th Squadron
				Huff–Nay A/C 44-8045 L PFF
			Fox A/C 44-6579 J		Ashton A/C 43-38080 Q
	Patterson A/C 43-39001 M						Langdon A/C 43-37854 V
Sandel A/C 44-6802 X		Maish A/C 43-38694 C				Gattens A/C 43-38592 N		Rice A/C 43-38650 M
	Taylor A/C 43-38428 A						Mahnke A/C 44-8280 H Spare
Blaney A/C 43-37665 N		Haskins A/C 43-37512 S

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group High Squadron Formation Over Target
				511th Squadron
				Huff–Nay A/C 44-8045 L PFF
			Fox A/C 44-6579 J		Ashton A/C 43-38080 Q
	Patterson A/C 43-39001 M					Taylor A/C 43-38428 A
Sandel A/C 44-6802 X		Gattens A/C 43-38592 N
	Rice A/C 43-38650 M
Murray A/C 42-37515 L		Haskins A/C 43-37512 S

[Lts. Langdon, Maish, Blaney and Mahnke aborted the mision.]
[Lt. Murray, the Lead Sqdn. Flying Spare, filled in Lt Blaney's position in the High Sqdn.]

94th "A" Combat Bomb Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over–Target
				509th Squadron
				Knight–Hammond A/C 44-8374 U PFF
			Maddux A/C 43-37595 O		Cronin A/C 43-38116 Q
	Foreman A/C 43-38666 T						Mueller A/C 44-6566 F
Adams A/C 44-6610 B		Hammet A/C 43-38640 C				Kirkland A/C 43-38465 A		Smith A/C 43-37964 M
	Parker A/C 42-97843 P						Wefel A/C 42-97169 N Spare
Quinn A/C 43-38591 U		Vergen A/C 44-6156 R

[Lt Wefel, the flying spare, returned as planned.]

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 1000 BST [British Standard Time] Briefing: Enlisted Men 0530; Officers 0600 Stations: 0805 Start Engines: 0815 Taxi: 0835 Take-Off: 0850 Leave Base: 0850 [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0430; Officers 0500]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]

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351st Bomb Group

Polebrook, England

Group Mission #265

Credited Mission #258