351st Bomb Group

Group Mission #283

Credited Mission #276

BRIEFING OUTLINE

1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.
   
   
2. Read Special briefing poop.
   
   
3. TARGETS:
   
   1. The Visual Primary for today is: Soest [Germany]
   2. PFF Primary: Hamm [Germany]
   3. Visual Secondary: ____
   4. PFF Secondary: ____
   5. Last Resort Target: Koblenz - Giessen
   
   
4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:
   
   
5. Weather:
   
   
6. Time Schedule:

   Zero Hour:	- 1200		Stations:	- 1010
   Start Engines:	- 1020		Taxi:	- 1040
   Take Off:	- 1055		Last Take Off:	- 1210
   Intercept Group at	North Foreland	at	14,000 ft.
   Target Time:	- 1503		ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1821
   Depart English Coast at:	1245	at Felixstowe

   
   Time on oxygen: 4 hours
   
   TIME TICK [Set your watches.]
   
   
7. Loadings:

   Gasoline:	2,500 Gallons
   Bombs:	18 x 250 G.P. 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses] Plus M-17 IB [Incendiary Bomb] Chart 7 - Lead & Low High Sqdn. 6 x 500 G.P.'s Plus 6 M-17 IB's

   
   
8. Intervalometer Settings: 30 feet if Visual, PFF or GH
   
   
9. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 8 mins before Target - Continue for 15 minutes.
     Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 360 Plus 288 units.
   
   
10. Disposition of Forces:
    
    3 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England 2nd preceded by 3rd Division and followed by the 2nd Division.
    1st Division will dispatch 10 CBW's of 36 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    

    Lead	94th & 40th A	Attacking	Soest - Hamm
    2nd	40th B	Attacking	Hagen - Hamm
    3rd	41st	Attacking	Hagen - Hamm
    4th	1st	Attacking	Schwerte - Hamm

    2nd Division targets are	Siegen - Arnsberg - Bielefeld
    3rd Division targets are	Kassel (1st in of 8th A.F.)

    
    
11. Fighter Cover: 3 Gps. of P-51's - Balance 3 [Call Sign]
    
    
12. Assembly:

    Lead at	9,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Green	Flares
    High at	10,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Green-Green	Flares
    Low at	8,000'	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Red	Flares
    401st at	9,000'	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares
    457th at	9,000'	feet on	Glatton	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares

    Combat Wing Assembly Line: Bodney - Felixstowe
    Division Assembly Line: Felixstowe to 51°15’N-02°55’E [Bredene, Belgium]
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 22,000'
    Bombing altitude: 25,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.
    
    
13. Call Signs:

    351st	Woodcraft A - Able
    401st	Woodcraft B - Baker
    457th	Woodcraft C - Charlie
    1st Div. Air Commander	Lt. Col. Ball
    94th CBW Air Commander	Lt. Col. Ball

    
    
14. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - S-512, F-566, U-831; "C" - 8th A.F. - D-082; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - N-665.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.
    
    
15. FLYING CONTROL: _____
    
    
16. SPECIAL ISTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - Normal
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: Lead - P-038, Low - Y-108, High - O-920
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: Z-198, C-020, G-862, B-349, B-610, T-666, C-640
     d. Camera A/C: Lead - U-216, Low Q-565, High A-465
      return at  Discretion of Air Commander
     e. Spares to turn back at 05° East.
     f. PFF A/C fly as deputy lead - Lead Sqdn., Lead of Low Sqdn.
     g. GH A/C fly as Lead of Lead and High Sqdns.
     h. REMARKS: 
       F-1667-D German Civilian Hospitals marked with Red Square on White Circle will not be bombed.
       In event Hamm is attacked right turn off target will be made.
    
    
17. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.

  BRIEFING OFFICER: HAVE YOU READ SPECIAL BRIEFING POOP??

Operational Narrative.

1. Date of Mission - 28 February, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked: The primary target at Seost, Germany, was attacked by Gee-H methods.
   2. Force: Thirty-eight aircraft, including two PFF ships and two GH aircraft and two flying spares were dispatched.
   3. Position: The 94th "A" Group flew in its briefed position as the lead group of the First Division Formation.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Division Lead
      	Air Commander:	Lt Col Clinton F. Ball
      	Pilot:	Captain James M. Gibbons
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Benton F. Love Jr
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Frederick S. Ralph

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Henry R. Rossen
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Morris G. Turner
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Allen G. McDonald
      	Bombardier:	F/O Lt. Paul A. Walker

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Thomas G. Petersen
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Gustave A. Bochert
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. Robert G. Craig
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Robert L. Adams

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out without difficulty at the briefed altitude of 9,000 feet over the Kings Cliffe buncher.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made on time (1207) from a point slightly east of the buncher. Before reaching Spaulding it became evident that that point would not be reached on time. The formation turned to the right inside of the briefed course and reached the next check point, Bodney, on time. It was necessary to cut inside of the leg between Bodney and Felixstowe in order to depart from the English coast on time. No difficulties were encountered in this slight deviation. This point was reached at an altitude of 12,400 feet, 400 feet above the briefed altitude.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The turn to the south was made after leaving Felixstowe and the briefed route was followed with slight divergency in crossing the channel. The 94th “A” Group was in its briefed position as the lead group of the First Division. The Belgian coast was crossed to the left of the briefed point at an altitude of 17,000 feet, the briefed height, and on time (1318).
   4.  Flight to Target: Inside of the coast, the formation went to the left of the briefed course while over Belgium. The briefed route was contacted before reaching the front lines and was followed with very little variance for the remainder of the flight to the target. The IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] used was slightly to the east of the briefed point. It was reached at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the briefed bombing altitude, at 1453, two minutes late. On the turn before the IP was reached, the lead aircraft reported that its Gee-H equipment was inoperative, and directed that the High Squadron take the lead in order to make a Gee-H run. The high Squadron flew directly to the Gee-H IP, the Lead Squadron filling in on the left, the Low Squadron, on the right.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The primary target at Soest, Germany, was attacked by Gee-H methods. Bombing was done in group formation. The briefed turn was made at the IP. The target was found to be completely overcast. No interference was encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was not used.
   6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the Lead Squadron again resumed the lead of the formation. The briefed route was followed with minor divergencies until, in the vicinity of six degrees east, the 94th “A” was forced to the right of the briefed course by the 398th Group which was two minutes late at the Division rally. No difficulty was encountered as a result. The formation slowly returned to the briefed route, contacted it in the vicinity of Brussels, and then swung to the right of course once more. To avoid prop wash from the 1st Combat Wing, departure from the Belgian coast was made to the right of the briefed point at an altitude of 8,500 feet. The formation gradually closed into the briefed route while crossing the channel. The two GH aircraft left the formation before the English coast was reached and returned to Kimbolton.
      
      The deputy leaders took over the Group and High Squadron leads. The English coast was crossed at the briefed point, Felixstowe, at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The formation returned direct to base above the overcast, omitting the dog-leg in the briefed course between Cambridge and base due to shortage of gasoline. The High and Low Squadrons went to their respective stand-off areas before landing. An instrument let-down procedure was executed.
   7.  Fighter Support: Poor until 7°43’E. Fighters believed late.
   8.  Comments: No Aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak at the target was meager and inaccurate, and trailed behind the formation. There were ten-tenths low clouds in the target area.
      
      The PFF-Gee-H equipment of the lead aircraft functioned poorly. The Gee-H equipment of the High Squadron Lead Aircraft functioned well enough for bombing purposes. The Weather Scouting Force furnished adequate weather information. The High Squadron Leader’s VHF transmitter was inoperative; all communication with him was relayed by his wing men and visual signals.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: Nil. The two flying spares returned as planned.

  [Signed] Carl C. Hinkle, Jr, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
DIVISION FIELD ORDER NUMBER 642

	351st Bombardment Group
	Lead Squadron	High Squadron	Low Squadron	TOTALS
Borrowed Aircraft	0	0	0	0
No. of Aircraft Failing to Take Off	0	0	0	0
No. of Aircraft Sorties	13	12	13	38
No. of Aircraft Airborne Less Unused Spares	12	12	12	36
No. of Aircraft Credit Sorties	12	12	12	36
No. of Effective Sorties	12	12	12	36
No. of Non-Effective Sorties	0	0	0	0
Name of Primary Target	SOEST, GERMANY
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Primary Target	12	12	12	36
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs	210 x 250# GP  24 x 500 M-17	71 x 250# GP  72 x 500 M-17	214 x 250# GP  24 x 500 M-17	424 x 250# GP  120 x 500 M-17 71 x 500 GP
Name of Secondary Target
(A) No. of A/C Attacking Secondary Target
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Last Resort Target (LRT)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking LRT
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
Name of Target of Opportunity (T.O.)
(A) No. of A/C Attacking T.O.
(B) No., Size & Type Of Bombs
No. of A/C MIA - Total	0	0	0	0
No. of A/C MIA - Flak
No. of A/C MIA - Flak and E/A
No. of A/C MIA - Enemy Aircraft
No. of A/C MIA - Accident over Enemy Terr.
No. of A/C MIA - Other and Unknown
Time of Take Off	1050	1051	1052
Time of Attack	1504½	1504½	1504½
Total Time for Mission	95:36	92:44	96:59	285:19
Altitude of Release (Indicated)	25,000’	25,600’	23,200’
Visual, H2X, Gee-H, M-H, Eagle, or Combination	GH	GH	GH
Enemy Resistance – AA Intensity & Accuracy	MEAGER AND INACCURATE
Enemy Resistance – Fighter	0	0	0	0
Enemy Resistance – Bombers	0	0	0	0
U.S. A/C Engaged by Enemy Aircraft	0	0	0	0
Number of Passes made by Enemy Aircraft	0	0	0	0
Degree of Success	RESULTS UNOBSERVED

2 A/C borrowed as follows: 2 GH Aircraft borrowed from 379th Group. 351st Group furnished crews.
____ A/C loaned as follows: ____

[Lead Sqdn.] Lead Navigator’s Narrative of Raid on Soest, 28 February, 1945

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 1050 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1130hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 9,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1226 hours at Bodney.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Point A was cut short to save time. Point "E" was cut short to save time. C.P. [Control Point] 1 on time on course.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England.  Pilotage, Gee, Radio and DR [Dead Reckoning].
   6. Division formation was joined at 1245 hours at Felixstowe.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Gee Mickey and DR
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 5119 0852E was IP used for GH run.
      2. True heading over target. 294°.
      3. Actual Drift 8° Right.
      4. Altitude over Target 25,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1504½.
      6. Wind used for bombing 251°/33 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. GH
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. 10/10ths
      10. Axis of withdrawal 224° Mag. [Magnetic Compass Heading]
   10. Group rally was accomplished at 51°44'N 08°13'E at 1509 hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at 11548 hours.
   13. Flight home was was (not) as briefed. 
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. DR, Mickey, Gee and Radio.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed. Fighters not with us until 0730E.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: Poor
       2. Gee: Poor
       3. Radio Compass: OK
       4. Fluxgate: Very poor at times.
       5. Other Equipment OK

  [Signed:] B.F. Love, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator, Lead Squadron

Lead Bombardier’s Narrative:
Date - 28 February, 1945
Field Order # 643
Squadron or Group - High Sqdn., 94th CBW "A" Group
Target - M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Soest, Germany

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  "G.H."
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Bombing was in Group Formation on the High Sqdn; M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] of the High, Lead, and Low Sqdn was 300° and Bombs were released at 15:04:30.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? As Briefed
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. 10/10
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? MPI [Mean Point of Impact] was located by "G.H."
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? The C-1 Pilot was not used.
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? None

Combat Bombing Flight Record:

I certify that this 12E Form is complete and accurate.
[Signed] Warren C Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.

High Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group Bombardier - 2nd Lt. McDonald, Allen G.
Pilot - 1st Lt. Rossen, Henry B.
Navigator - F/O Walker, Paul A.

Aircraft B-17G   Z-469  Take-off - 1050 Landed - 1820
Objective - Soest, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] By "G.H."
Initial Point - As Briefed
Method of Attack - Bombing was in Group Formation on the Lead of High.
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 36   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One   Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 5 x 500 Lb. G.P.[General Purpose] & 6 x M17 I.B's & Markers
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/40
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  Lead's M.H. [Magnetic Compass Heading] was 300° and Low's was 300°

Altitude of Target - 330		Magnetic Heading Ordered 318° Actual 300°
True Altitude Above Target - 25,900		True Heading 294°
Indicated Altitude - 25,600		Drift, Estimated 9° Right - Actual 2° Right
Pressure Altitude of Target -310		True Track 296°
Altimeter Setting 29.92		Actual Range 11,039'
Calculated Indicated Air Speed - 150K		Bomb Sight Type - M-9
True Air Speed - 194K		Time of Release 15:04:30
Ground Speed Est. 190 Actual 200		Length of Bombing Run - 12 miles
Wind Direction Metro - 270° Actual - 280°		Intervalometer Setting - 30 Feet
Wind Velocity Metro 40 Actual 36		C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] _____
D.S. - 121  Trail - 91   ATF - 43.6		A-5 Pilot _____
Tan. D.A, Est. .37 Actual .32		Manual Pilot - X [Used]

Type of Release - Train 30'
Point of Impact If Seen - Unobserved
Mean Temp. Metro -10.5 Actual -10
Winds - Altitude - 26,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 270°  Actual 280°  Velocity - Metro 40  Actual 36
Temp C. - Metro -38° C. Actual -36° C.

Narrative Teletype Report:

1. No leaflets were carried on today's mission.
2. The three squadrons of this group bombed the M/Y [RR Marshalling Yard] at Soest, Germany, through 10/10 clouds by Gee-H methods. The Gee-H equipment of the lead A/C malfunctioned and bombing was done in Group formation on the lead A/C of the high squadron. Mickey [Radar] Operators estimate that bombs fell slightly to the right, North, of the briefed MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. Photographs show only 10/10 clouds and no ground detail.
3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Flak at the target was meager and inaccurate and trailed behind this formation. No other flak was encountered along the route.
5. There were 10/10 clouds in the target area but weather in general did not hinder formation flying on the bomb run.
6. There were no observations of military importance.
7. The equipment of the four PFF A/C provided by this group worked well but that of the combination PFF-Gee H A/C from Kimbolton [379th Bomb Group] functioned poorly. The Gee H equipment of the high leader operated well enough for bombing purposes but both the PFF and Gee H of the lead A/C malfunctioned. The Scouting Force furnished adequate weather information. Fighter support was good. Because no flak was encountered at the front lines this group had no occasion to observe the effectiveness of the fire control relay A/C. None of our A/C are missing.

Track Chart:
Click on Chart to Enlarge

“J” Form:

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: D–6082
   Sqdn 509th A/C: G–8617, P–6907
   Sqdn 510th A/C: C–9020, G–7862, M–9001, N–7665, P–8038, S–7512, U–7216, (T–9156 Spare)
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (D–8664 PFF)
   Sqdn 524th A/C: (Z–8198 GH & PFF)

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: B–7349, C–8753, G–8954, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956, U–8813, Y–6108, (X–6579 Spare)
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: (L–8045 PFF), C–6952, G–8872, Q–6565

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: C–8640, F–6565, L–2955, M–7964, O–8920, Q–8166, R–6156, T–8666, U–8591
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610
   Sqdn 511th A/C: None
   Sqdn 527th A/C: (GH & PFF Z-8469)

2. Target: GH 444
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T LOH R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T UWM R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T PDM R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T TSQ R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 1040; Take-Off – 1055; E.T.D. Field – 1055
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1300	14,000 Ft	North Foreland

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1418	17,000 Ft	51°15'N-02°55'E [Bredene, Belgium]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1709	10,000 Ft	51°15'N-02°55'E [Bredene, Belgium]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1740	5,000 Ft	Felixstowe

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1821 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's [Incendiary Bomb]
    Low Squadron: 18 x 250 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 2 M17 I.B's
    High Squadron: 6 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40 Plus 6 M17 I.B's
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: 2500 Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Col. Ball A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8198 GH (524)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt Peterson A/C No & Sqdn. L-8045 PFF (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Rossen A/C No & Sqdn. Z-8469 GH (527)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By Maksimik, John, S/Sgt.

Formation Chart:

94th "A" Group - Lead Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
				510th Squadron
				Lt Col Ball–Gibbons A/C 44-8198 Z GH & PFF [379th BG]
			Haskins A/C 42-38038 P		Stewart–Redman A/C 44-8664 D PFF
	Oakes A/C 44-8617 G						Brooks A/C 43-39001 M
Dahlborg A/C 43-37512 S		Gonske A/C 44-6082 D				Adams A/C 43-37665 N		Peterson, A.E. A/C 43-39020 C
	Rebo A/C 43-37862 G						Bone A/C 43-39156 T Spare
Oen A/C 44-6907 P		Haft A/C 42-97216 U

[Lt Bone, the Flying Spare, returned as planned.]

94th "A" Group - High Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
				509th Squadron
				Rossen–Turner A/C 44-8469 Z GH & PFF [379th BG]
			Nowakowski A/C 43-38920 O		Maddux A/C 42-102955 L
	Taylor A/C 43-38116 Q						Quinn A/C 44-6610 B
Brennan A/C 43-38666 T		Mueller A/C 44-6566 F				Wefel A/C 43-38640 C		Thomson A/C 44-6156 R
	Gattens A/C 43-38591 U
Sexton A/C 43-37964 M		Hamton A/C 43-38465 A

94th "A" Group - Low Squadron Formation at Take–Off and Over Target
				508th Squadron
				Bennett–Peterson, T.G. A/C 44-8045 L PFF
			Kale A/C 44-6108 Y		Rohr A/C 43-38954 G
	Hansen A/C 44-6952 C						Beringer A/C 43-97349 B
Steward A/C 44-8412 H		Anderson A/C 43-38813 U				Russell A/C 43-37956 L		Ryan A/C 43-38130 K
	Horns A/C 43-38753 C						Dunn A/C 44-6579 X Spare
James A/C 43-38872 G		Hart A/C 44-6565 Q

[Lt Dunn, the Flying Spare, returned as planned.]

Time Schedule:
Zero Hour: 1200 BST [British Standard Time]  Briefing: Enlisted Men 0730; Officers 0800 Stations: 1010 Start Engines: 1020 Taxi: 1040 Take-Off: 1055  Leave Base: 1055 [Breakfast: Enlisted Men 0630; Officers 0700]

[Wounded On Mission: 0]

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