351st Bomb Group

1. Ask 508th, 509th and 510th Operations representatives if their crews are all present.
   
   
2. Read Special briefing poop.
   
   
3. TARGETS:
   
   1. The Visual Primary for today is: Recklinghausen [Germany]
   2. GH Primary: Recklinghausen [Germany]
   3. Visual Secondary: Munster
   4. PFF Secondary: Munster
   5. Last Resort Target: (See Field Order)
   
   
4. S-2 [Intelligence] Information:
   
   
5. Communications:
   
   
6. Weather:
   
   
7. Time Schedule:

   Zero Hour:	- 0900		Stations:	- 0905
   Start Engines:	- 0915		Taxi:	- 0930
   Take Off:	- 0945		Last Take Off:	- 1100
   Intercept Group at	Dungeness	at	15,000 ft.
   Target Time:	- 1323		ETR [Estimated Time    of Return]:	- 1532
   Depart English Coast at:	1158	at Dungeness

   
   Time on oxygen: 3½ hours
   
   TIME TICK [Set your watches.]
   
   
8. Loadings:

   Gasoline:	2,300 Gallons
   Bombs:	12 x 500 G.P. 1/10 x 1/40 [Fuses] - All A/C High Sqdn. 6 x 500 G.P.'s Plus 6 M-17 IB's

   
   
9. Intervalometer Settings:  Visual - Salvo - GH or H2X - Minimum
   
   
10. Chaff: Commence discharge of chaff at - 6 mins After IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run]- Continue for 18 minutes.
        Each A/C [Aircraft] will carry - 432 units.
    
    
11. Disposition of Forces:
    
    3 Divisions will be dispatched. The 1st Air Division will depart England Last preceded by 3rd Division and preceded by the 2nd Division.
    1st Division will dispatch 3 CBW's of 4 Groups each.
    The order of attack in the 1st Division will be:
    

    Lead	398	Attacking	Coesfeld
    2nd	381	Attacking	Coesfeld
    3rd	91	Attacking	Coesfeld
    4th	306	Attacking	Coesfeld
    5th	92	Attacking	Recklinghausen

    2nd Division targets are	Munster - Osnabruck - Rheine
    3rd Division targets are	Geisecke - Hengstey - Unna

    
    
12. Fighter Cover: 2 Gps. of P-51's - Front and Rear Support - 20 Groups Free Lancing in Target Area.
    
    
13. Assembly:

    Lead at	8,000	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Green	Flares
    High at	9,000	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Green-Green	Flares
    Low at	7,000	feet on	Kings Cliffe	Buncher	Red-Red	Flares
    401st at	8,000	feet on	Cottesmore	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares
    457th at	8,000	feet on	Glatton	Buncher	Red-Yellow	Flares

    Combat Wing Assembly Line: Brandon - Dungeness
    Division Assembly Line: Dungeness to 50°40’N-04°50’E [Glimes, Belgium]
    2 minutes interval between Groups.
    Reference altitude: 20,000'
    Bombing altitude: 25,000'
    Point for instrument let-down Kings Cliffe magnetic heading of 30 degrees.
    
    
14. Call Signs:

    351st	Woodcraft Able
    401st	Woodcraft Charlie
    457th	Woodcraft Baker
    1st Div. Air Commander	Lt. Col. Ensign
    94th CBW Air Commander	Major Korges

    
    
15. The following ships will monitor [Radio Channels]- "B" - T-666, N-665, H-412; "C" - 8th A.F. - M-964; "C" - 67th Fighter Wing - B-592.
    Other Communications information will be found on the flimsy.
    
    
16. FLYING CONTROL: _____
    
    
17. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
     a. Type of Bombing Formation - By Squadrons
     b. Bombardier and Navigator of the #3 A/C of each sqdn. report to Photo Lab.
      The A/C are: Lead - G-617, Low - H-280, High - U-813
     c. Ball Turret Gunners of the following A/C report to Photo Lab: Lead C-640, B-592; High M-900, B-349; Low L-515, C-020
     d. Camera A/C: Lead - A-428, High K-130, Low A-465
      return at  Continental Coast
     e. Spares to turn back at Go All The Way
     f. PFF A/C fly as Deputy Lead of Lead Sqdn.
     g. GH A/C fly as Lead of Each Squadron
     h. REMARKS: 
       Bomb Bay Doors will be opened and closed over Channel.
       Visual Run [Bomb Bay Doors] opened as cross the Rhine [River] - GH opened at first GH check point to be announced over
        "A" channel by Air Commander.
       There can be No Accidental Releases!
       Buckeye Red - Weather Scout
       4 Mosquitoes - Screening Force
    
    
18. You are reminded not to discuss the target. EXERCISE ALL SECURITY MEASURES.
    
    

1. Date of Mission - 23 March, 1945.
   1. Target Attacked:  The lead and Low Squadrons bombed the marshalling yards at Recklinghausen, Germany, (No. 1) while the bombs of the High Squadron fell in the marshalling yards at Westerholt, Germany (T/O) [Target of Opportunity].
   2. Force: 94th “A” Group. Thirty-eight aircraft, including one H2X ship, three combination H2X-GH aircraft, and two flying spares, were dispatched.
   3. Position: Due to the fact that the 94th "C" Group was ahead of the 94th "A", the position flown in the Division Formation was eighth, rather than seventh, as briefed.
   4. Lead Teams

      	Wing Lead
      	Air Commander:	Major Mortimer L. Korges
      	Pilot:	Captain Clifford T. Pryor
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Normal L. Gootee
      	Bombardier:	Captain John J. Schadegg

      
      

      	Low Squadron
      	Leader:	Captain Jay H. Maish
      	Pilot:	1st Lt. Paschel M. Huff
      	Navigator:	1st Lt. Melvin L. Ouder
      	Bombardier:	1st Lt. Mart G. Smith

      
      

      	High Squadron
      	Leader:	1st Lt. Morris G. Turner
      	Pilot:	2nd Lt. Boleslaus Lipski
      	Navigator:	2nd Lt. John H. Brandon
      	Bombardier:	2nd Lt. Patrick J. Finnegan

2. Narrative.
   1.  Squadron and Group Assembly: The assembly was carried out satisfactorily at the briefed altitude of 8,000 feet over the Kings Cliffe buncher.
   2.  Route Over England: Departure from the assembly area was made on course and one minute early (1054). The briefed route was closely followed to Gravesend, which was reached at time (1143). At that point, three other groups were seen approaching from the left across the briefed course. It was necessary to make a variance to the right of the briefed course in order to fall in trail. The 94th “C” Group (401st), however, flew the briefed route, hence cutting of the 94th “A" Group. The formation returned to the briefed route at the English coast, and made its departure eight minutes late at an altitude of 15,000 feet, the briefed height.
   3.  Division Assembly Line: The briefed Division Assembly Line was flown. The 401st Group remained in the Division Column ahead of the 94th “A”, rather than behind it, as planned. As a result, the briefed position could not be flown. The 94th “A” was the eighth group in the Division Column, rather than the seventh, as planned. The French coast was crossed at the briefed point at an altitude of 17,000 feet.
   4.  Flight to Target: The briefed route was followed with little divergency. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted and it passed on the information that the primary target could be attacked visually. The High and Low Squadron Leaders were so informed. The IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was made good by the High and Low Squadrons, but the Lead Squadron made its turn into the bombing run at a point to the south of the briefed point. This was done in order to permit the trailing squadrons to cross the IP and also to eliminate any possibility of interference from a preceding group observed in the area. The Lead Squadron made the turn from its selected IP nine minutes late, (1315) at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the bombing altitude.
   5.  Description of Bombing Run: The GH equipment was inoperative in the lead ship and could not be used as prescribed to start the bomb run. However, the visibility was good, and it was decided not to have one of the other GH equipped aircraft lead the 94th “A” to the target. The Lead Bombardier picked up the aiming point ten miles from the target. No difficulties, other than haze, were encountered on the bomb run. The C-1 Pilot [Autopilot] was used and functioned satisfactorily, except for a slight wallow. Bombing results of the Lead Squadron were good.
      
      The Low Squadron started its bomb run by using GH equipment. The bombardier took over when the Rhine River was reached. However, the formation encountered prop wash on the bombing run and found that the gyro tumbled excessively. It was impossible for the bombardier to make a proper sighting, and so he requested that a second run be made on the target. A 360° turn was made, and the High Squadron was followed on the bomb run. No difficulties were encountered on the second run. The C-1 Pilot was used and functioned satisfactorily. Bombing results were good.
      
      The High Squadron started its bomb run by using the GH equipment in the lead aircraft. Through an error on the part of the GH operator in identifying the target, the run was made on the wrong target, the marshalling yards at Westerholt, Germany. Bombing was done by GH methods with a visual assist. Bombing results were good and should cause heavy damage to that area. The High Squadron reported that it encountered some difficulty on the bomb run when it gained on the Low Squadron, and could not increase the interval, in spite of a double drift which it made. The Low Squadron turn off in its 360° and the High Squadron continued on its bomb run without further difficulties. The C-1 Pilot was used and functioned satisfactorily.
   6.  Flight From Target: After bombing, the Lead Squadron made the briefed turn to the left, followed the briefed route for a short way, and then cut inside of the briefed route. The briefed route was contacted before reaching the Zuider Zee and was followed slightly to the right of course on the withdrawal. Departure from the Dutch coast was made to the right of course at an altitude of 18,000 feet. The planned route was paralleled on the flight to the English coast, which was crossed to the right of the briefed point, Cromer, at an altitude of 8,000 feet. The Lead Squadron paralleled the briefed route to base and landed.
      
      After bombing, the High Squadron withdrew on the briefed route and followed it with little variance. The Lead Squadron could be seen ahead on the last leg of the route over Holland, and the High Squadron joined it a short ways off the Dutch coast and returned to base with it.
      
      As a result of the 360° turn, the Low Squadron had fallen far behind the Lead and High Squadrons. It followed the briefed route closely on the withdrawal and flew directly to base. A normal let-down procedure was followed by all aircraft.
   7.  Fighter Support: Thin, but adequate.
   8.  Comments: No aircraft were lost. No enemy aircraft were encountered. Flak was moderate and accurate at the target. Weather was CAVU [Ceiling And Visibility Unlimited] during the entire mission, but there was a small amount of ground haze in the general target area. The Weather Scouting Force was contacted by the Air Commander and furnished the correct weather information.
      
      The 94th “A” was scheduled to attack the target behind the 40th “B” and “C” Groups, but reports from crews indicate that the target was not bombed before the arrival of the 94th “A”. The 94th “C” Group, which was to follow the 94th “A” and “B”, was scheduled to attack with the 41st “A”, “B”, and “C” Groups. It is not known if this was done, but the 94th “A” was preceded by this group on the Division Assembly Line and the flight to the target.
   9.  Aircraft Not Attacking: There were no failures to attack. The two flying spares stayed with the formation.

1. I was the GH Navigator in the High Squadron on this mission. As the GH equipment in the Lead Squadron was inoperative the Lead turned about four to six miles short of the IP to make a visual run on the target. The Low Squadron, not knowing that the Lead’s equipment was out, turned with them. We stayed on course and turned on the briefed IP. After following the GH bomb run for approximately thirty miles, the Low Squadron moved in from the right and made their GH course good. This placed them directly below us and we were forced to do a double drift to the right to fall behind them. I think that we went about three miles right of course on the double drift. We made the turn to the left to get back on our original course. About one mile from our original GH course the bombardier stated that he could see the target area and would complete the run visually. We then turned to a heading which would bring us on to the target. I followed on GH for about two minutes after this last turn. At this time the GH reception went out due to a loose signal cable connection. At this point we were approximately at the Rhine River. This was before the first GH check Point was reached. It was after bombs away when I got the GH set in Operation again so I then turned on to the Ruhr Gee Chain to help in navigating on the return trip.
   
   Note: If the GH set had not gone out, I could have given the bombardier an approximate check on the sighting angles even though we were a little off the GH bomb run. As it was, I gave him no check points.
   
   [Signed] Paul P. Kohorst, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, GH Navigator

1. Flight Plan and Log attached.
2. Track Chart attached.
3. Narrative.
   1. T/O at 0940 hours.
   2. Group formed at 1040 hours on Kings Cliffe buncher at 8,000 feet.
   3. Wing assembly was completed at 1130 hours at Colchester.
   4. Route over England was (not) flown as briefed. Deviated between Pt. F and CP [Control Point] 1 because 3 groups swung across our course.
   5. Methods of Navigation over England. Gee and Pilotage
   6. Division formation was joined at 1206 hours at CP 1.
   7. Flight to IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] was (not) flown as briefed. 
   8. Methods of Navigation to the I.P. Pilotage
   9. BOMB RUN.
      1. Actual I.P. was not as briefed. 7 mi. South
      2. True heading over target. 087.
      3. Actual Drift +4°
      4. Altitude over Target 25,000.
      5. Time Bombs Away 1336.
      6. Wind used for bombing 145°/18 knots.
      7. Method of target identification. Visual
      8. Difficulties on bomb run. None
      9. Weather over Target. Slight Haze.
      10. Axis of withdrawal ____
   10. Group rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   11. Wing rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   12. Division rally was accomplished at ____ at ____ hours.
   13. Flight home was was (not) as briefed. Deviated to avoid flak after Bombs Away.
   14. Methods of navigation on return route. Pilotage.
   15. Winds aloft were (not) called out to the formation.
   16. Fighter rendezvous' were (not) as briefed.
   17. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT.
       1. Mickey [Radar]: OK
       2. Gee: OK
       3. Radio Compass: In and Out
       4. Fluxgate: OK
       5. Other Equipment API no good

1. Type of Bombing (Visual, PFF or Combined)?  Visual
2. Did Squadron perform own sighting operation, bomb on smoke marker, or was bombing done in Group Formation? Squadron performed own sighting operation.
3. Was turn made at briefed I.P.? 4 mi. south of briefed I.P.
4. Cloud coverage and visibility. Good
5. If Visual, when was MPI identified? If not actually seen, how was it located? Identified at a point 10 miles from target
6. Any Interference on Bomb Run? None
7. Did C-1 [Autopilot] function satisfactory? A slight wallow
8. Any other factors affecting accuracy? Air was rough

I certify that this 12E form is complete and correct.
Warren C. Steitz, Captain, Air Corps, Group Bombardier.
Lead Squadron, 94th CBW "A" Group
Bombardier - Capt. Schadegg, John J.
Pilot - Maj. Korges, M.L. & Capt. Pryor, C.T.
Navigator - 1st Lt. Gootee, Norman L.

Aircraft B-17G   P-867  Take-off - 0945 Landed - 1525
Objective - M/Y at Recklinghausen, Germany
Aiming Point (MPI) [Mean Point of Impact] - As Briefed
Initial Point - 4 miles south of briefed.
Method of Attack - Squadron
No. of Attacking A/C in Group: - 12   Composite Group - ____
Number A/C Dropping Bombs by own Sighting Operation: ____
Deflection and Range Sighting, Group: One    Composite Group - ____
Range Sighting only, Group - __   Composite Group - ____
Bombs, Types and Sizes - 12 x 500 Lb. AN-M43, G.P.[General Purpose]
Number of Bombs Loaded - As Above   Released - Same
Fusing, Nose - 1/10   Tail - 1/100
Synchronization - On

Information at Release Point:  

Type of Release - Salvo
Point of Impact If Seen - Good
Mean Temp. Metro -15 Actual -14
Winds - Altitude - 25,000 Ft.  Direction - Metro 250°  Actual 145°  Velocity - Metro 15  Actual 18K
Temp C. - Metro -37° C. Actual -34° C.

1. The lead and low squadrons of this Group attacked as the priority No. 1 target the M/Y [RR Marshalling Yard] and railway workshops at Recklinghausen, Germany. The high squadron attacked the M/Y at Westerholt (near Buer), which is seven miles due west of Recklinghausen.
2. The pattern of the lead squadron fell into the target area with the heaviest concentration slightly right of the M/Y. There are at least eight hits on the M/Y near its eastern entrance and at least ten hits in the sidings leading to the repair shed. The repair shed has one direct hit. There will be damage to the M/Y, rolling stock, and repair facilities. The pattern is 2,568 feet by 2,782 feet with the center 642 feet right of the MPI [Mean Point of Impact]. There will be 55% of the bombs within 1,000 feet and 98% within 2,000 feet of the briefed MPI.
3. The pattern of the low squadron is very loose and scattered, with bombs continuing to fall for several miles. The main concentration fell into the repair facilities and sidings with some hits on the M/Y. There are five hits on the main repair shop and at least thirteen hits on the M/Y and sidings. An explosion is seen coming from a long train in the yards. The main pattern is 1,763 feet by 1,700 feet, with the center 1,645 feet short of the MPI. There will be 15% of the bombs within 1,000 feet and 82% within 2,000 feet of the assigned MPI.
4. The bombs of the high squadron fell across the M/Y at Westerholt. The yard is full of rolling stock and damage will be heavy. There are some hits in an industrial site adjacent to the yards, and an explosion and fire are seen in a large building, the pattern is 2,600 feet by 2,340 feet.

1. No leaflets were carried by this Group.
2. Bombing on today’s mission was done by individual squadrons. This Group was the 94th “A” Combat Wing and the lead and low squadrons bombed the M/Y [R.R. Marshalling Yard] at Recklinghausen, Germany, while the high squadron bombed the M/Y at Westerholt, Germany. Photos show the target at Recklinghausen to be well hit. The bombs of both the lead and low squadrons fell on and around the M/Y and there will be damage to the yards and rolling stock. There are at least five hits on the large repair shed. The bombs of the high squadron fell across the M/Y at Westerholt (near Buer) and there will be some damage. There is possible damage to an unidentified industrial site adjacent to the M/Y. See paragraph 7 below.
3. No E/A [Enemy Aircraft] were encountered and no claims [of enemy aircraft being shot down] are being submitted.
4. Meager to moderate, accurate flak was encountered on the bomb run from the Rhine River to the target. Flak was moderate and accurate at the target.
5. Weather was CAVU [Ceiling And Visibility Unlimited] during the entire mission, but there was a small amount of ground haze in the general target area.
6. There were no observations of military importance.
7. PFF equipment worked efficiently, but was used only for navigational aid. The GH equipment of the lead aircraft was inoperative, that in the lead aircraft of the low and high squadrons was in operation. Bombing by the lead squadron was done visually, bombing by the low squadron was done with the initial aid of GH equipment, and bombing by the high squadron was done by GH equipment with a visual assist. A target error of the GH operator in the high squadron resulted in the bombing of Westerholt. Fighter support was thin but adequate. Scouting Force was contacted by the Air Commander and gave correct weather information. None of our A/C [Aircraft] is missing.
8. Assembly was SOP [Standard Operating Procedure], but this Group was eight minutes late at control point #1, when it was forced to fall behind another combat wing and the 94th “C” Group which flew in ahead of this Group instead of behind as briefed. This Group was still late at control point #2 and the lead squadron turned on to the bomb run somewhat south of the IP [Initial Point of Bomb Run] and started a visual run when its GH equipment was found to be inoperative. The other two squadrons began GH runs, making good the IP. The low squadron had gyro trouble on the bomb run and was forced to make a 360 degree turn and make a second bomb run, and bombed the target visually. The high squadron made a GH run and bombed with a visual assist. This squadron bombed the M/Y at Westerholt due to the error of the GH operator. The return flight was as briefed, except that the squadrons had become separated on the bomb run and were not able to re-form in proper group formation before reaching the Zuider Zee area.

1. Abortives - None

1. Last Four numbers and Call Letter of A/C in each Squadron:

   a. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Lead Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: A–8428, B–8592, C–8640, G–8617, M–7964, O–8920, P–6907, R–6156, T–8666, V–8070, D–7193 Spare
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: D–8664 PFF, P–8867 GH & PFF

   
   

   b. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   Low Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: None
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: A–8465, B–6610, C–9020, G–7862, H–8280, L–7515, M–9001, N–7665, S–7512, T–9156, V–7705
   Sqdn 511th A/C: U–8374 GH & PFF)

   
   

   c. 94th Combat Wing "A" Group   High Squadron - 351st Group
   Sqdn 508th A/C: A–8410, B–7349, C–8753, H–8412, K–8130, L–7956 Spare, M–7900, O–8277, P–7258, Q–8799, U–8813, Y–6108
   Sqdn 509th A/C: None
   Sqdn 510th A/C: None
   Sqdn 511th A/C: F–8376 GH & PFF

2. Target: GH-363
   
3. W/T and R/T Operational Call Sign of each Squadron:

   Squadron	508 [Call Sign]	W/T FMX R/T CARLTON		Squadron	510 [Call Sign]	W/T SDK R/T TIPSTAFF
   Squadron	509 [Call Sign]	W/T WTB R/T HOTMINT		Squadron	511 [Call Sign]	W/T NOW R/T PARTNERSHIP

4. Taxi – 0930; Take-Off – 0945; E.T.D. Field – 1055
   

5. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (OUT)
   1158	15,000 Ft	Dungeness

6. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (IN)
   1206	16,500 Ft	50°53'N-01°35'E [Tardinghen, France]

7. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing Enemy Coast: (Out)
   1416	20,000 Ft	52°45'N-04°37'E [Leihoek, Netherlands]

8. Time:	Height:	Place of Crossing English Coast: (IN)
   1502	8,000 Ft	Cromer

9. E.T.R.(Estimated Time of Return) Base: 1532 Hours
10. MF/DF [Medium Frequency/Direction Finder] Section: "G"
11. Bomb load of Each A/C: "A" Lead Box
    Lead Squadron: 12 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    Low Squadron: 12 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    High Squadron: 12 x 500 G.P. - 1/10 x 1/40
    ___ Squadron:
    
12. Fuel Load of each A/C: ____ Gallons
    
13. Leaders:
    Lead Sqdn: Rank & Name: Major Korges A/C No & Sqdn. P-8867 GH (511)
    Low Sqdn: Rank & Name: Captain Maish A/C No & Sqdn. U-8374 GH (511)
    High Sqdn: Rank & Name: Lt. Turner A/C No & Sqdn. F-8376 GH (511)
14. Passengers, if any: (Full Name, Rank, A/C and Squadron Passenger flying with)
    None

Report Compiled By Maksimik, John, S/Sgt.